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Abstract
Appreciative Inquiry summits and organizational knowledge creation:
A social systems perspective

by
Emi Makino
Claremont Graduate University: 2013

The purpose of this exploratory study is to develop alternative models for analyzing the
systems dynamics of a large group conference format called appreciative inquiry (AI) summits. I
apply Luhmann’s social systems theory to the strategizing activities of AI summits to examine
how this particular format is capable of generating organizational knowledge. An AI summit is a
strategic planning conference in which hundreds of internal and external stakeholders
collectively design the future of the organization through structured activities. It applies the
principles of AI, a consulting method used in organizational development that attends to the
positive aspects of an organization as opposed to its problems. Critics challenge this
unconditional focus on the positive, questioning the validity of its methods and techniques.
Indeed, very few rigorous evaluations of AI methods including AI summits exist.
I propose a new approach for assessing the effectiveness of AI summits. I focus on
knowledge creation as the dependent variable. Previous studies have shown that successful AI
interventions generate new knowledge, not just transformational change. I conceptualize an AI
summit as a strategic episode that allows an organization to temporarily suspend its routines and
structures for strategic reflection.

According to social systems theory, organizations are autopoietic (self-reproducing)
systems that maintain their identity through an ongoing production of decision communications.
An AI summit consists of three different types of systems that co-evolve and are structurally
coupled: an organization system, interaction system and the individual participants’
psychological systems. I propose a typology for analyzing episodes during an AI summit as a
starting point for determining the structural dynamics inherent in an AI summit system.
Using illustrative examples from a case study, I identify five structural features of an AI
summit that facilitate organizational knowledge creation, including reduced communication
barriers and the production of decisions during the conference. The study contributes to the
existing literature by identifying the important but understudied role of self-organizing project
teams in the knowledge creation process at an AI summit. Limitations and implications are
discussed.
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study
“Essentially, and perhaps arguably, there has been no innovation in the social technology
of organization development (OD) since appreciative inquiry originated in 1987” (Burke, 2011, p.
143). Appreciative inquiry—commonly referred to by its acronym AI—is a popular method used
by OD consultants to drive strategic change. For over 25 years, organizations around the world
have been using AI to promote change, growth and innovation. There is no shortage of cases
documenting successful interventions at companies and institutions ranging from GTE (now
Verizon), British Airways North America, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, BBC, to the United
States Navy, World Vision, the United Nations, and the City of Cleveland (Bunker & Alban,
2006; Cooperrider, Whitney, & Stavros, 2008). Most recently, Walmart, the world’s largest
retailer, has been experimenting with AI to develop and execute a business case based on
sustainability (Cooperrider, 2012). Yet for all its popularity, the validity of AI’s methods remains
open to question.
The AI approach emphasizes positivity, inclusiveness, and social construction—
essentially, the notion that words creates worlds (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 2008). In a sense, it
represents an antithesis to traditional strategic management consulting practices. Strategists pride
themselves on their ability to analyze a company’s competitive environment and business trends
to arrive at “seemingly hard truths based on models” (Wooldridge, 2010). Such models are
mostly grounded in microeconomics (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000). Management
decides on a strategy based on these “hard truths” which is then rolled out to the rest of the
organization for execution. This approach to strategy development can be characterized as “big
think in the boardroom” (Wooldridge, 2010). Consulting companies market themselves as
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delivering solutions, underscoring a world view that perceives organizations as problems to be
solved.
AI takes a fundamentally different approach. It seeks innovation, not solutions. AI was
founded on the assumption that organizational life is constructed through the social interactions
of the people who constitute the organization, both inside and out (Cooperrider & Srivastva,
2008), in other words, a social constructionist view of the world (Gergen, 2009). Corporate
strategy is usually developed by an elite group of people, often consisting exclusively of top
management and the board (Andrews, 1980). Sometimes, strategy consultants from the likes of
McKinsey and The Boston Consulting Group are brought in. In contrast, AI is a democratic and
participative approach to developing and executing strategy in which the AI process, not the
consultant, takes center stage. AI differs from conventional strategizing practices in other ways
as well. One of its core principles is positivity. The AI method directs an organization to
exclusively study areas of strengths and opportunities. Root causes of success, not failures, are
analyzed. This singular emphasis on the positive has been both a source of inspiration and
contention. Traditional strategy development depends on historical data analysis, both
quantitative and qualitative. AI is future-oriented. A guiding, positive image of the future is
deemed a more powerful vehicle for driving an organization’s success than a strategic plan
developed by the “lords of strategy” as Kiechel (2010) called strategy consultants in his book
chronicling the management consulting industry.
As Burke (2011) noted in his critique of OD practice, the AI method is indeed creative. It
also suffers from a credibility issue. Critics point to an “amazing lack of rigorous assessment of
AI methodology or techniques” (Messerschmidt, 2008). Hundreds of articles have been written
about AI globally, but very few have made it through the peer-reviewed process and rigor of
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academic publishing. A review of the current literature suggests that AI has eluded evaluation
partly because it has been framed as an OD intervention. OD deals mostly with organizational
change. AI in particular is often described as an intervention for transformational change. One of
the few studies evaluating the effectiveness of AI interventions across different organizations
(Bushe & Kassam, 2005), for example, examines the degree to which transformational change
occurred as the key success factor. But a more recent evaluation study by Bushe pointed to a
dilemma. One of the sites that did not undergo transformational change would not have benefited
much from such change because it already had a high-performing culture. In a more general
sense, causally linking change to firm outcomes such as financial performance can be
problematic. This is especially true for a typical AI intervention, which engages hundreds of
stakeholders across the entire organization in many different types of activities over a prolonged
period of time. With so many moving parts—the changing external environment
notwithstanding—trying to build a working model of AI that reliably predicts firm outcomes can
be a difficult exercise. Some organizations have claimed millions of dollars in benefits from
adopting AI and its methods. For example, plants at John Deere achieved three million dollars in
immediate cost savings and “millions more in new market share” as a direct result from an AI
summit (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, & Griffin, 2003, p. xii). But one could also make the case that
these companies were able to execute the ideas generated through AI because they had good
management and leadership practices in place to begin with. Failed interventions rarely make it
into case studies, suggesting the existence of a selection bias.
For AI to endure as a valid and effective management technique, we need a better
understanding of how and why AI functions as it does. I therefore propose a different lens with
which to examine AI and its methods. In the literature review on AI (Chapter 2), I conclude that
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there are two aspects of AI that have been relatively underexplored: its capacity to create new
organizational knowledge, and its function as a strategizing practice. AI does not seek a solution
to a pre-existing or emerging problem; it seeks innovation. The creation of new knowledge is an
aspect of innovation. Scholars have only just begun to recognize the knowledge-creating
capacity of AI (Richer, Ritchie, & Marchionni, 2009). While knowledge is also a slippery
outcome to observe and measure, it is recognized as a source of sustained competitive advantage
(Dierkes, Berthoin Antal, Child, & Nonaka, 2001; Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003b). Empirical
studies in strategic management link knowledge to competitive advantage (e.g. Bierly &
Chakrabarti, 1996; Narver, Slater, & MacLachlan, 2004; R. Sabherwal & Sabherwal, 2005;
Zander & Kogut, 1995). If AI functions as method for creating organizational knowledge, then
companies engaged in the practice may be building a dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano, &
Shuen, 1997) or core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) for generating innovation, thereby
endowing them with a sustained competitive advantage that is hard for others to imitate.
The heightened interest in the study of organizational knowledge reflects a larger societal trend
that Toffler (1981) called the third wave, the movement from an industrial society to the
information society. Such a shift occurs in Western history only once every few hundred years
(Drucker, 1993c). “The basic economic resource…is no longer capital, nor natural
resources…nor ‘labor’. It is and will be knowledge” (emphasis in original, p.8). Knowledge as an
economic resource poses many difficulties for traditional economic analysis and strategy
development. In the industrial age, strategists relied heavily on the tools of microeconomics to
aid decision-making in an organization. For example, Porter’s (1996) five forces model, one of
the most famous conceptual frameworks for developing corporate strategy, used microeconomic
principles to analyze a company’s competitive position in its industry. “An advantage of
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economics, and one reason for its widespread use for analyzing individual and institutional
decision making, is that it requires the analyst to be explicit about the key elements of the
process under consideration” (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000, p.2). But knowledge cannot
always be made explicit (Polanyi, 2009) let alone be quantified. As Drucker (1993c) noted,
“there is no economic theory unless there is a model that expresses economic events in
quantitative relationships. Without it there is no way to make a rational choice—and rational
choices are what economics is all about” (p.185). Wooldridge, an economic journalist and
commentator, wryly pointed out in a book review for the Wall Street Journal:
Today the status of strategic thinking in the business world is somewhat confused…. The
lords of strategy are now given to happy talk about “people”—on the grounds that people
are the key to innovation and innovation is the key to long-term success. (2010, March
12)
It is not surprising that a new research program has emerged in strategic management that
is shifting the focus of study to strategizing activities and practice (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, &
Vaara, 2010). Recent studies in this emerging area have great relevance for AI. Originally known
in the literature as “strategy as practice” or SAP, this research program seeks to understand the
doing of strategy as opposed to developing frameworks for formulating the right strategy
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Johnson & Melin, 2003). The latter is a description of traditional
strategy research. It focused on the what of strategy and assumed that strategy is something that
organizations have as opposed to something people do (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara,
2010, p.7). Individuals were relegated to data points that are statistically correlated to
quantifiable variables, resulting in a “curious absence of human actors” (Jarzabkowski & Spee,
2009, p. 70). I suspect that the traditional approach to studying strategy is no longer sustainable
because the key economic variable, namely knowledge, defies easy quantification.
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In the introduction to the Cambridge Handbook on Strategy as Practice, Golsorskhi et al.
(2010) made some interesting observations that echo some of the fundamental assumptions upon
which the AI approach is grounded:
First, the world of strategy is no longer taken to be something stable that can be observed,
but constitutes a reality in flux. Second, strategy is no longer regarded as “located” on the
organizational level; instead, it is spread across many levels from the level of individual
actions to the institutional level. Third, the world of strategy constitutes a genuinely
social reality created and recreated in the interactions between various actors inside and
outside the organization. (p.7)
In this study, I turn away from the conventional view of AI as a change intervention, and
situate AI as first and foremost a strategizing practice. An intervention implies that an outsider,
usually a consultant with expert knowledge, steps in to intervene in order to cause some desirable
outcome. Looking back to the origins of AI, however, Cooperrider (1986) and his colleagues
initially developed the approach as a research method for building grounded theory (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967). The whole point of AI was to provide an organization a way to inquire into its
life-giving properties. After all, AI stands for appreciative inquiry. So much of the fanfare (and
criticism) surrounding AI has been directed to its unconditional focus on positivity (Bushe, 2012)
that the aspect of inquiry tends to be overlooked.
I posit that AI is a participative mode of strategizing that can accelerate the creation of
organizational knowledge. The knowledge generated by AI endows an organization with a
competitive advantage in a knowledge-based economy. Corporations are increasingly tapping
collective strategizing methods like the AI summit format to propel growth and boost
profitability. The purpose of this study therefore is to explore the effectiveness of AI compared
to other forms of strategizing in the context of organizational knowledge creation. Adopting a
systems perspective, the general research question I pose is: how and why AI as a whole,
accelerates organizational knowledge creation? I adopt a systems perspective for two reasons:

6

the complexity of AI summits, and its emphasis on working with whole systems. A systems
perspective assumes that the system as a whole may be different from its parts. This should not
be confused with the popular cliché “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” which
assumes that the system becomes whole by adding up all its parts. Systems are not that simple. A
system is characterized as a system when there is “order in the gross with freedom in the small”
(Weiss 1971, p. v in Weiss, 1978, p. 18). The hierarchical order and group interdependencies of
subsystems reduce the range of varied behavior capable by its individual components.
To limit the scope of the research, I narrow the phenomena of interest to a specific format
in the AI toolbox called the AI summit. It applies the principles of AI to a large group method
(Bunker & Alban, 2006) of strategizing. The AI summit method has become the format of choice
among many practitioners of AI. For example, in September 2012, Walmart conducted a major
conference using the AI summit method. It invited hundreds of suppliers to flesh out a
sustainability index to which Walmart’s supply chain would be held accountable (Personal
communication, Cooperrider, 2012). The name summit is somewhat of a misnomer. Global
summits such as the G8 are conferences where heads of states and ministers negotiate issues of
contention. An AI summit is essentially the equivalent of an offsite strategy workshop, with two
notable exceptions. Participation is not limited to the top management team, and the strategizing
activities selectively focus on positive experiences and topics. Hundreds of people from every
level of the organization are assembled in one room over multiple days to engage in structured,
strategizing activities. Positive, democratic conversations are the order of the day. AI summits
can be a powerful tool for developing strategy because internal stakeholders from all levels of
the organization strategize in collaboration with external stakeholders such as customers and
suppliers. This is achieved by structuring activities in many different group configurations in
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terms of size and diversity. I review the literature on AI summits and large group methods in
Chapter 3. The methodology used for this study is provided in Chapter 4.
In the current analysis, I complement existing theories of AI and large group methods by
viewing AI summits through an alternative theoretical lens: Luhmann’s social systems theory.
Luhmann’s social systems theory is a good starting point for several reasons. First, social system
theory is highly consistent with the social constructionist heritage common to both AI and large
group methods. In fact, Luhmann has been labeled as being part of the “radical constructivism”
movement (Luhmann, 1995), as his theories are based on a radical systems view of biology
called autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980). In Luhmann’s formulation of the world, social
systems are comprised of communications, not people. People fall into a separate category of
systems—cognitive systems—and can only interact with social systems; they can never be a
component of one. Organizations are a special type of social system that reproduces itself based
on an ongoing production of decision communications. Luhmann’s lens allows for a decoupling
of the effects of positive psychology from the dynamics inherent in organizations and interaction
systems, because social systems cannot think or feel—only people can.
Luhmann’s social systems theory fits well also because it is based on a relatively new
approach to thinking about systems called autopoiesis. The theory of autopoiesis was developed
by the Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela (1980) in the 1970s. It has since had a
tremendous impact on systems thinking, affecting the work of Senge (2006) among others.
Winograd (1987) applied autopoiesis to computer systems design. Under his guidance, his
students, Page and Brin invented a highly effective database retrieval system that now dominates
search on the Internet—Google.
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I provide an overview of autopoietic theory in Chapter 5. Autopoiesis means selfreproduction (Maturana & Varela, 1980). An autopoietic system reproduces itself and its
components, using only its components. A social system cannot be autopoietic if it is comprised
of people, because society cannot produce people. An autopoietic system is simultaneously a
closed and open system. Its operations are completely closed from the environment, but it is
open to its environment through interactions. A key insight of this so-called new systems theory
is that an autopoietic system can refer only to itself. It is self-referential. It operates according to
its internal structures and logic. This means that the environment can never directly affect a
system. An external event in the environment is a trigger that perturbs the system. The system is
not immune to the environment, because it is interactionally open. External events can trigger a
perturbation so great that the system disintegrates. It is in this respect that autopoietic theory is
different from open systems theory, which relies on a logic based on inputs and outputs between
system and environment. Luhmann (1995) wrote: “The distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open
systems’ is replaced by questions of how self-referential closure can create openness” (p. 9). A
theory of cognition and knowledge based on autopoiesis, leads to the conclusion that there is no
pre-given world from which we select and process information to make ever more accurate
representations of the world. Rather, “we have only the world that we bring forth with others”
(Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 248).
Luhmann (1995) looked at the mechanism of autopoiesis, and concluded that autopoiesis
can be used to describe social systems, not just living and cognitive systems. He recognized
autopoiesis as a major paradigm shift in systems theory. Maturana and Varela (1987) were
hesitant in applying autopoiesis to social systems. Some have deemed that Luhmann’s
application to sociology is inappropriate (e.g. Mingers, 1995). That said, his theory has had great
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utility in highlighting the communication issues inherent in law (Luhmann, 1988), the mass
media (Luhmann, 2000b), art (Luhmann, 2000a), and sustainability (Luhmann, 1986). I
introduce the key concepts of social systems theory relevant to this study in Chapter 6. In
particular, I look at the implications of Luhmann’s conceptualization of organizations as social
systems that reproduce themselves based on their ongoing production of decision
communications. This radical view of organizing forces one to seriously consider the role of the
observer—the researcher—in the study of organizations. Although Luhmann’s theory is
notoriously complex, it has the benefit of developing models that disambiguate social dynamics
from psychological and cognitive effects. Luhmann’s lens allows one to scrutinize the structural
couplings between various systems to sort out phenomena occurring at different units of analysis.
I look at recent studies that apply Luhmann’s theory to management to develop a new
conceptual model of AI summits. A leading scholar in the emerging strategizing activities and
practice research program, Seidl (2005b), has drawn on Luhmann to develop new ways of
thinking about organizational identity, management consulting (Mohe & Seidl, 2011), strategy
workshops (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008) and organizational knowledge (Seidl, 2007). These
studies serve as a foundation in building alternative ways of viewing AI summits through a
social systems lens. This line of theorizing defines knowledge as structures that determine how a
system deals with information (Seidl, 2007). The premises a company uses for its decision
making, for example, qualify as organizational knowledge because they specify what matters to
the organization—“the difference that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1979) and determines the
meaning of that information (Seidl, 2007).
Guided by the work of Seidl and his colleagues, in Chapter 7, I begin modeling AI
summits through a social systems lens. First, I situate AI in the context of management
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consulting. This allows me to contrast AI with other forms of management consulting. Luhmann
(2005b) has written about the communication barriers inherent in management consulting. Mohe
and Seidl (2011) expanded upon Luhmann’s ideas in theorizing the client-consultant relationship
in consulting. I apply their methodology in my analysis of AI summits.
I conceptualize an AI summit as a strategic episode (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in which an
organization suspends its operational routines to reflect upon itself in a strategic context. I
develop a conceptual model of AI summits based on Luhmann’s theoretical concepts. The model
describes the components, and the structural coupling mechanisms of a generic workshop, a
large group method, and finally an AI summit. It begins to surface how an AI summit is
differentiated from other types of strategic workshops and large group methods. The model
shows that hundreds of individual psychological systems are structurally coupled to the
organization system through their positions within their company. These couplings form an
intimate type of structural coupling called interpenetration. Not only can systems co-evolve
through interpenetration, they can leverage the structural complexities of the other system to
facilitate their autopoiesis. Such extremely tight couplings between individual participants, the
organization and the summit’s interaction system create a social dynamic that enable the
production of organizational decisions during the strategic episode.
In contrast, strategy meetings at many organizations typically limit participation to a
handful of executives and at times, external consultants. Although their positions may be at the
apex of an organizational hierarchy, not all decisions can be produced during the strategy
meeting. Many, if not most decisions must be produced closer to the fringes of the
organization—at the level of managers and front-line employees, the people who implement the
chosen strategy. A social systems lens allows us to see that such decisions are produced in vivo
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so to speak, at a summit. This is possible because the communications barriers between the
consultant and the client company, as well as between executives and the rest of the company,
are significantly reduced.
In the next step, I focus on the characteristics of an AI summit as a strategic episode. An
AI summit is comprised of dozens of episodes that unfold in linear sequence over several days.
Each episode varies in the degree to which existing structures are suspended. This creates a
dynamic oscillation between strategic and routine contexts throughout the duration of the summit
conference. I develop a typology of episodes based on four dimensions: overall context, group
composition, activity and level of decoupling from the organizational system. I posit that this
constant oscillation between different contexts play a significant role in generating new
knowledge structures.
In Chapter 8, I expand the social systems theoretical lens to explore the dynamics
involved in the generation of organizational knowledge at an AI summit. I propose that the AI
summit method structurally couples its systems components, such that communication barriers
are reduced, and access to “nonknowledge” (Seidl, 2007) increases. The summit system creates,
modifies and reinforces organizational knowledge through the production of decisions. These
decisions are not only produced, but also can reconnect back to the organization’s operations
while the strategic episode is still ongoing. This accelerates knowledge creation while making
more robust, emerging but fragile decision premises that are produced at the summit. I identify
self-organizing project teams as one of the most important outcomes of an AI summit in the
context of organizational knowledge creation. I then introduce a case study to illustrate some of
the dynamics identified in this chapter and the previous chapter. A discussion and implications
for future research follows in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2 Appreciative Inquiry
Introduction
In this chapter, I review the literature on appreciative inquiry (AI). As the name implies,
AI was originally conceived as a method of inquiry (Cooperrider, 1986; Cooperrider & Srivastva,
2008). One of AI’s co-founders, Cooperrider (1990), emphasized that AI is first and foremost, a
joint process of knowing. AI seeks to discover new knowledge about an organization by
understanding what gives it life. Organizations are treated as though they are living systems.
Once the life-affirming properties of the organization are identified, they become the basis for
articulating possibilities for a better organizational future. Dialogue is the primary means by
which knowledge is generated and strategic plans are developed. New knowledge and new
images of possibility can disrupt and interrupt the status quo, but are nevertheless valued because
the process unfolds through shared experiences. AI’s methods aspire to include every person
who has a stake in the organization’s future, whether they are employees, executives or external
customers and suppliers. Knowledge is jointly created, and corresponds to the visions of human
and social possibility, which are jointly imagined (Cooperrider, 1990).
In the 25 years since the seminal paper on AI was published in 1987, AI and its
application in practice have evolved considerably, sometimes in ways the founders did not intend
or anticipate. AI’s emphasis on positivity, inclusiveness and holism has generated a large and
devoted practitioner following in the field of organization development (OD). AI has been hailed
by some as the most innovative social technology to emerge in OD in recent years. There has
been no shortage of case studies documenting success stories, often written by the very
consultants who designed and executed the intervention. In contrast, scholarly research on AI’s
methods has been limited. Despite the method’s popular appeal, few scholarly articles on AI
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have been published in the mainstream literature in business and management studies. This
implies that theories of AI have not developed as quickly or robustly as the practices of AI.
Therefore, as part of this review, I retrace AI’s history and examine in particular, its theoretical
heritage and foundations, some of which have been pushed into relative obscurity in the rush to
apply AI in practice.
Criticism of AI in the literature for the most part has been concentrated in one area:
positivity. From its very beginning, AI’s selective focus on the positive aspects of organizing has
been a source of considerable concern. Advances in positive psychology offer some remedy.
Others have proposed that generativity as a more useful concept than positivity. Scholars are also
paying more attention to the dark side of AI, linking it to concepts like the shadow organization.
Practitioners have also begun to reflect more carefully about why some interventions fail.
That said, the lack of rigorous evaluations of its methods continues to undermine the
validity of the approach and its techniques. I argue that one of the reasons AI has eluded
evaluation is the perception that AI is a change intervention. Change is often difficult to link to
firm performance, the generally accepted standard by which methods are tested. I propose
turning to a different outcome to measure AI’s effectiveness: the creation of organizational
knowledge. AI is first and foremost a strategizing practice. Its goal is innovation. Positioning AI
as a strategizing practice is consistent with existing theories of AI. However, the knowledge
creating aspect of AI has not been fully explored. Organizational knowledge is a known source
of competitive advantage in the post-industrial economy. Alternative theories and conceptual
models are necessary to understand how and why AI can generate knowledge in organizations.
Such frameworks can generate testable propositions upon which AI’s effectiveness can be
critiqued and evaluated.
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What is AI?
AI has been described simultaneously as a philosophy (Cooperrider et al., 2008), social
technology (Burke, 2011), constructive inquiry process (Cooperrider & Avital, 2004), and most
often as a change intervention (Bunker & Alban, 2006). A practitioner-oriented definition is
given in the leading handbook and textbook on AI (Cooperrider et al., 2008):
Appreciative Inquiry is the cooperative co-evolutionary search for the best in people,
their organizations, and the world around them. It involves the discovery of what gives
“life” to a living system when it is most effective, alive, and constructively capable in
economic, ecological and human terms. (p. 3)
The handbook lists 20 application areas in which AI has been used successfully including
“innovations leading toward the ideal organization,” strategic planning, leadership development,
work process redesign, culture change, diversity initiatives, evaluation, and new product
development (p. xxix).
The method originated at Case Western Reserve University in the 1980s. Cooperrider
was a doctoral student at the time, working with faculty and students on a consulting project for
the Cleveland Clinic, one the world’s largest medical centers. Cooperrider had been interviewing
physician leaders there. His advisor, Srivastva “was impressed by the excitement in his young
student” and “encouraged him to put the problems aside and focus on what gave life and vitality
to the organization” (Bushe, 2012, p. 8). The study led to an article theorizing conditions for
egalitarian ways of organizing (Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1986), which was published in Human
Relations. The AI model was mentioned as a footnote. Citing Cooperrider’s dissertation and a
chapter in press, it described AI in the following way:
[AI] is based on an assumption that organizing is a miracle to be understood rather than a
problem to be solved. It seeks to uncover the forces which give organizational life its
vitality and self-generative capacity. It seeks to contribute knowledge about
organizations-in-action which is: (1) appreciative,(2) applicable, (3) provocative, and (4)
collaborative. (p. 686)
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The initial reception to Cooperrider’s idea of focusing on the positive was apparently quite cool.
During a presentation Cooperrider gave 1984 at the Academy of Management, “he was laughed
at” (Bushe, 2012, p. 9) when he suggested organizations should be appreciated as mysteries.
When he gave his first presentation on AI to practitioners at the OD Network conference in San
Francisco, 1985, he was met with similar skepticism. Bushe, who subsequently became a leading
scholar in AI, attended the conference. It was his first exposure to AI.
I remember how the majority of those in attendance were incredulous at the suggestion
that they should stop focusing on problems. It seemed too one sided. Many thought the
argument that diagnosis should be abandoned, as it simply recreated the mental models of
those doing the diagnosis, was fanciful at best. (Bushe, 2012, p. 9)
AI would have to wait over a decade for the emergence of a similar turn in psychology that
became the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).
Nevertheless, AI resonated with many. AI represented a genuine breakthrough in OD
(Bunker, Alban, & Lewicki, 2004), a sub-field of management consulting that evolved out of
social psychology. Burke (2011) described it as an innovative social technology. AI’s popularity
grew exponentially in the 90s among consultants and practitioners involved in strategic planning
and organizational change efforts. Applications of AI spread rapidly in part due to the
publication of high profile success stories (Bunker, 2004). Forbes ran a feature story on
Roadway Express which had conducted an AI conference in which teamsters and managers
wrote business plans together. By the early 21st century, its status had risen to “the current hot
intervention” (Bunker et al., 2004) in organization development. Even McKinsey has been
sending their consultants to AI training sessions (Personal communication, 2009). AI also
extended beyond OD into areas such as community development (Messerschmidt, 2008), nursing
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and social work (eg. Richer, Ritchie, & Marchionni, 2009), IT (Gonzales & Leroy, 2011), and
education (Bushe, 2010; Conklin, 2009).
Methods of AI
Whitney and Trosten-Bloom (2003) have identified at least eight different methods of AI.
Common to them all is a process known as the 4D model (Cooperrider et al., 2008). An
intervention cycles through the four phases of Discover, Dream, Design, and Destiny
(alternatively Deploy or Deliver). In the first D, stakeholders discover the organization’s positive
core, what makes it tick. This is usually done by sharing stories and conducting interviews about
the high point moments of organizational life. The second D encourages stakeholders to dream
and construct images of its preferred future. Facilitators push participants to dwell on “what
might be” rather than “what is.” This is a major aspect of AI that differentiates it from other
strategizing approaches. It is also why AI tends to be associated with change interventions than
strategizing. In the context of strategy development, AI’s future- oriented framework is a
significant break from convention. Traditional strategy development is grounded in analysis of
data collected from its past. Historical data analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, is crucial
for understanding the organization’s competitive advantages in order to develop strategy. A
guiding, positive image of the future is a deemed a powerful vehicle for driving positive actions
in an organization (Cooperrider, 1990). The images of the future become the equivalent of a
strategic focus or vision of the organization (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005).
The second half of the 4D cycle represents the planning side of strategizing. In the third
D, stakeholders begin to design the elements necessary to realize the images of the future they
created in the dream phase. What the participants design depends on the topic and purpose of the
inquiry. “Good news-stories are used to craft provocative propositions that bridge the best of
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‘what gives life’ with a collective aspiration of ‘what might be’” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p.
162). Provocative propositions are also called design statements and possibility statements,
depending on the organization. They can be called the equivalent of a corporate vision statement.
More recently, AI practitioners have been incorporating the industrial design company, IDEO’s
(T. Brown, 2009) product design approaches. Instead of design statements, participants are
involved in a brainstorming activity followed by a rapid prototyping exercise (Cooperrider et al.,
2008). At Fairmount Minerals, participants of a 3-day AI summit made a cardboard mock-up of
a new sand filter that purified water. They presented it “with a skit demonstrating its use in a part
of the world where many children suffer from lack of clean water” (p. 173). Rapid prototyping is
far more effective than “a five-page report” because “they persuade and they help move the ball
forward for real-life experimentation” (p. 173).
The final D is called Destiny but is also known as Deploy or Deliver. In some AI formats,
participants develop specific plans for executing the visions and prototypes developed in the
previous three phases. This includes two aspects: 1) “aligning the actual organization with the
provocative propositions created in the Design phase” and 2) “building AI learning competencies
into the culture” (p. 200). The focus is on generating action. Cooperrider and the co-authors of
the AI Handbook for Leaders of Change have insisted that the ultimate goal of the Destiny
process “is to create highly improvisational organizations” (p. 205). Following Barrett (1998)
these are organizations that are “affirmative, expansive, generative, and collaborative” (p.205).
These competence areas are expanded by an ongoing application of the skills used during the 4D
process.
Practitioners have noted that the 4D model overlooks an important step: defining the
topic of inquiry. According to Bushe (2012), the Clergy Leadership Institute in the U.S.
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advocates a 5D model, the first step being Define. In the 4D model, the affirmative topic choice
is at the core and centers the entire intervention (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005). A successful
intervention will cycle through all four or five phases. If we step back for a bit, and situate AI not
as an intervention but as a strategizing activity, the 4D process resembles a qualitative approach
to strategy development. Data is collected, coded and analyzed for patterns and themes during
Discover. In the Dream and Design phase, hypotheses are generated from the data in the form of
vision statements and prototypes. They are then tested against reality once again in the Destiny
phase when participants begin to develop executable plans and deploy them.
The specific activities and levels of participation vary depending on the actual method
deployed (Whitney & Trosten-Bloom, 2003). The form of engagement ranges from involving a
small, core group of people to conduct the activities, all the way to involving all stakeholders
from the entire organizational system, often including external stakeholders. The scope of the
intervention can be limited to a specific project, as in an “AI learning team” method. GTE
adopted a “positive change network” in which the company trained hundreds of its employees in
AI to share resources and best practices. In a “mass mobilized inquiry” thousands of interviews
are conducted across communities and organizations. One of the most popular methods in the
corporate sector is the AI summit (Ludema et al., 2003), which is a conference involving large
groups of stakeholders who go through the entire 4D cycle in two to four days. A “whole system
4D dialogue” was conducted at Nutrimental in Brazil, which temporally shut down its operations
to enable literally all its employees to participate in an AI summit (Barros & Cooperrider, 2000).
Theoretical background
The theoretical framework used to justify AI has changed over the years from the one
originally proposed by Srivastva and Cooperrider in the footnotes of their 1986 article. It is
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useful to trace AI’s theoretical roots, as some of its history has been lost in translation, so to say,
as the practice of AI took off and evolved. Two of the most important influences on AI theory
have been the work of Lewin (1946) and Gergen (1978). Lewin is considered by some, the
founding father of OD. He pioneered research in group dynamics (1947a, 1947b). He also
developed the concept of action research. Lewin (1946) envisioned research as being inseparable
from action. The scientist (or consultant) is not a detached observer but part of the action.
Diagnosis is necessary yet insufficient to help the practitioner. Furthermore, Lewin emphasized:
“Socially, it does not suffice that university organizations produce new scientific insight. It will
be necessary to install fact- finding procedures, social eyes and ears, right into social action
bodies” (Lewin, 1946, p. 38). Lewin was neither denying the role of logical positivist modes of
research nor underplaying the importance of theory. Rather, he called for research methods that
incorporated both action and theory.
Cooperrider and his colleagues at Case Western Reserve University conceived of AI as
an action research method that would enhance an organization’s capacity for social innovation
(Cooperrider, 1986; Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1986). Cooperrider contended that action research
had diverged from Lewin’s ideal, and as a result, had become pre-occupied with action and
problem solving. AI’s original agenda was to bring creative theorizing back into the picture.
According to Cooperrider, the inability to “dream” constrained organizations from reaching their
full potential to innovate. He cited Kierkegaard in his dissertation: “If I were to wish for
anything, I should not wish for wealth and power, but for the passionate sense of the potential”
(Cooperrider, 1986, p. 1). Cooperrider and Srivastva wrote in their 1987 article “Appreciative
Inquiry in organizational life” that they were attempting a “conceptual re[con]figuration of action
research”(Cooperrider & Srivastva, 2008, p. 353) based on a social constructionist view of
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science. They claimed that “good theory may be one of the best means human beings have for
affecting change in the postindustrial world” (p. 353). What they were proposing was a method
for generating such theories.
Cooperrider was drawn to the work of Gergen (1978) who championed social
constructionist thought in psychology. In social constructionism, the world is constructed
according to how we approach the world. How we approach the world “depends on the social
relationships of which we are a part” (Gergen, 2009, p. 2). Therefore, “the realities we live in are
outcomes of the conversations in which we are engaged” (p. 4). In 1978, Gergen wrote an
influential article titled “Toward generative theory” in the prestigious psychology journal,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. He rejected the logical-positivist assumptions that
dominated at the time, writing:
Much contemporary theory appears to lack generative potency, that is, the capacity to
challenge prevailing assumptions regarding the nature of social life to offer fresh
alternatives to contemporary patterns of conduct. (Gergen, 1978, p. 1344)
Gergen urged for a “sociorationalist” perspective which “places the locus of knowledge not in
the minds of single individuals, but in the collectivity” (Gergen, 1982, p. 207). Knowledge and
rationality is generated through “a social process of communication” instead of in the minds of
individuals. This notion of sociorationalism lies at the heart of AI.
In 1990, Cooperrider wrote a chapter on the impact of positive images on actions in a
book he co-edited on appreciative management. He reviewed the literature in neuroscience and
psychology to build a case that positive images lead to positive action in organizations.
Synthesizing this material with his earlier work, Cooperider and his colleagues formulated a new
set of five principles which represent “the most widely accepted” (Bushe, 2011) theoretical
framework of AI: constructionist, simultaneity, poetic, anticipatory and positivity (Cooperrider et
al., 2008).
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Constructionist reflects AI’s social constructionist roots inspired by Gergen. Simultaneity
refers to the dynamic feedback loop of inquiry and change. It is analogous to the “circulatory
response” (Follett, 1924) and the double interact (Weick, 1979) in which stimulus and response
can simultaneously be a cause and an effect, a cornerstone of systems thinking (Senge, 2006). It
also builds from the famous studies by Rosenthal and his colleagues in which the expectations of
the experimenter can be transmitted to participants of an experiment (Rosenthal, 1966), drawing
the conclusion that inquiry is in and of itself an intervention.
The poetic principle assumes that an organization’s inner talk or narrative has a profound
effect on organizational outcomes. This is consistent with Weick’s views on historicizing (Weick,
1979), Boje’s storytelling organizations (Boje, 2008) and the power of metaphors (Lakoff &
Johnson, 2003; Morgan, 1997). The anticipatory principle takes the view that the image of the
future guides current behavior. Weick’s theory of future perfect thinking, which will be
described in detail in the next chapter, supports this notion. Finally, the principle of positivity
“grows out of years of experience with AI” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 9) based on the claim
that change requires energy and momentum which can be created through positive affect.
Bushe (2011) has claimed there are ten theoretical levers he identified in the literature
that explain the underlying change mechanisms of AI. His critique includes theories of discourse
and narrative (Barrett, Thomas, & Hocevar, 1995), stakeholder engagement (Gergen &
Thatchenkery, 1996), and self-organizing processes (Jantsch, 1980). Bushe singled out the theory
of “inquiry as intervention” as the most important contribution AI has made to theories of
organizational change. According to Bushe, Cooperrider and his colleagues theorize “that
organizational inquiry is simultaneously the production of self-and-world. What researchers
choose to study and how they study it creates as much as it discovers the world” (Bushe, 2011).
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AI criticism
Positivity.
The claim that has been the greatest allure and has drawn the greatest criticism toward AI
is the principle of positivity. Critics of AI worry that an unconditional focus on the positive may
do more harm than good. One major concern is the possibility that AI dodges conflict and
important structural problems under the rug. Pagés (1990), a psychoanalyst and researcher from
Europe, shared his reservations and discomfort towards a focus on the positive dimensions of
organizational life in a book edited by Srivastva and Cooperrider in 1990.
I fear it may be used to create solutions so distinct from reality that one could view it as a
defense mechanism rather than a visioning process grounded in reality. Such a coping
mechanism may overlay profound conflict; it may prove ephemeral and damaging in the
long run. (Pagés, 1990, p. 354)
In a critical review of AI interventions in health care published in 2011, some participants
who were interviewed by the reviewers echoed these concerns. One project developer was
quoted as saying: “Some people may look at AI as yet another concept that will be a ‘band aid’
to the symptoms that really block our change” (Dematteo & Reeves, 2011, p. 206). The authors
of the review noted that a lack of critical analysis can undermine examinations of existing
structural tensions in the workplace—interprofessional tensions between nurses and doctors, for
example. As a result, AI “may have also helped to legitimate existing unequal power relations”
(Dematteo & Reeves, 2011, p. 206), despite the appearance of a democratic change process, and
restoration of hope and meaning towards the future among the participants. Although the
participants clearly desired more interprofessional collaboration, Dematteo and Reeves
concluded that in the absence of critical analyses of structural issues, AI will be limited in its
effectiveness in securing lasting change in health care. Aldred (2009) criticized AI’s use in
community development for similar reasons, especially in situations in which “institutional
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legitimacy and trust are low” (p. 66). She questioned whether participants in an AI intervention
were really in control of their destiny as opposed to a temporary feeling of control arouse
through provision of “a bounded space for flouting convention” (p. 66).
Reflective practitioners have noted that in some situations, facilitators may have
inadvertently stifled opportunities for liberal discourse by steering a group away from talking
about the negative issues and constraints of the larger system. Grant and Humphries (2006)
critiqued four case studies from their own AI practice involving school boards, and noted that in
one instance, the researcher-facilitator’s positive bias “could have exacerbated participant
perceptions of the relative power imbalance within the research group and the de-valuing of local
knowledge within the action research process” (p. 413). Grant and Humphries raised the
possibility that deflecting attention from negativity may have led to a diminished sense of trust
within the group, resulting in members being less open and granting less disclosure in the inquiry.
None of the four cases were able to complete the full 4D cycle of AI.
A comparative study by Bushe (2010) of AI interventions within the same organization
provides a partial response to the issues raised above. Bushe examined interventions at eight sites
belonging to a large, urban school district. AI summits were an integral part of the intervention
methodology in all eight sites. Half the sites achieved transformational change where changes
could be attributed to the AI process, and where the normative routines of teachers at the site
clearly differed after the process. Change was incremental at two sites where the observed
changes were consistent with change efforts prior to the AI process and were not changes to
normative routines. Two sites were classified as having no change (Bushe, 2010).
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What is noteworthy in his study was “that the inquiry needed to address some problem,
issue or concern that was widely shared for transformational change to occur” (Bushe, 2010, p.
22).
Sites where there were no identified “problems” that the AI was attempting to solve
either had no change or incremental change. When there were obvious, unresolved
conflicts in the system not addressed by the AI there was no change. It is probably
significant that the two sites with the highest levels of morale and pride prior to the AI
was it to that experienced only incremental changes…. Sites that experienced
transformational changes, however, were those where the AI was connected to real,
shared concerns within the schools and helped to ‘solve problems’ that were meaningful
to participants. (Bushe, 2010, p. 19)
Sites with no change were significantly worse at getting the right people to participate in the
process given the topic of inquiry. “AI does not magically overcome poor leadership,
communication failures, and unresolved conflicts” and requires normal OD processes necessary
for successful change (Bushe, 2010, p. 22). Bushe also found that levels of positive affect
generated by the inquiry did not predict levels of change.
This line of reasoning is similar to the objections to the positive psychology movement
raised by some psychologists. Depending on the context, negative emotions such as anger can be
generative and lead to positive change (Hunter, 2009). Bushe has argued that, “the generation of
new, compelling ideas was central to the change process” (Bushe, 2010, p. 21). Generativity, not
positivity, was core to the AI change process (Bushe, 2007). Elliott has pointed out that AI is an
“appreciative” approach, deliberately differentiated from a positive or affirmative approach
(Elliott, 1999). The positive lens is a way of compensating for “the tendency in our culture to
highlight deficiencies” (Elliott, 1999, p. 10) and ignore the positive and the pleasing. At the same
time, it is important for AI not to undervalue the “shadow” (Fitzgerald, Oliver, & Hoxsey, 2010).
Grant and Humphries cite an analogy by Rogers and Fraser who question an unconditional focus
on the positive as risking distortion similar to a lopsided plant reaching out to the sunlight
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(Rogers and Fraser, 2003, cited in Grant & Humphries, 2006). That said, Bushe raised the
possibility that positive affect may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful AI
interventions because all eight sites reviewed showed high levels of positive affect after the
completion of the AI summits (Bushe, 2010, p. 21).
Advances in positive and cognitive psychology suggest that the positive affect generated
during an AI intervention may have effects that influence their outcome. Research on the
benefits of positivity on individuals, groups and organizations has expanded significantly
(Donaldson & Ko, 2010). One of the foundational theories on positivity was posited by
Fredrickson who hypothesized that positive emotions play an evolutionary role in that they
broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoire of an individual, allowing them to
build resources for physical, intellectual and social resiliency (Fredrickson, 2001). Lab
experiments not only support this hypothesis (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; K. J. Johnson,
Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010) but also show that positive emotions can reduce own-race bias and
increase the likelihood of recognizing faces of a race other than our own (K. J. Johnson &
Fredrickson, 2005). In the organizational behavior literature, Losada and Heaphy (Losada &
Heaphy, 2004) used non-linear modeling to demonstrate that high performance teams in business
have a higher “positivity ratio” than their lower performing counterparts. The ratio was
calculated by dividing the number of positive comments by negative comments in meeting
settings. High performance teams showed an orientation towards others and inquiry as opposed
to self and advocacy. These findings lend support to the effectiveness of an approach that
stresses appreciation and inquiry. That said, it is not clear from the current literature how
individual level outcomes translate into organizational ones.
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The validity of AI methods.
Lewin (1946) noted that action must be evaluated by some criteria that determines the
relation between effort and achievement or else there is no way of judging whether “an action
has led forward or backward” (Lewin, 1946). One significant concern continues to weigh down
AI: a lack of evaluation of results and methods. There continues to be a dearth of literature
evaluating the effectiveness of AI. In 2008, Messerschmidt estimated that there were over 500
articles on AI in the international literature. Yet there was “an amazing lack of rigorous
assessment of AI methodology or techniques” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 455). Messerschmidt
observed, “many AI practitioners appear almost evangelical in their belief in the ‘positive
affirmation’ theory” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 455). The studies that Messerschmidt identified
were illustrations of “only tentative attempts at evaluating AI” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 463).
Relatively few articles on AI have been published in peer-reviewed research journals in
management. Many of the scholarly articles on AI have appeared in the Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science. Founded by the NTL Institute, the journal is devoted to OD and “the effects
of

evolutionary

and

planned

change”

according

to

the

publication’s

web

page

(http://jab.sagepub.com/). Six articles have been published in JABS with the keywords
“appreciative inquiry” in the abstract. Burke’s critique is one of the six. A keyword search in all
fields in the journal retrieved 61 citations. A similar search of publications of the Academy of
Management—the world’s largest scholarly society in the discipline—yielded nine citations
containing the words in the abstracts. Of these, only one was a published, academic journal
article (Powell et al, 2004). Six were conference papers and symposia presented at AOM’s
annual conference, and two were book review related. A full-text search of the AOM archives
retrieved 85 citations. This is a drop in the bucket, considering that these results were culled from
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the full-text of all journals and conference proceedings for the past 25 years. These results
suggest that mainstream academics in the management field may not be taking AI seriously.
Burke was careful to include the words “and perhaps arguably” in describing AI as one of the
greatest technical developments in OD; the legitimacy of AI is still in question. Is AI an enduring
innovation? Or is it a fad that will fade once OD clients who “are eager for the new and different,
for any magic that will make change easier” (Bunker et al, 2004, p. 404) inevitably move on to
the next big thing?
One of the first published quantitative analyses of an AI intervention was a laboratory
experiment by Bushe and Coetzer (1995). They compared three conditions: team-development
using AI, task-oriented team development (TOTD) and a lecture (placebo). Significant
differences were found between both treatment groups and the placebo in task performance,
group processes and outcomes. However, in comparing AI with TOTD, significant differences in
variance were limited to task performance, with TOTD scoring higher (Bushe & Coetzer, 1995).
Jones (1998) studied the effect of AI interventions on employee turnover at 94 fast-food
restaurants and found that a test group using the AI methodology resulted in 30-32% higher
retention rates compared to two control groups (Jones, 1998).
Van de Haar and Hosking (2004) have argued that quantitative evaluations comparing pre
and post intervention outcomes, which they call

the “product evaluation” approach, are

inconsistent with the social constructionist assumptions of AI. “A ‘product evaluation’ approach
does not aim to be responsive to multiple local ontologies, imposes one reality construction (in
the name of science and rationality) on others and so reproduces relations of ‘power over’” (p.
1028).
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After ten years of experience using the AI method, Whitney and her colleagues
conducted a qualitative study to evaluate why it works (Whitney & Trosten-Bloom, 2003). They
used the AI approach for the study. Many of the participants were from Hunter Douglas, which
had experienced great financial success from the AI interventions. Their data suggested that the
liberation of power contributed to the success of AI. There were at least six conditions for power
to be liberated: the freedom to be known in relationship, to be heard, to dream in community, to
choose to contribute, to act with support, and to be positive (pp. 238-239).
To date, there has only been one published study that systematically compared different
interventions from different organizations to ascertain the conditions necessary for a successful
intervention. Bushe and Kassam (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 20 published case studies
AI interventions prior to 2003. The interventions were evaluated for transformational outcomes.
Seven showed transformational change that went beyond “what we might expect from any
competently managed change process” (p. 171). The authors identified conditions that were
common to the transformational cases. Before discussing those conditions, I will briefly point
out some issues on the methodology of comparing case studies.
Limitations of meta-analysis of case studies
Case studies are generally accepted as a valid research method (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, &
Mitchell, 2011). However, a perception persists in academia that they are not scientifically
rigorous (Yin, 2011). There are valid concerns regarding comparisons of AI case studies,
because they are vulnerable to selection bias. Most are written by scholar-practitioners who were
hired by the clients as consultants. This has consequences: many more cases are written about
successes than failures. People are reluctant to talk about failed interventions. The facilitators of
the intervention have no interest in talking about and neither is the organization.
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Failed interventions, therefore, are likely being systematically excluded from being
documented and published as case studies. Bushe and Kassam (2005) sampled published case
studies that may have been susceptible to such biases. A more fundamental issue has to do with
the validity of a meta-analysis of AI case studies. A meta-analysis analyzes the results of
previously published research according to certain criteria. They are often used to compare and
contrast quantitative findings from experimental studies. Meta-analyses of qualitative methods
like case studies are far less common and are relatively undeveloped (Rudel, 2008). The
application to AI cases begs another question: are AI interventions even comparable to one
another? AI comes in many shapes and forms. There are at least eight different methods.
Depending on the method, data might be collected by the consultant, a select group of employees,
or by hundreds of internal and external stakeholders. The degree to which management and
employees buy into the approach may also differ. Such factors make it problematic to pool data
in the first place.
Reframing the purpose of AI
AI and knowledge creation
Despite the methodological issues, Bushe and Kassam’s (2005) meta-analysis provide
some crucial insights into the conditions for successful AI interventions. They compared 20
published cases of AI prior to 2003 and evaluated them for transformational outcomes. Seven
showed transformational change that went beyond “what we might expect from any competently
managed change process” (p. 171). All cases reporting transformational outcomes 1) created new
knowledge, 2) created a generative metaphor, and 3) changed or created new background
assumptions underlying the organization’s actions. In contrast, none of the non-transformational
cases created knowledge, and only one case each showed 2) or 3). Transformational cases tended
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to take a more improvisational approach in the final AI phase. Bushe and Kassam concluded that
in the transformational cases, the organization was able to:
(a) generate new, internally validated knowledge that is meaningful to system members
and provokes new actions and
(b) plan for, and guide, the action phase in a way that supports local innovations without
requiring a consensual or centralized approval. (p. 178)
In the more recent comparative study of AI summits at four different sites of the same
organization, Bushe (2010) was unable to find any significant correlation between positivity and
transformational outcomes. Bushe (2007) stressed in an earlier article that the generative aspects
should be emphasized, not just the positive.
It is the quest for new ideas, images, theories and models that liberate our collective
aspirations, alter the social construction of reality, and in the process, make available
decisions that were not available or did not occur to us before. When successful, AI
generates spontaneous, unsupervised, individual, group and organizational action toward
a better future. (p. 30)
In the language of strategic management, AI can be conceptualized as a systematic strategizing
process for practicing innovation and entrepreneurship. It is not surprising that AI echoes many
of the management principles advocated by Drucker (2009): “An organization will have a high
spirit of performance if it is consistently directed toward opportunity rather than toward
problems. It will have the thrill of excitement, the sense of challenge, and the satisfaction of
achievement if its energies are put where the results are, and that means on the opportunities,” (p.
460). An organization is destined to die if it loses its spirit of performance. According to Drucker
(2008), “the purpose of organization is to enable ordinary human beings to do extraordinary
things. It is a means to make strengths productive and weaknesses irrelevant” (p. 280). To do so,
the focus must be on performance and opportunities. AI not only orients an organization’s
attention to areas of strengths and opportunities, but it does so in a way that engages the entire
organizational system. Opportunities are identified collectively as a whole instead of in
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organizational silos or by management consultants, raising the likelihood that resources are
allocated to areas with growth potential.
The AI method can be viewed as a way for an organization to adjust what Drucker calls
its theory of business. An organization can stall if its theory of the business becomes incongruent
with its operating environment. Cooperrider intended AI to enable organizations to creatively
theorize about itself. AI often engages external stakeholders such as suppliers and customers in
its strategizing activities. Their presence serves both as a reality check and a source of insight.
The theories that emerge form the basis for generating images of the future. This is in line with
Drucker’s famous words: “the best way to predict the future is to create it.” Strategic planning is
an entrepreneurial skill. “Forecasting attempts to find the most probable course of events or, at
best, a range of probabilities. But the entrepreneurial problem is the unique event that will
change the possibilities” (Drucker, 2009, p.124). The key question is “What should our business
be?” as opposed to “What is our business?”
According to Drucker (1993), innovation is one of two basic functions of a business (the
other being marketing). “Innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by which
they exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or a different service” (p. 19).
Drucker identified three managerial practices required for entrepreneurship in existing businesses.
First, managerial vision must be focused on opportunity. Second, an entrepreneurial spirit must
be generated throughout the entire management group. This includes constantly asking the
people and units who do things better and differently, “What are you doing to that explains your
success?” (p. 157). Third, scheduled sessions should be systematically carried out in which a
member of top management sits down with junior people from various divisions of the company
to listen to their aspirations, their views of where the opportunities and threats are, their ideas for
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new things. All three practices are highly congruent with the AI approach. Indeed, the AI summit
format appears to incorporate the three practices in a large group setting.
Additional insights can be culled from a recent study of an AI intervention in nursing.
Richer, Ritchie and Marchionni (2009) examined the use of AI to promote innovative ideas for
improving work environments of nurses and health care workers. They sought to answer the
question “How does an AI change process lead to the development of innovative ideas regarding
the organization of health care services?” (p. 949). The authors developed a theoretical
framework relying on the notion that” knowledge is a source of innovation and change that
requires synergy between individuals within a group” and situated AI as process in which tacit
and explicit knowledge is exchanged to build a shared future. Using a multiple embedded casestudy methodology, they looked at an AI change process at two cancer care clinics consisting of
11 one-hour sessions with each health care team simultaneously over nine months. In addition to
participant-observation of the sessions, the researchers observed management meetings and
conducted interviews with team members. Participants classified ideas that were generated from
the sessions as innovative or not.
Their results suggested that in addition to change processes, AI creates opportunities and
some of the conditions promoting the emergence and implementation of innovative ideas.
Throughout the AI process, discussions between different members of the team permitted
the refinement and the evolution of the generated ideas. This process of knowledge
exchange and development is in line with Nonaka’s (1991) proposition that the
emergence of innovative ideas or new knowledge always begins with individuals, is
embedded in values and beliefs and is created when tacit knowledge is made explicit and
transformed into something new. (p. 952)
The authors elaborated how the AI process served as a “space” where knowledge is developed
and shared.
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This shared space, called “ba” (Nonaka & Konno 1998, Nonaka et al. 2000),
encompasses any virtual or physical area designed for the creation of collective
knowledge and the development of relationships. Thus, the common context in which
knowledge was shared, created and utilized during the AI process united physical and
mental spaces, “ba”, that promoted the sharing of common goals and provided a platform
for innovation. (Richer et al., 2009, p. 953)
Nonaka’s (1994) theory of knowledge creation is one of the best known theories in the
organizational knowledge literature (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003b). In Nonaka’s framework,
knowledge is dynamic, and at a fundamental level, created by individuals. Referencing the work
of Varela and his colleagues (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), “cognitive experience is
‘embodied action’ rather than a mere representation of a world that exists independent of our
cognitive system” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 24). He explained:
An organization cannot create knowledge without individuals. The organization supports
creative individuals or provides a context for such individuals to create knowledge.
Organizational knowledge creation, therefore, should be understood in terms of the
process that “organizationally” amplifies the knowledge created by individuals, and
crystallizes it as a part of the knowledge network of organization. (Nonaka, 1994, p. 17)
Nonaka describes innovation as a key form of organizational knowledge creation.
Innovation cannot be adequately explained in terms of information processing or problemsolving, he argued. “Innovation can be better understood as a process in which the organization
creates and defines problems and then actively develops new knowledge to solve them” (Nonaka,
1994, p. 14). In Nonaka’s theory of knowledge creation, knowledge is dynamically converted
from tacit to explicit forms, from the individual to the organizational level, in four phases known
as the SECI model. Knowledge goes through a conversion between tacit and explicit modes in
four phases: Socialization, Externalization, Combination and Integration, hence the acronym
SECI (pronounced “seki”). Knowledge is created in shared contexts (ba) which are perpetually in
motion and transcend physical space and time. The various AI methods including an AI summit
could constitute the shared context necessary for knowledge to emerge.
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Nonaka’s model is very intuitive. Polanyi’s (2009) famous insight that “we know more
than we can tell,” is something most people can relate to. Thus, it naturally follows that
companies that are better able to convert the tacit knowledge of its employees into an explicit
mode in which it can be leveraged and exploited, have more knowledge resources and are more
competitive. Ambrosini and Bowman (2001) have suggested cognitive mapping as one way of
operationalizing tacit knowledge. Knowledge comes in various degrees of tacitness. Not all
knowledge can be made explicit. Some of it is embodied deep in our adaptive unconscious
(Wilson, 2002) and is out of reach. Cognitive mapping methods such as causal mapping, the
authors claimed, can make explicit, at least some of the tacit knowledge that is closer to the
surface. AI’s appreciative interviews can be considered a form of causal mapping; stakeholders
probe deeper and deeper into the root causes of success to make explicit the organization’s
positive core.
Nonaka’s work had a great “popularizing influence”(Emphasis in the original, EasterbySmith & Lyles, 2003a, p. 11) in the burgeoning field of organizational knowledge studies. The
Knowledge Creating Company co-authored by Takeuchi (1995) expounded on important ideas
including “the importance of national culture and philosophy to understanding the construction
and communication of knowledge” (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003a, p. 11). There are some
issues, however. Critics have contended that the very nature of tacit knowing prohibits it from
ever being converted into explicit knowledge (Tsoukas, 2003). Nonaka takes the view of
knowledge as a resource—a resource based view (Barney, 1996), whereas Tsoukas and others
take more of a social practice view of organizing. The two approaches have yet to be reconciled
(Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). There are some issues in the empirical application of the SECI
model as well. Demonstrating the acquisition and transfer of tacit knowledge in the socialization
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and externalization phases is especially problematic, and any description can be open to
interpretation. For example, a second-order observer—an individual reflecting upon
themselves—may have a very different perspective from a third-order observer who is observing
the individual from the outside in. One interpretation can be just as valid as another.
The study by Richer and her colleagues is nevertheless informative in that there appears
to be something embedded in the AI process that contributes to the creation of organizational
knowledge. It is worth pointing out here that, despite the social constructionist roots of AI, its
methods implicitly acknowledge a representational view of knowledge. AI is referred to as “a
search for knowledge” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 3) in the AI handbook for practitioners, a
choice of words more consistent with the notion that knowledge is out there to be grasped. The
first phase of AI sets out to discover an organization’s positive core, implying that some positive
core already exists and is begging to be found. The purpose of the current study therefore is to
pursue the line of vision opened up by Richer et al. that situates AI as a shared context for
generating new knowledge leading to innovation.
Summary
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on AI and identified the following points
pertinent to this study. First, AI originated as a research method, not an intervention. Second, the
role of positivity in AI remains controversial. Third, past studies of AI suggest that the purpose
of AI can be reframed as a shared context for organizational knowledge creation. This suggests
that there may be alternative ways of evaluating AI’s effectiveness by situating AI as a
strategizing practice for organizational knowledge creation, rather than a change intervention.
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Chapter 3 The AI Summit: A Large Group Method of Strategizing
Introduction
Although there are a variety of methods available to appreciative inquiry (AI)
practitioners, the AI summit has recently become the format of choice at many companies. The
AI summit integrates AI with another recent innovation in OD: large group methods. Formerly
known as large group interventions (Bunker & Alban, 1997), these methods seek to involve a
wide range of stakeholders in the decision-making process for systemic change (Bunker & Alban,
2006). The four characteristics common to these methods are the inclusion of stakeholders,
engagement of multiple perspectives through interactive activities, opportunity to influence
outcomes, and a search for common ground as opposed to conflict resolution (pp. 19-21).
Bunker and Alban categorized large group methods into four types based on their
purpose. The first are methods geared towards “creating the future together” (pp. 10-13),
including AI. They all revolve around a conference with participants ranging from about 40
people to as many as several thousand. Creating a future is equivalent to developing strategy.
Therefore, these methods are analogous to strategy workshops in large group configurations. The
two others are methods for “work design” (pp. 13-15) and for “whole-scale participative work”
(pp. 15-19). These methods, redesigning the flow of work and engaging people in participation,
are similar to business process reengineering projects except they utilize large group meetings.
The last category is methods for “discussion and decision making” (pp. 28-31) such as World
Café.
Large group methods emerged partly in response to the increased levels of complexity
that confront organizations today. Advances in information technologies promoted globalization
and greater levels of interdependencies between what used to be independent, self-contained
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systems. In practice, OD consultants were frustrated by the unintended consequences and
unexpected changes in the environment that accompanied conventional interventions. “The idea
that change must involve the whole system has been growing in currency over the last forty years”
(2006, p. 4) wrote Bunker and Alban.
The idea of a system-wide approach may sound appealing to an OD consultant. But
proposals that seek the participation of lower-level employees in strategic decisions in
organizational level strategic planning and change development “meets definite resistance and
skepticism” (Powley, Fry, Barrett, & Bright, 2011, p. 69) from management. There is a strong
perception that large groups take too long to reach consensus, are “unruly” and “seldom result in
action” (p.69). Yet there has been a considerable amount of experimentation by practitioners
since the mid-1980s, based on developments in research in social psychology. The AI summit is
a beneficiary of such trial and error. That AI’s popularity has not waned for over 25 years may
have as much to do with the innovations in large group methods as the AI approach itself.
In this chapter, I trace the theoretical origins of large group methods and how those
theories were integrated into practice. I then turn to the AI summit format, and review the
findings of a case study of AI summits conducted by the US Navy (Powley et al., 2011). The
authors suggested that the AI summit format can be used as a participative management tool in a
command-control environment like the Navy. Of particular interest is their observation that the
AI summit “represents a communal atmosphere where the temporary suspension of normal
organization structure allows for the accomplishment of significant, empowered strategic work”
(p. 78). The mechanism of suspension allows the members of a strictly hierarchical organization
like the Navy to engage in democratic dialogue without permanently altering the formal
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command-control structure. I pick up this thread and connect it to recent studies on the concept
of strategic episodes (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in the strategic management literature.
Hendry and Seidl developed the concept of strategic episodes by applying Luhmann’s
social systems theory to strategy meetings. “Episodes, in Luhmann’s theory, provide a
mechanism by which a system can suspend its routine structures and so initiate a reflection on
and change of these structures” (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 175). I introduce the findings from
Jarzabkowski and Seidl who conducted a study of 51 strategy meetings of a university. Despite
the ubiquity of strategy meetings and workshops in organizational life, strategic management
scholars have largely overlooked their role in strategy development. Jarzabkowski and Seidl
analyzed the meetings through the concept of strategic episodes. I conclude the review with
some thoughts on how Luhmann’s theory is a useful lens through which to evaluate the
conditions that make AI summits effective as a space for creating organizational knowledge.
Large group methods: Theory and practice
Group dynamics meets systems theory.
Large group methods evolved through a combination of theory and practice. In 2006,
Bunker and Alban published the most comprehensive book on large group methods to date, The
Handbook of Large Group Methods. They identified three strands that became the precursors to
large group methods of organizing. The first strand can be traced back to the research of Lewin
and Bion. Independently of each other, they developed the foundational ideas and theories of
“group dynamics,” the former in the US, the latter in the UK. Lewin is credited for having coined
the word group dynamics in a 1939 article (Weisbord, 1987). He emigrated to the US from
Germany in 1933 after working with two of the founders of Gestalt psychology, a stream of
psychology that focused on understanding the whole rather than the elements of cognitive
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processes. He made significant contributions to social psychology in general, and large group
methods in particular. In reflecting upon those contributions, Weisbord wrote:
Lewin wed scientific thinking to democratic values and gave birth to participative
management.… He taught that to understand a system you must seek to change it.…
Diagnosis does not mean just finding the problem, but doing it in such a way as to build
commitment for action.… Not only could you solve the problem, you could
simultaneously study your own process and thereby refine the theory and practice of
change. (p. 72)
Lewin posited that group experiences based on mutual tasks, changed the attitudes and
actions of everyone in that social system more quickly than through individual exercises.
According to Weisbord, Lewin discovered a core principle during his experiments with
anthropologist Margaret Mead in the midst of World War II, in which they were tasked with
getting housewives in Iowa to reduce their consumption of rationed foods. The principle was:
“we are likely to modify our own behavior when we participate in problem analysis and solution
and likely to carry out decisions we have helped make” (Emphasis in the original, Weisbord,
1987, p. 89). Lewin saw a downside in conventional methods of consulting. When an expert
comes in to do everything from defining the problem to generating the solutions, ironically, the
more the expert does, the less inclined are the people affected by the proposed solution to
cooperate. Instead, Lewin called for an action-oriented mode of consulting and research in which
the expert collaborates with those experiencing the problem at hand, enabling “those with a stake
in the problem to define and solve it” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 190). Lewin’s conceptualization of
action research was crucial not only to the development of large group methods in the context of
whole-system change, but also to the emergence of the appreciative inquiry approach to
consulting. This latter point will be explored in a later section.
Meanwhile, Bion, an army psychologist in the UK trained in psychoanalysis, paved the
way for advancing theories in group dynamics at the Tavistock Institute. Guided by his
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observations in group psychotherapy, Bion theorized that when groups are confronted with highanxiety change, there is a tendency for people to behave based on one of three emotional states:
fight-flight (battle or withdraw), dependency (rely on leader or expert), and pairing (find a
partner within the group) (Weisbord, 1987). Different leadership behaviors were needed to be
matched with the different emotional states of the group. Researchers at the Tavistock Institute
went on to further develop Bion’s work through “a form of laboratory” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 147)
that conducted training sessions using learning groups called “Tavi” groups. “When people fight,
run away from the task, pair up defensively, or depend on a leader to solve their problems, they
become childish, immature, and unable to grow” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 149) impeding creativity
and joint action. These insights were later applied to developing methods for work design and
studies of leaderless groups—self-organizing work teams.
Systems theory was brought to the Tavistock Institute by Emery, an “assertive young
activist” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 157) who had been studying the open systems theory of von
Bertalanffy (1969). In the 1940s, the Austrian biologist von Bertalanffy (1969) proposed a
“theory of the organism as open system” (p. viii), which described living organisms as open
systems that continuously interact with their environment. Emery was one of the first social
scientists to fully appreciate the significance of the open systems ideas for psychology and the
social sciences (Weisbord, 1987). He collaborated with Trist, one of the founders of the institute
and a colleague of Bion’s. Trist had been studying the impact of new technology in the coal
mining industry. The two developed their ideas into a theory of sociotechnical systems (STS)
which recognized the importance of understanding how both technology and people relate to
“the larger whole they serve” (p. 159). STS showed “how changes in technology can disrupt
system functioning, even when what is being introduced is a more efficient technology” (Bunker
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& Alban, 2006, p. 5). A change in one part of the system can lead to unintended consequences in
another. This insight meant that in order to institute sustainable change, the whole system must
be taken into account (Bunker & Alban, 2006), and provides the theoretical rationale for bringing
the whole system into the room.
Future perfect thinking.
Lewin’s colleague Lippitt is one of the researchers credited for bringing in the final
dimension, futuring. Lippitt played back tape recordings of 30 planning groups in action. He was
struck by “how voices grew more depressed” as they went down their list of problems, especially
those that were beyond their control. Lippitt noted that the motivation “was to escape the pain
induced in part by the method itself: the piecemeal listing of problems, the solution of any one of
which might create still more problems” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 283). Lippitt shifted gears. He
teamed up with Lindaman, a planning director for the Apollo mission to the moon. Weisbord
wrote:
Lindaman believed that the future was created by our present ways of confronting
“events, trends and developments” in the environment. The “preferred future”—an image
of aspiration—could be a powerful guidance mechanism for making far-reaching course
corrections. (Weisbord, 1987, p. 283)
The two found that when they asked people to work back from the future they desired to plan the
present, “they develop energy, enthusiasm, optimism, and high commitment” (Weisbord, 1987, p.
283).
People also give more detailed and understandable accounts of hypothetical situations
that are temporally in the past than in the future (Bavelas, 1973 as referenced by Weick, 1979).
In an experiment, accounts of an imagined trip that “will occur” were less detailed, shorter and
less sensible than if the trip was presented as if it had already occurred. Weick cites Schutz
(1967) who explained: “because it is pictured as completed, the planned act bears the temporal
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character of pastness…as if it were simultaneously past and future” (Weick, 1979, p. 198).
Weick has described this as thinking in the future perfect tense.
The future event is more sensible because you can visualize at least one prior set of
means that will produce it. The meaning of that end is those means that bring it about.
Furthermore, when one imagines the steps in a history that will realize an outcome, then
there is more likelihood that one or more of those steps will have been performed before
and will evoke past experiences that are similar to the experience that is imagined in the
future perfect tense. (Weick, 1979, p. 198)
In contrast, the simple future tense has a greater cognitive load because without a cognitive
anchor, any number of outcomes is possible. Weick linked these ideas to organizational sensemaking.
When an event yet to happen is treated as if it’s over, this aids sense-making because that
imagined completion can be related more easily to similar cause maps that have already
been enacted. When something is thought about as ongoing and changing, it’s harder to
match it with something known in the past than if the event is thought of as completed
and fixed. (Weick, 1979, p. 201)
Breakthrough in practice.
As Powley and his colleagues pointed out, large groups are perceived to be unruly. In the
late 19th century, the French physician and writer, Le Bon (1930) wrote a bestselling book titled
The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind.
The fact that [individuals] have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of
a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite
different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in
a state of isolation. (pp. 29-30)
Le Bon described the characteristics of crowd psychology such as impulsiveness, irritability, an
exaggeration of sentiments, among others (p. 39). These are certainly not the characteristics one
would hope for in a strategizing meeting that will determine the future direction of an
organization. According to Bunker and Alban (1997), issues of large group dynamics fall under
four categories: dilemma of voice, dilemma of structure, a systems problem, and the contagion of
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affect. The dilemma of voice arises from the limited amount of airtime available for all
participants to speak, resulting in some speaking a lot and others staying silent. This can lead to
the tyranny of the few, causing those who are silent to feel marginalized and even less inclined to
contribute. Latane and Darley’s (1968) “diffusion of responsibility” suggests that as the number
of people in the group increases, the sense of personal responsibility for the outcome decreases.
The second issue is the dilemma of structure. Having too much or too little structure can cause
anxiety in people. There is fear of losing control and the potential for chaos and total
disorganization. “The right amount of structure is reassuring and allows people to function in a
healthy way” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 204). The problem is we neither know how much
anxiety exists nor how much structure is needed.
The third issue is a systems problem. Analogous to the blind man’s elephant, employees
have a limited range of vision of their organization. This is the egocentric dilemma. At the
beginning of a large group event, “hundreds of people with differing pictures of organizational
reality all act as if theirs is the only true reality” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 207). Some of these
issues are exacerbated due to the contagious nature of affect in larger groups, the fourth issue.
Bunker and Alban (1997) have suggested that “people begin to experience feelings because they
feel them vicariously in others, not because they are all having the same experience” (p. 208).
The affective center of a group is easily manipulated. In extreme cases, strangers can quickly act
in concert and turn cruel and violent, even in a simulated role play, as the Stanford prison
experiments by Zimbardo (1973) demonstrated.
Breakthroughs in large group methods came with the realization that many small groups
can be the equivalent of one large system (Bunker & Alban, 2006). Large group conferences
became effective by adopting “small group technologies and processes that allow people to
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participate fully and feel engaged” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 204). Large groups can be divided
into many small groups of 12 or less, and assigned specific tasks. Groups interacting within the
larger framework of the whole system in the room reduced the probability of contagion.
Clear task and group structures lower the potential for chaos while encouraging active
and individually determined behavior. Functional group roles such as recorder and reporter can
be rotated, promoting individuation and leadership (Bunker & Alban, 1997). As the methods
matured, professional facilitators were no longer needed at every discussion table, paving the
way for organizations with smaller budgets to adopt the methods (Bunker & Alban, 2006). By
bringing the whole system in the room, participants gain a holistic view of the organization and a
better sense of what it is like to be in the shoes of someone in a different functional position.
Large group methods in practice.
Strategy development consists of making sense of the future. In the 1980s, Emery.
Weisbord, and others sought to integrate and apply these theories to strategic planning through
large group conferences designed to search for the future. Weisbord’s seminal book, Productive
Workplaces (1987) examined the contributions of Taylor, McGregor and the theories outlined
above “in a new light” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 22) that made clear the implications for large
group methods. Weisbord also referenced some theories of practice culled from his own
conference model called Future Search. Weisbord took the “back to the future” concept and
combined it with conference management processes consistent with democratic values. The
conference is based on three assumptions:
1. Change is so rapid that we need more not less, face to face discussion to make
intelligent strategic decisions. Teleconferencing won’t do.…
2. Successful strategies—for quality goods and services, lower costs, more satisfying
ways of working—come from envisioning preferred futures. Problem solving old
dilemmas doesn’t work under fast-changing conditions.…
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3. People will commit to plans they have helped to develop. (Emphasis in the original,
Weisbord, 1987, p. 285)
There are four steps in the Future Search conference. Participants build a database, look
at it together, interpret what they find and draw conclusions for action (Weisbord, 1987, p. 289).
It is worth noting here that these processes closely resemble qualitative research methods (Yin,
2011): data collection and compilation, coding, analysis and discussion. Participants are tasked
with looking at the past and present from various perspectives (self, company, society, outside
and inside), then generating images of the future (Weisbord, 1987, pp. 288-290). Participation is
limited to people who have a stake in the organization’s future. Groups of 50 to 60 people are
chosen for diversity with consideration to their linkages to the outside. Planning for the
conference involves external consultants and a voluntary committee of four to six potential
participants. The committee sets the agenda and decides the selection method for participants.
Some methods emerged independent of developments in OD. One of the better known
methods is GE’s Work-Out (D. Ulrich, 2002). According to Bunker and Alban (1997), WorkOut was the brainchild of GE’s former CEO, Jack Welch and Jim Bowman, the head of the
Crotonville learning center at the time. The method emerged in the late 1980s. Welch was
dismayed at supervisors and employees who were telling him at training sessions that they liked
Welch’s ideas but didn’t have the power to make things happen (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p.170).
The Work-Outs were designed to overcome the stiff joints of bureaucracy. They were led by
teams of internal and external consultants, conducted off-site, and typically involved 100 to 200
employees crossing functions and positions. Part of the success, Bunker and Alban (1997) have
suggested, appeared to be Welch’s presence at these meetings:
Rumor has it that if the workers’ recommendations were reasonable and the upper-level
manager procrastinated or balked, Welch would bang his fist on the table and say,
“Sounds good to me. Let's do it!” Whether this story is true or not, what is true is that
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Welch's presence brought strong support for the process and sent a clear message to the
decision makers. (p. 171)
The Work-Out eventually became an internalized process within GE. A book (D. Ulrich, 2002)
is currently available that details the process.
Another method emerged in the 1980s out of a training engagement for Ford (Bunker &
Alban, 2006). Ford had asked Dannemiller, a student and colleague of Lippitt, to “train Ford
middle managers to be more proactive” (p. 7). She refused. Dannemiller thought the training was
destined to fail because “the Ford system did not encourage that kind of behavior” (p.7).
Dannemiller said she would take on the engagement if Ford would let her take 500 managers
from all three levels of management to an off-site meeting for a week. By assembling such a
large number of people at one time, Dannemiller’s method demonstrated that an entire
organization or division “could work on the same issue together and make decisions that would
stick and could be immediately implemented” (p. 7). The method was initially called Real Time
Strategic Change, is currently known as Whole-Scale Change (Dannemiller Tyson Associates,
n.d.). World Café created by Brown (2005) and Open Space Technology by Owen (1997) are
also well known large group methods. The 21st Century Town Meeting was developed by
AmericaSpeaks as a method developed specifically for town hall meetings on public policy
issues.
Origins of AI summits
The AI summit is modeled after Weisbord and Janoff’s (2010) Future Search conference
format. But it “breaks new ground by stressing the relational nature of innovation and by
highlighting the power of the positive to unleash extraordinary organizational performance”
(Ludema et al., 2003, p. 20). AI summits differ from Future Search in three ways. First, summits
tend to be larger in scale. A typical Future Search involves 60 to 100 people, whereas an AI
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summit usually engages hundreds, sometimes thousands of people (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, &
Griffin, 2003; Weisbord & Janoff, 2010). Second, activities are structured differently. Future
Search goes through five “sessions”—focus on the past, focus on the present, focus on the future,
discover common ground and action planning. Activities include mind-mapping around timelines and trends, future scenario development, and planning around common ground statements.
AI summits begin with a one-on-one peak experience interview, then move through the 4Ds
through activities such as group discussion, skits, possibility statement design, brainstorming,
rapid prototyping, and business plan development. Both methods take advantage of small group
activities, large group report-outs and voting schemes to select themes to focus on (Ludema et al.,
2003; Weisbord & Janoff, 2010). The most important distinction is that AI summits selectively
focus on positive experiences while Future Search “accepts all experiences as relevant”
(Weisbord & Janoff, 2010, p. 12).
The origins of AI summits date back to the mid-1980s when Cooperrider and two fellow
graduate students at Case Western Reserve University experimented with large group methods in
strategic planning. They brought together 350 partners of Touche-Ross Canada to take part in a
“fully participatory, open, dialogical” roundtable to develop strategic plans. Through this
experience they learned the power of full participation in crossing the “generational divide” (p.
14) among organizational members. Storytelling and creating images of the future were two
other aspects of the roundtable that left an impression (Ludema et al., 2003). This was followed
by a leadership development program funded by the US Agency for International Development,
which brought together 30 to 100 executives at a time to engage in the AI process. In 1994, a
group of AI practitioners tested an idea to bring entire organizations to the table. Working with
the international development organization, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
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(CRWRC), they designed AI meetings that blended Future Search with AI. They were called
“Appreciative Future Search Conferences” (p. 16).
According to Ludema et al., the word “summit” replaced the name of the conference
format when Cooperrider and Whitney were involved in the United Religions Initiative (URI)
from 1995 to 2000. URI was an initiative to promote interfaith cooperation. The summit format
was used for regional and global summits of between 100 to 250 people in order to develop a
charter. This culminated in a global summit in June 2000, for the signing of the charter. Ludema
and his colleagues wrote that they learned through this process, three lessons. First, that
appreciation can dislodge certainty. Second, a good AI interview guide can allow “people to
anticipate the entire summit within the first hour or so of the four-day meeting” (p. 18). They
called this a “holographic beginning” (p.18). Third, “leadership levels the playing field” (p. 19).
By this they mean that leaders join in as peers, as fellow inquirers.
Key success factors of AI summits
Ludema et al. (2003) have written that there are six factors that contribute to the AI
summit approach’s effectiveness. Summits were quicker at enabling change, better at building
organizational confidence, provided broad and immediate access to information, promoted a
“total organization mindset,” inspired action, and gave a means to sustain positive change (p.
xiii). These are generally consistent with the findings of Powley et al. (2011), who analyzed AI
summits held at the US Navy. They are benefits derived from the structure of an AI summit
which puts the whole system into one room for multiple, consecutive days, concentrated on a
common purpose and tasks. Powley et al. were focused on how the AI summits structure
conversations, a dialogical perspective.
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The authors proposed three design principles for successful democratic organizing:
normative

consciousness,

holistic

collegiality

and

communal

conviction.

Normative

consciousness “is a practical awareness of oneself in relation to others” (p. 74). The physical
presence of so many organizational members in one place at one time heightens an awareness of
relatedness. Holistic collegiality refers to a cooperative environment where people are aware of
the connectedness of their micro-level interactions to the macro-level issues of the organization,
“giving each person an opportunity to experience a sense of efficacy in relation to others and the
organization” (p. 76). Communal conviction is “a sense of commitment to the organization and
its future well-being” (p. 76). Individuals willingly engage in conversations about substantive
issues, thereby enhancing intrinsic motivation and a willingness to commit.
In the minds of the authors, the key differentiating factor of an AI summit as a forum for
strategizing is the democratic nature of its activities. Powley et al. noted a general trend in
organizations of a more participative form of management. Employee stock options, open-book
management, and an emphasis on teamwork are some of the examples they gave as evidence of
this trend. “There is no question that we are in the participative era of management and
leadership. Yet at the strategic level, we seem equally rooted in the hierarchical mode of
decision-making and action taking” (p. 67). The AI summit is a democratic and participatory
method which makes it “possible and worthwhile to bring everyone into the inner circle of
strategy” (p. 69). Although some dialogic practices for involving multiple stakeholder groups
exist, “these interventions, when attempted, generally encourage and support the voices of all
participations up to the point of recommending action” (Emphasis in original, p. 69). Ultimately,
“a senior sponsor or other organizational leader decides which proposals to legitimize and which
to set aside” (p. 69). Indeed, the authors warned that AI summits can at times backfire. They
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wrote, “a short-lived Summit experience may in fact discourage organization members from
truly participating in post-Summit work groups” (p. 79).
Powley et al. cited research in small groups that linked dialogic participation to team
outcomes (eg. Losada & Heaphy, 2004). This research generally demonstrated that the issue of
voice mattered in groups such that employees felt more ownership towards outcomes they had a
hand in designing and monitoring. This is consistent with Lewin’s wartime experience in trying
to change food habits (Weisbord, 1987). Procedural justice also mattered. Kim and Mauborgne
(1998) have argued that “when people feel their strategic decision-making processes are fair,
they display a high level of voluntary cooperation” (p. 323). Powley et al. were blunt: “Leaders
should not hold a Summit if they fundamentally do not wish to expand the involvement,
participation, and discretion of employees” (2011, p. 78).
Democratic organizing can be a challenge for organizations like the military that depend
on a command-control structure. Powley et al. proposed the AI summit format as a method for
achieving this goal without compromising the necessary structure. A longitudinal study
observing the process and outcomes of two AI summits at the navy showed that the summits
were useful for creating and strengthening informal ties that cut across organizational silos.
In the comparative study by Bushe (2010) of eight sites in a Canadian school district, all
conducted an AI summit. Two affirmative questions were chosen for the intervention: “What do
educators do that create exceptional learning experiences?” and “What choices and options
offered in educational settings most enhance learning?” (p. 10). The purpose of Bushe’s study
was to determine what contributed to differences in the levels of change in the following year.
Four sites had transformational outcomes (as defined by clear and compelling changes in
normative routines), two had incremental outcomes and two experienced no change. The factors
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identified in the study were “how generative the inquiries were, how well the Discovery phase
was managed and the quality of Design statements that came out of the summits” (p. 7). Each
summit lasted two days with participants ranging from 50 to 100. The Discovery phase was
conducted prior to the summit. Technically, the summits only went through the Dream and
Design phases during the summit, as the bulk of the processes for Destiny happened after the
summit ended. Therefore, of the three factors that contributed to the difference in change
outcomes, at least one was not part of the summit activities. The Destiny phase commenced at
the summit but the communication of the results differed by different sites. Bushe noted that
“many of the design statements and commitments to action faded with time” (p. 22). Whether the
Design statement would have mattered as much had the summit had more time to devote to the
Destiny phase remains an open question.
Bushe’s study also raised another important point. “It is probably significant that the two
sites with the highest levels of morale and pride prior to the AI were the two that experienced
only incremental changes” (p. 19). Bushe discussed this in the context that sites needed to have
some level of shared pain for there to be transformational change. The incremental sites did not
transform “because stakeholders were pretty happy with their leaders and with their school” (p.
22). Bushe raised these points to highlight “that it is inaccurate to say that AI is not concerned
with solving problems” (p. 22). The term transformation implies a dramatic change, in this case,
normative changes in organizational routines. As the cliché goes: “Don’t fix what isn’t broken.”
More insights into the AI process might be gained if sites that were already thriving prior to the
intervention were evaluated by measures other than the transformation of existing norms.
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Towards AI as a strategizing practice
The 2011 article by Powley et al. is the only one on AI that has been published in the
journals of the Academy of Management (AOM). It appeared in the Academy of Management
Executive, a peer-reviewed journal more oriented towards practitioners. It is interesting to note
that while the content of article is mostly about the benefits of admitting a wider set of
stakeholders into the inner circle of strategy, the title acknowledges AI’s OD roots: “Dialogic
democracy meets command and control: Transformation through the appreciative inquiry
summit” (p. 67). During the proceedings of a symposium on the future of OD at the annual AOM
conference in 2012, Burke reiterated the views he expressed in his article in 2010 that OD has
become too preoccupied with the concept of change. This is the article in which he set off to say
that “perhaps arguably” there had been no innovation in OD since AI. He wrote that “the failure
rate for organization change efforts is around 70%,” with rates even higher for mergers and
acquisitions (p. 144).
Burke was one of the invited panelists of a symposium including OD heavyweights like
Schein, a pioneer in the study of organizational culture. Burke pointed out that OD has become
very knowledgeable and adept at loosening the tightly coupled structures of bureaucratic
organizations. Conversely, the field knew very little about how to deal with “loosely coupled”
structures. Burke suggested that OD needs to go beyond the idea of “managing change” if it is to
be relevant in a world in which new forms of organizing such as virtual organizations and teams
are emerging.
The US Navy is a prime example of a tightly coupled organization. Powley et al.
demonstrated the utility of AI summits for enabling democratic organizing in a command-control
organizational structure. One of the key characteristics identified by the authors was the AI
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summit’s ability to temporarily suspend its organizational routines and realities. This aspect of
AI summits should hold regardless of how tight or loose the underlying structures may be. As
part of the strategizing activities and practice (SAP) literature, Hendry and Seidl (2003) have
developed a concept called “strategic episodes” that encapsulates the mechanism necessary for
organizational processes of strategic change. The switching of contexts from the operational to
the strategic, the temporal features of the episode, the choice of participants, and the
reconnection back to the organization’s ordinary routines are some of the key elements of a
strategic episode. The authors posited that “strategy presents two distinct faces” when seen from
a sociological perspective.
On the one hand, strategies serve to structure, organize and give meaning to the complex
operations of business organizations…. On the other hand, the discourses of strategy and
the role-definitions of strategists are very largely concerned with change. Strategy, for
practitioners as well as academics, is explicitly concerned with the future, and with how
this might differ from the present: with what “should be” rather than what is. (pp. 176177)
This description of strategy is a very good fit for the practice of AI. AI aims to give new
meaning to organizations by using a positive lens, and develops an image of a preferred future.
Because so many of the organizational members are personally involved in the development of
the strategy, more people are likely to buy in and commit to action. Jarzabkowski and Seidl
(2008) applied the concept to an analysis of strategy meetings at a university. Their findings
suggested that a strategy meeting can stabilize the strategic direction of an organization,
especially if the organization is “loosely coupled” like a university. In other words, strategic
“change” may, in some organizational contexts, denote a change from flux to stability.
In the context of strategic management, scholars in the SAP research stream take a more
constructivist approach to strategy making (Grand, Rüegg-Stürm, & von Arx, 2010). Strategy is
defined “as a situated, socially accomplished activity” (p. 70). Practice is considered a both “the
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situated doings of the individual human beings (micro) and to the different socially defined
practices (macro) that the individuals are drawing upon in these doings” (Jarzabkowski, Balogun,
& Seidl, 2007, p. 7). The actions and interactions of people as they accomplish that activity is the
primary focus of inquiry. The research stream is relatively new, consisting mostly of European
scholars. At AOM, SAP remains an “interest group” that complements the work of other
divisions like organizational behavior and organization management theory.
There are some notable gaps in the SAP literature that a study of AI summits will likely
fill. Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) identified that there has only been one study that looked at
the impact of external practitioners on strategy making. External practitioners such as consultants,
regulators and special interest groups certainly impact strategy, but “these interactions have been
widely neglected in empirical strategy research so far” (p. 79). In addition, conferences have also
been understudied. The most detailed and comprehensive study of the impact of conferences has
been by Garud (2008), who examined how academic conferences affected innovation in the
hearing device industry. These academic conferences were attended by scientists from device
manufacturers with vested interests in trying to persuade the scientific community to adopt
particular scientific models over others. Jarzabkowski and Seidl (2008) looked at the role of
strategy meetings at a university with regard to their effect on strategic orientations. Gustavsen
and Engelstad (1986) reviewed how work-life reform can be affected by democratic dialogue in
conferences. To date, no large group methods of collective strategizing have been studied from a
social practices perspective.
In this study, I extend the concept of strategic episodes to AI summits. An AI summit can
be described as a strategic episode that extends over several days with the participation and
engagements of large numbers of stakeholders from both within and without the organization.
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One of the purposes of AI is to generate organizational knowledge that can stimulate innovation.
In the corporate world, AI has primarily been used in hierarchical organizations with tightly
coupled structures. This study, in contrast, was inspired by my participation in a summit
conducted by a relatively young, fast growing, entrepreneurial automotive company. What I
experienced felt different from the descriptions of AI summits as a change intervention. I situate
AI summits as a strategizing practice and ask: How and why does an AI summit, as a whole,
generate and possibly accelerate organizational knowledge creation?
To answer this question, I propose an analysis of AI summits using Luhmann’s social
systems theory, upon which the notion of strategic episodes is based. Following an overview of
the methodology used for this study (Chapter 4), I devote two chapters to explain the two
theoretical lens I will be using. These chapters introduce readers to the radical systems theory
that underlies the analysis. In Chapter 5, I explain the concept of autopoiesis (self-reproduction),
a theory that has had an enormous impact on systems theory in general, and on Luhmann’s social
systems theory in particular. Autopoiesis was developed by the Chilean biologists Maturana and
Varela in the 1970s as a biological theory for explaining cognition and living systems. It
radicalizes and extends general systems theory by positing that living systems are operationally
closed but interactionally open. The core ideas are complex and counterintuitive for those of us
who take open systems theory for granted, but it is crucial to understanding Luhmann’s social
systems theory. I will also briefly review how Luhmann’s theories are being applied to the study
of organizations.
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Chapter 4 Methodology
Overview
The purpose of this study is to develop an alternative conceptual framework for
understanding how and why appreciative inquiry summits function as a system for organizational
knowledge creation. The goal is to build theory rather than to test the validity of an existing
theory. I use a case-study research design to facilitate theory-building and to identify illustrative
examples of the propositions that have been developed.
In the discipline of management, case studies have become a widely accepted research
method for building theory, especially for studies of organizational processes. A case study is a
type of qualitative research design. Qualitative methods generally seek to describe and explain
rather than provide empirical evidence supporting specific theory-based hypotheses and claims.
Qualitative methods are appropriate for studying phenomena that are not easily quantifiable (Yin,
2011). Processes by their very nature are difficult to quantify. In an article on strategies for
conducting process research, Langley (1999) cautioned: “Process data is messy” (p. 691).
Process data often deals with the intangible assets of an organization, the so-called soft side of
the business like people’s thoughts, interpretations, and relationships.
Process models are driven by stories of what happened (Langley, 1999). They typically
consist of “events, activities and choices ordered over time” (p. 692). Such characteristics render
process data from organizational settings “difficult to analyze and manipulate” (p. 692).
Consequently, process research does not try to explain organizational behavior through models
of variance, in which a difference in an independent variable X (e.g. strong leadership) might
account for the variance in the dependent variable Y (e.g. profits). Rather, a process model seeks
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an explanation based on how and why events, activities and choices lead to an outcome. The
conceptualization of events and pattern detection are important in analyzing data.
Case studies are a good fit for research in which how and why questions are being asked
of a contemporary event over which the researcher has little control (Yin, 1984, p. 20). In other
words, they are useful for studying processes in the context within which they unfold. This
applies to the current study which seeks to understand the organizational knowledge creation
processes in the case of one specific AI summit; the researcher essentially has no control over the
summit itself. Case studies are often used for exploratory research such as this one, when there is
little or no existing theory. The preceding chapters demonstrated how conventional theories do
not adequately address how AI creates organizational knowledge. Strategy workshops and
conferences have been underexplored by scholars both theoretically and empirically, and the few
existing studies also relied on a case study design.
In this study, I probed the activities of a single AI summit. Although a comparison of
multiple cases can lead to more robust, generalizable findings, the exploratory nature of this
study justifies the use of a single-case design. The research question asks the question of how
and why an AI summit generates organizational knowledge from a systems perspective. A
systems perspective requires one to look at the phenomenon of interest as a whole that is
different from its parts. “The performance of a system is not the sum of the independent effect of
its parts; it is the product of their interactions” (Gharajedaghi & Ackoff, 1985, cited in Patton,
2002, p. 121). The foundational question revolves around the “how” and the “why” a system as a
whole functions the way it does (Patton, 2002). This assumption is consistent with Luhmann’s
social systems theory, which is grounded in a systems perspective.
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The study takes an inductive and iterative approach to theorizing. At the early stages of
this research during the pilot phase, I was planning to study the impact of the psychological state
called “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) on the outcomes of an AI summit. Flow is a state in
which one is fully absorbed in the task at hand. It has been linked to optimal performance in
individuals. However, when I actually participated in a summit conference as part of the pilot
study, I was struck by the extent to which knowledge was made explicit, shared and combined
into new knowledge, which then formed the basis for further action.
The presence of external stakeholders was also extremely important. My participantobservations from the summit shifted my focus to organizational knowledge creation. I began
theorizing by drawing upon the organizational knowledge creation theory proposed by Nonaka
and his colleagues (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000). These findings were
presented to the sales leadership team who sponsored the summit. Nonaka’s theory seemed to be
in congruence with the overall dynamics that appeared to be driving the summit in terms of tacit
to explicit knowledge conversion. However, on closer scrutiny, the theory was insufficient in
explaining the specific social practices and activities at a summit. I then looked at the literature
on organizational knowledge creation that was more grounded in Maturana and Varela’s theories
of cognition. In the next iteration, I shifted to Luhmann’s social systems theory to develop a
conceptual model and propositions.
After familiarizing myself with Luhmann’s social systems, I went back to the data I had
collected, analyzing the data for illustrative examples of the conceptual model I had developed.
The study is inductive and iterative in its theorizing. It is important to note that it does not take a
grounded theory approach to theorizing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory consists of a
specific, research method, which involves systematic procedures of coding and categorizing
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(Patton, 2002, p. 127). In its purest form, grounded theorists begin with no presupposed theory.
The empirical data grounds the theory. In contrast, this study tries to build theory not only by
extrapolating from the empirical data, but also guided by pre-existing theories from neighboring
domains.
Sampling
The sampling strategy for this study was opportunistic. I had taken a course on
appreciative inquiry by Cooperrider in the spring of 2010 at the Drucker School of Management
as part of my requirements for an MBA degree. I approached Cooperrider about my research
interests in the AI summit methodology, and in January, 2011, he offered to introduce me to a
mid-west company that regularly conducted these summits for visioning and strategic planning
purposes. Cooperrider was a consultant to this company, and was planning to be facilitate an AIbased sales summit in February for this company. The company, TireCo—a pseudonym—
distributed tires to car dealers in the US and Canada. The AI approach to organizational
development was an integral part of their growth strategy, and it had been conducting AI
summits on a regular basis for approximately five years.
The Chief Sales and Marketing Officer (CSMO) of TireCo was the sponsor of the
February Sales Summit. She had been working with Cooperrider for more than 10 years, and is
considered one of the experienced practitioners of AI. In her previous job at a major trucking
company, she had organized and executed dozens of summits. She immediately approved my
request to participate in the 4-day summit in the mid-west as an external stakeholder. I was
required to be a full-participant in the conference and not an observer. I paid for travel and
accommodation, but all conference expenses for materials and meals were paid for by TireCo. In
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return, I committed to writing a post-summit report (about 5,000 words) about the conference,
which was submitted to TireCo’s sales organization in April, 2011.
I observed and participated in the February AI summit as an external stakeholder in the
capacity of a graduate student conducting a pilot study for her dissertation research. One of the
goals of the pilot study was to determine how flow might be measured, especially in the group
setting of an AI summit. Prior to my participation, I had not realized how often the group
configurations changed during a summit. In addition, the aspect of knowledge creation appeared
far more significant than the literature had suggested. Subsequently, the research question was
changed to reflect these observations. The revised research question focused on how and why the
activities of an AI summit create organizational knowledge. Institutional Review Board
approvals were sought and provided based on the revised research question.
Key characteristics of the Sales Summit
A closer analysis of the TireCo summit revealed five major characteristics that benefit the
study. First, the summit falls within the parameters of a “regular” summit. AI summits come in a
variety of shapes and sizes. They can be as short as one or two days by selectively focusing on a
particular part of the 4D cycle. They can involve a dozen people on site at the organization, or
tens of thousands of people by utilizing virtual conferencing technologies. TireCo’s summit was
organized very much in line with the practices outlined in Ludema et al.’s (2003) handbook for
practitioners on running AI summits. The summit involved about 400 stakeholders of which
about one in ten were from outside the organization. A steering committee conducted the
planning for the summit, including the choice of a topic statement and the selection of
participants. The summit went through the entire 4D cycle over four days. The activities for each
phase were also standard, starting from high point moment paired interviews in the Discovery,
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and ending with the presentation of business or action plans in the Deployment. A 43-page
workbook was printed and distributed to the participants. The summit relied on self-managed
group activities in which the participants themselves, appointed facilitator roles such as timekeeper, recorder and presenter. The overall summit was facilitated by one external consultant.
Second, the summit method is a routine business practice for strategy development at
TireCo, not a novel, one-time intervention for transformational change. Appreciative inquiry is a
standard business practice that is embedded into their business planning cycle. TireCo is an
entrepreneurial company founded in 1999. Despite the challenging market environment of the
US auto industry, the company has experienced sales growth of nearly 40% a year on the heels
of an innovative new business model. About five years prior to the Sales Summit, TireCo put
together a new management team and recruited executives who had been working at a Fortune
500 trucking company based in the mid-west. The trucking company was one of the early
adopters of the AI method. The management team incorporated the AI method for strategizing
purposes. TireCo had implemented AI summits in previous years to create a set of guiding
principles and values for the company, and to generate a strategic roadmap for the future.
Although TireCo executives talk about the need for constant, transformational change, the
explicit purpose of this particular Sales Summit is strategic planning. The summit was held in the
larger context of positive business results. It is therefore is different in nature from some of the
early, documented cases of AI summits which often involved larger, more established companies
that were using AI as a means for breaking out of stagnation or conflict through transformational
change.
Third, the summit method had buy-in from multiple levels of the organization because it
is an ongoing practice with demonstrated results. The company’s leadership, including its two
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founders, fully supports the AI method. Buy-in for the method exists among line level
management and employees as well, since many of those who have been at the company longest
have experienced an AI summit and seen the results from those summits. The AI summit
methodology is well aligned with TireCo’s organizational culture. For example, one of the
guiding principles of the company is fairness. This is highly consistent with the democratic
principles of organizing that are foundational to AI summits. At the same time, the summit has
not become so rigid that it has become merely a ritual. A board meeting for developing corporate
strategy, for example, at some corporations can lose its practical value when the business
practice has more meaning as a ceremony or ritual. TireCo has had to hire at a rapid pace to keep
up with accelerating sales. As a result, a significant proportion of the Sales Summit attendees
were relatively new to the company, and for them, the AI method is novel. For those newcomers,
the summit format itself serves to reinforce the open-book culture that TireCo leaders are
promoting.
Fourth, TireCo’s summit is run and facilitated by the most experienced practitioners of
AI, and can be considered a best practice in AI summit execution. The main internal “owner”
and sponsor of the Sales Summit process—the chief sales and marketing officer—is an expert in
AI. She has been working with Cooperrider for many years, and has directly supervised dozens
of summits, making her one of the most seasoned practitioners of AI summits in the world.
Cooperrider himself, is the external consultant facilitating the Sales Summit. Cooperrider is a cofounder of the AI approach, and continues to be considered the foremost expert in AI. Since
TireCo has conducted several summits before, the company has procedures, positions, and tools
in place to facilitate the smooth execution of the summit. Nearly 80% of the employees at the
time attended the summit in the previous year and have first-hand experience of the process.
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Significant financial resources were committed for implementing the summit as well. The
conference was held at a luxury hotel in the downtown area near TireCo’s corporate office, using
the main ballroom for the plenary session, and many of the adjacent meeting rooms for breakout
sessions. Hundreds of participants were flown in from across the country. The conference was
conducted from Tuesday to Friday, requiring accommodation from out-of-town participants for
at least four nights. The entire proceedings for the plenary session were recorded by a
professional video production crew. A graphic artist was hired to graphically record the key
point of the conference in real time.
Finally, the summit also includes events that are not purely strategizing activities,
allowing for better observation of the oscillation between strategic and operating routines.
The Sales Summit also included sessions that were not part of the AI summit. For example, the
morning of the second day was devoted to education and training sessions. Recognition dinners
were held in the evening to honor the best performers of the sales organization. Other social
events encouraged networking among the sales organization. Breakfasts and lunches often
doubled as an unofficial space for conducting business meetings. Breaks between the summit
activities were often used to conduct day-to-day operations. This meant that a given individual
would go back and forth between strategizing, networking and operational activities, offering an
opportunity to study how such oscillations affect knowledge creation.
The sampled case also has weaknesses. The summit focused specifically on the sales
organization rather than the business as a whole. Roughly half of the company’s employees
participated in the conference, with representation from all departments but skewed heavily
towards sales and marketing. External stakeholders mainly consisted of TireCo’s customers such
as dealers and auto manufacturers. Suppliers such as tire manufacturers, software vendors and
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transportation companies were not represented, possibly because a separate summit had been
organized the week after to address the supply chain. As a result, the Sales Summit did not
represent the whole organizational ecosystem. In addition, since this study developed out of a
pilot study involving a single researcher—myself, I could only observe and participate in the
activities of one group configuration at a time. These issues will be addressed more fully in the
next section on data collection. Despite these shortcomings, the paucity of existing empirical and
theoretical research on the strategizing activities of an AI summit means that this study will
likely make a contribution to the literature.
Data collection
Data was collected in two stages. In the pilot study phase, I collected data from three
sources: participant-observation, informal conversations, and documents. I was a full participant
of all of TireCo’s activities during the four days of the Sales Summit, including all of the summit
activities and most of the corporate events (training, socials and recognition dinner). Detailed
notes were taken of my observations, including my comments related to reflexivity. I did not
keep a separate research journal on my reflections. Instead, I recorded observations of reflexivity
and possible bias directly into my observation notes. I also had many informal conversations
during the summit activities, breaks and at social events. I kept notes of the conversations that I
thought might have implications for my research. I also exchanged emails with some of the
participants after the conference. Prior to attending the summit, I conducted a document search
on the Internet. I collected data from the company’s website, as well as news databases to gather
published news articles about the company. TireCo also sent me emails after the summit
regarding post-summit activities. Some of the data collected was used to write a 5,000 word
post-summit report which was submitted and distributed to the key sales executives at TireCo
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including the chief sales and marketing officer. The report was a subjective account of the
summit proceedings written in a journalistic format.
During the pilot study, I had been reading Polanyi’s (2009) seminal book on tacit
knowing, The Tacit Dimension as well as Bohm’s (1996) book On Dialogue. These two books
had a profound influence on how I approached and thought about the summit, and precipitated a
shift in the topic of interest towards knowledge creation. A more thorough literature review on
both appreciative inquiry and organizational knowledge creation was conducted, and the research
question was revised to reflect the shift in focus. Permission to collect data was obtained from
the Internal Review Board in September, 2011, on the basis of the revised research question.
The second stage of data collection began shortly after IRB approval. The additional data
collected consisted of video footage from the Sales Summit, interviews, and additional
documents from the Sales Summit. This data was collected during a visit to TireCo’s Cleveland
headquarters for 3 days in October, 2011. TireCo provided me with approximately 15 hours of
unedited video footage from all four days of the plenary session of the Sales Summit. The
footage came from one of the three cameras, Camera C, which recorded the speakers on stage.
Audio from speakers on the floor was also captured. All the video was time-coded. The High
Definition digital video files were saved on a hard disk drive. This video was then converted into
WMV file formats with time codes embedded in the footage, using Adobe Premiere. These
WMV files were imported into nVivo, a qualitative analysis software package, and then
manually transcribed.
During the November visit to TireCo, I conducted interviews with several TireCo
employees and executives. All interviewees signed a consent form. The purpose of the
interviews was to begin gathering data about the impact of the Sales Summit on the interviewees
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and the operations of TireCo. Notes were taken and in some cases, the interviews were recorded.
I also delivered a presentation to TireCo’s sales executives on the topic of the current study,
including an overview of Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory. Although
participant feedback was not officially recorded, the participants were supportive of the study,
and genuinely interested in my take of AI as a system of knowledge creation. In addition, TireCo
provided additional documents and artifacts from the Sales Summit. Digital files of planning
materials including floorplans, master planning document, meeting notes, agenda, workbook,
group configurations and presentation PowerPoint slides were obtained. I was given a
photocopied set of the handwritten table notes from the group tasks.
Multiple sources of data will not only enhance the depth and breadth of the data, but also
increase validity through triangulation (Yin, 2011). The video footage in particular, allows a
robust way to validate observations made during my participant-observation. Since the video
only recorded presentations and comments delivered at the plenary session, planning documents
and table notes from the summit provide additional levels of detail about the composition of the
groups, and discussions at the breakout session. However, the strategizing activities in table
groups were not fully recorded. Observations from these sessions are limited to the notes I took
during my participant-observation in the pilot phase. No data was collected to reconstruct what
happened in the breakout sessions I did not participate in, except for the table notes recorded by
the recorder, and the remarks made by the presenters in the plenary session. The breakout
sessions are important from a group dynamics perspective. An ethnographic study of the microlevel strategizing activities at a summit would be incomplete without a comprehensive record of
the breakout session. The temporal ordering of events is important in process research, and the
breakout sessions represent gaps in the data set if the entire AI summit. In this study, I focus on
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the plenary session as the interaction system of interest, as it is only the plenary session in which
all the participants of the summit are physically present. Although it is desirable for future
studies to collect more data on the breakout sessions, for the scope of this current study,
supplementing these gaps with my observations from the pilot study should suffice.
Data analysis
This study is theoretical in nature and does not aim to test an existing theory. Data was
reviewed and analyzed in multiple phases to facilitate theorizing. In the first phase, I developed a
descriptive, 5,000 word summary of the conference, based on the notes I had taken during my
participant-observation. This exercise familiarized me with the data. These reflections, coupled
with a literature review on AI, large group methods and organizational knowledge creation,
enabled me to begin conceptualizing AI summits as a forum for creating new organizational
knowledge. In the next phase, I focused on Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory
as an alternative framework for explaining AI summits. I reviewed my notes to find illustrative
examples of the theory. While it was relatively easy to find examples of Externalization and
Combination, I found it difficult to operationalize tacit knowledge. I consequently went back to
the literature on social systems theory to develop a conceptual model of AI summits from
Luhmann’s social systems perspective.
Data was entered into a database created with the software package nVivo. The primary
data source was the transcriptions from the 15 hours of video footage from the plenary session,
supplemented with other data described in the previous section. I then looked for illustrative
examples that demonstrate the insights gained by analyzing the structure of an AI summit seen
through a social systems lens. As most readers will be unfamiliar with the theories of autopoiesis
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and Luhmann’s social systems, the next two chapters will provide an overview of their core
concepts and how they are being applied to organizational studies.
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Chapter 5 Theoretical Lens: Autopoiesis

Empirical origins of autopoiesis
The empirical roots of autopoiesis can be traced to experiments Maturana conducted on
vision in the 1960s. Maturana taught biology at the medical school of the University of Chile in
Santiago while pursuing research in the neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of vision. Varela
had been his student. For a while, Maturana experimented on frogs and pigeons without ever
questioning the conventional view that there existed “an objective reality independent of the
observer”(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xv). But when he and his fellow researchers began to
examine color vision, they quickly found this approach “leads to deep trouble” (p. xiv). They
could not seem to map the visible world of color in the external world onto the activity of the
nervous system. They tried a new approach. Instead of correlating physical stimuli to the nervous
system, they attempted “to correlate the activity in the retina with the color experience of the
subject” (p. xv). Explains Maturana:
The new approach required us to treat seriously the activity of the nervous system as
determined by the nervous system itself, and not by the external world; thus the external
world would only have a triggering role in the release of the internally-determined
activity of the nervous system. (p. xv)
This approach required them to “close off” the nervous system from its environment and
treat it as if it were the whole system. Perception would be viewed not “as a grasping of an
external reality, but as the specification of one” (p. xv). What this means is that it is impossible
to distinguish perception from hallucination in a closed system. The color spectrum experienced
by the nervous system would be essentially the same for visions of reality or hallucination. This
approach is a radical departure from the tradition in biology of assuming there is “an objective
reality independent of the observer”(p. xiv). Perception had to be studied from the inside out,
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“looking at the properties of the nervous system as the generator of phenomena, rather than as a
filter on the mapping of reality” (Winograd & Flores, 1987, p. 42). The goal was to understand
how the retina and the nervous system participate in generating the color space. This radical
approach enabled Maturana and his colleagues to map out the entire color space of the observer.
Previous experiments in vision by other researchers lent credibility to treating the nervous
system as closed, autonomous, and self-referential. Maturana and Varela (1987) cited research
by Sperry in the mid-1940s as an example. In this experiment, the eye of a tadpole is surgically
rotated 180 degrees and left to develop into its mature adult state. The experimenters then cover
the rotated eye so that the frog can only see with its normal one. The frog is shown a worm. Its
tongue shoots out to capture its prey. When the frog can only see with its rotated eye, however, it
consistently misses by a deviation of exactly 180 degrees. “The frog shoots out its tongue as if
the retinal zone where the image of the prey is formed were in its normal position” (p. 125)
noted Maturana and Varela. This could “be direct evidence that the operation of the nervous
system is an expression of its connectivity or structure of connections and that behavior arises
because of the nervous system’s internal relations of activity” (p. 126).
Maturana felt he had made significant findings in his research on vision and perception,
and began studying cognition as a biological phenomenon. In March of 1969, Maturana accepted
an invitation from von Foerster—a physicist and a prominent figure in cybernetic theory—to
speak at a conference in Chicago on the anthropology of cognition (Maturana & Varela, 1980).
The interdisciplinary nature of the symposium inspired him to reflect upon the broader
implications of his research and to deliver a speech on the neurophysiology of cognition without
talking about neuronal circuits. The following year, he published an essay based on his findings.
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What is autopoiesis?
What Maturana would propose represented a paradigm shift in the way we think of
systems today. In traditional biology, living systems were viewed as purposeful, open systems
that have inputs and outputs. Change came from the environment. Living systems respond to
those changes based on its purpose. Open systems thinking was first proposed by the biologist
von Bertalanffy (1969) in 1940. “The organism is not a closed, but an open system. We term a
system ‘closed’ if no material enters or leaves it; it is called ‘open’ if there is import and export
of material” (p. 121). The theory’s scope was expanded from physics and biology into a general
systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1969). The idea that systems are open and that the environment
can change a system has become so pervasive that we take it for granted. Porter’s five forces
framework for industrial analysis is more or less exclusively about how the environment
influences a company’s competitiveness. “Traditional approaches to organization theory have
been dominated by the idea that change originates in the environment” (Morgan, 1997, p. 253).
Maturana’s experiments on vision led him to the conclusion that living systems are
closed, not open, in their organization. In the early 1970s, Maturana expanded those ideas with
his student Varela into a theory of cognition that rigorously explained what attributes make
living systems living. “Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally,
they are continually self-producing” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 43). Living systems are
systems of interactions, they argued. These interactions are not organized in the linear mode of
inputs and outputs, where a certain input leads to a certain output. Instead, the units of
interactions are “all organized in a closed causal circular process” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.
9). These systems of interactions maintain their circularity, independent of the environment; they
are closed systems. The closed system’s autonomous, circular, self-referential structure, enables
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it to reproduce itself on the basis of an ongoing production of its own components using the very
components that itself produced. This process is called autopoiesis.
Autopoiesis is a word invented by Maturana and Varela. Maturana stumbled upon the
Greek word poiesis while conversing with a friend who had written an essay on Don Quixote.
His friend was analyzing Don Quixote’s “dilemma of whether to follow the path of arms (praxis,
action) or the path of letters (poiesis, creation, production)”(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii).
The prefix auto was added. “We could not escape being immersed in a tradition, but with an
adequate language we could orient ourselves differently and, perhaps, from the new perspective
generate a new tradition” (p. xvii).
The formal definition of autopoiesis is rather intimidating. Maturana and Varela
described autopoiesis in the context of living machines. An autopoietic machine (or system) is:
…a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production
(transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which:
(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate the network of
processes (relations) that produced them; and
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a
network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 78-79)
Maturana and Varela described this at the cellular level in The Tree of Knowledge, a book
intended as an advanced introduction to their theory. A cell’s molecular components are
dynamically related to each other through a dynamic network of ongoing interactions, what
biochemists call “cell metabolism” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, pp. 43-44). What makes cells
distinctive from other natural collections of molecular transformations (and hence, make them
living) is their autopoiesis.
…this cell metabolism produces components which make up the network of
transformations that produced them. Some of these components form a boundary, a limit
to this network of transformations. (p. 44)
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This boundary is the cell’s membrane; it is a product of the cell’s metabolism. The membrane
limits the cell’s network of transformation (the cell’s metabolism) from extending beyond the
membrane. In this sense, the membrane is not only produced by the transformation network but
also actively participates in the network by playing a functional role, so to speak. It is this special
spatial arrangement (i.e. the membrane separating the cell from its medium) that prevents the
cell’s metabolism from disintegrating into “a molecular mess that would spread out all over and
would not constitute a discrete unity such as a cell” (p. 46).
Open systems theory has conditioned us to hardly question the distinctions we draw
between a system and its environment (Morgan, 1997). Maturana and Varela challenged the
validity of system boundaries in open systems, because those boundaries are drawn by an
external observer, not by the system itself. “The most striking feature of an autopoietic system is
that it pulls itself up by its own bootstraps and becomes distinct from its environment through its
own dynamics” such that the system and its environment become “inseparable” (p. 47). The
system’s dynamics produces a system’s boundary which in turn produces the system’s dynamics
and so forth in a circular, self-referential manner. Unlike an input-output model, there is not
beginning or end.
When self-referential systems couple to other self-referential systems, “a change in any
one element can transform all the others” (Morgan, 1997, p. 254). This is reminiscent of chaos
theory and the butterfly effect, in which a flutter of a butterfly’s wing can generate a string of
interactions that produce a hurricane weeks later (Gleick, 1987). Morgan used the honeybee to
demonstrate the implications of autopoietic theory in analyzing complex systems. A honeybee is
part of a chain of circular, self-referential relations. Its physiological system is coupled to a
society of bees which is coupled to a wider ecology. Eliminating the bees changes the whole
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ecology because the bees are linked to the botanical system which links to other systems such as
insects, animals, and people. I quote at length, as Morgan eloquently explains a crucial point:
We could attempt to understand such systems by drawing an artificial boundary between
system and environment—for example, around the individual bee, or the society of bees,
or the bee-flora-fauna system—but in doing se we breake the circular chain of interaction.
An understanding of the autopoietic nature of systems requires that we understand how
each element simultaneously combines the maintenance of itself with the maintenance of
the others. It is simply not good enough to dismiss a large part of the circular chain of
interaction as “the environment.” The environment is part of the bee system, and the
different levels are in effect coproduced. (Morgan, 1997, p. 254)
The implication of autopoiesis for thinking about change is not insignificant. Changes do
not come from the environment. They come from “variations within the overall system that
modify the basic mode of organization” (p. 254).
Adaptation through structural coupling
The ultimate aim of autopoietic systems is self-reproduction. “Their own organization
and identity is their most important product” (Morgan, 1997, p. 253). When it loses its identity as
a unified whole, the system disintegrates. Maturana and Varela had proposed the simple but
powerful idea that “the essential characteristic of a living system is that it is a collection of
components constituting a unity that can live or die” (Winograd & Flores, 1987, p. 45) and
therefore, “that exactly this simple property leads to the complex phenomena of life” (p. 45).
Maturana and Varela’s (1980) theorizing culminated in the essay “Autopoiesis and
Cognition” first published in 1973. “This small book is very large: it contains the living universe,”
proclaimed Beer (1980, p. 66), a prominent cybernetician who wrote the introduction to the
essay when it was republished in book format seven years later. He explained:
The authors first of all say that an autopoietic system is a homeostat. We already know
what that is: a device for holding a critcial systemic variable within physiological limits.
They go on to the definitive point: in the case of autopoietic homeostasis, the critical
variable is the system’s own organization. It does not matter, it seems, whether every
measurable property of that organizational structure changes utterly in the system’s
process of continuing adaptation. It survives (p. 66).
75

There are two ways an organization can remain static and constant. Either the
components themselves are held constant or the relationships between components are
maintained. Autopoietic systems fall in the latter category. Autopoietic systems can be integrated
into larger systems as parts without losing their autopoietic nature. Physical, autopoietic systems
can be divided and analyzed as parts, but this “does not reveal the nature of the domain of
interactions that they define” (p. 82).
The theory of autopoiesis invites the observer to see the system in its unity, not by its
components. The way a system maintains its circularity (i.e. how the system organizes itself) can
evolve over time. Maturana and Varela posited that living systems are closed, but they are by no
means isolated. Nor do they claim that the structure of the system is fixed; a living system’s
structure is plastic and can change so long as those changes allow it to maintain its overall
organization and identity. Autopoiesis assumes that living systems are inherently purposeless;
there are no innate programs or projects being realized in and through them (p. 85). Nor do
systems have any inherent role or function per se. These notions “are established by the observer
and belong exclusively to his domain of description” (p. 86). Therefore, “the notions of purpose
and function have no explanatory value in the phenomenological domain in which they pretend
to illuminate” (p. 86).
An autopoietic system simultaneously tries to maintain itself while it maintains other
unities that are structurally coupled to it. A particular living being exists “in a medium that
constitutes the ambience in which it emerges and in which it interacts”(Maturana & Varela, 1987,
p. 95). The ambience has its own structure “operationally distinct from the living being” (p. 95).
These two structures—the living being and the environment—interact with each other in
congruence with their respective structures. They may trigger perturbations in each other’s
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structure but importantly, neither the living being nor the environment can specify or instruct the
structural changes in the other resulting from the interaction. A history of recurring interactions
results in the structurally coupled systems to adapt their structures accordingly.
Autopoietic systems interact with other systems through its environment, just like
systems in open systems theory. However, operationally, they are closed. Systems can
structurally couple to one another in a circular manner, just like the dynamic feedback loops in
open systems theory. The difference though, is that systems can only refer to itself. It is selfreferencing. Unlike open systems theory, the system produces the distinction between itself and
the environment, not an external observer. The system produces its boundaries and distinguishes
itself from the environment. It is this distinction that the system makes, that makes a system a
system. Without that distinction, the system is no longer a unity and would collapse into the
environment. The system can refer to the environment, but only on its own terms. Its references
to the environment can never be accurate one-to-one representations. The environment might be
described through language. Those descriptions are produced by the system and are therefore,
self-referential.
A nervous system is autopoietic. “For the operation of the nervous system, there is no
inside or outside, but only maintenance of correlations that continuously change”(Maturana &
Varela, 1987, p. 169). Furthermore, “in each interaction it is the nervous system’s structural state
that specifies what perturbations are possible and what changes trigger them” (p. 169). The
nervous system is recognized as a unified whole by virtue of its operational closure. Maturana
and Varela objected to the popular metaphor of referring to the brain as “an information
processing device” saying that not only is it ambiguous, “but patently wrong” (p. 169):
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…the nervous system does not “pick up information” from the environment as we often
hear. On the contrary, it brings forth a world by specifying what patterns of the
environment are perturbations and what changes trigger them in the organism. (p.169)
Autopoiesis and human cognition
Living systems are characterized by autopoiesis. Couplings on the second-order create
unities such as metacellular systems and organisms. Organisms can further couple on the third
order and generate new domains from which social phenomena can emerge. Maturana and
Varela go on to describe communication, language, and cognition based on the theory of
autopoiesis. When we observe organisms coordinating their behavior with one other, as
observers, we define this as communication. “Biologically, there is no ‘transmitted information’
in communication” (p. 196). The notion of transmitting information is false because “each
person says what he says or hears what he hears according to his own structural determination;
saying does not ensure listening” (p. 196). Animals can communicate. Only humans though,
have evolved enough to produce the phenomena called language. “The so-called ‘language’ of
bees, for instance, is not a language. It is a mixed case of instinctive and linguistic behaviors” (p.
208). The stability of the linguistic behavior of bees “depends on the genetic stability of the
species and not on the cultural stability of the social system in which they take place” (p. 208),
and hence, do not constitute language.
Language is an ongoing process, perhaps better described as “languaging.” Language can
radically modify domains of human behavior. For example, languaging “enables those who
operate in it to describe themselves and their circumstances through the linguistic distinction of
linguistic distinctions” (Emphasis in the original, p. 210). Self description, therefore, is a key
feature of language. Distinctions made using language form webs of distinctions that give rise to
meaning, observation, reflection, and consciousness. All these are social phenomena. The
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phenomenon of consciousness is one of the “unique features of human social life and its intense
linguistic coupling” (p. 223). Maturana and Varela posited that phenomena such as selfconsciousness, awareness and mind take place in language, and therefore “take place only in the
social domain” (p. 230) or in other words, “the realm of social coupling” (p. 234), and not
something that is within our brains. They came to a radical conclusion, reminiscent of social
constructionism.
Language was never invented by anyone only to take in an outside world. Therefore, it
cannot be used as a tool to reveal that world. Rather, it is by languaging that the act of
knowing, in the behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a world. (p. 234)
Maturana and Varela’s theory of cognition—knowing how we know—provided a
biological case for social constructionism. “What biology shows us is that the uniqueness of
being human lies exclusively in a social structural coupling that occurs through languaging” (p.
246). Language generated “the regularities proper to the human social dynamics, for example,
individual identity and self-consciousness” (p. 246). It also generated recursive social dynamics
that necessitated “a reflection enabling us to see that as human beings we have only the world
which we create with others—whether we like them or not” (p. 246).
Artificial intelligence, autopoiesis and the birth of Google
Maturana and Varela’s theory of cognition has had less an impact in biology as it has in
other disciplines. Winograd, a professor in computer science and artificial intelligence at
Stanford University, wrote an influential book on the implications of autopoiesis for computer
systems design in the 1980s. Winograd later mentored two students who went on to revolutionize
the world of information systems: Page and Brin, the founders of Google. Winograd was
introduced to autopoiesis through his co-author, Flores. Flores was a former Chilean Minister of
Economics and Finance, who “was instrumental in a large-scale project to apply cybernetic
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theory to practical management problems” (p. xii) in Chile. The project was implemented by
Beers but never completed; Augusto Pinochet ousted Salvador Allende’s government in 1973
and the project was disbanded. Their book, Understanding computers and cognition, devotes a
large portion towards explaining philosophical and biological theories including those of
Heidegger and Maturana. In the preface to the book, the authors justify their approach as
follows:
Readers with a background in science and technology may find it implausible that
philosophical considerations have practical relevance for their work. Philosophy may be
an amusing diversion, but it sees that the theories relevant to technological development
are those of the hard sciences and engineering. We have found quite the opposite.
Theories about the nature of biological existence, about language, and about the nature of
human action have a profound influence on the shape of what we build and how we use it.
(p. xii)
In their book, Winograd and Flores called for programmers to look at systems design in a
new way. The authors criticized “descriptions of human thought as ‘decision making’ and
language understanding as the manipulation of representations” (p. 178). They were deeply
concerned “with the discourse and actions that are generated by a rationalistic interpretation of
human action” (p. 178), especially since computers have a powerful impact “because they are
machines acting in language” (p. 178). Referring to Maturana and his ideas that our cognitive
systems have a plasticity which gives it the “power of structural coupling,” the authors argued:
We cannot directly impose a new structure on any individual, but whenever we design
changes to the space of interactions, we trigger changes in individual structure—changes
to the horizon that is the precondition to understanding. (p. 178)
Winograd played a pivotal role in the development of the search engine that became
Google. Page and Brin, developed the original search engine in his lab at Stanford. Page and
Brin entered the doctoral program in computer science just as the World Wide Web was
emerging. They began collaborating on a project to develop a search engine that could deliver
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high quality search results while keeping up with the exponential growth in web pages.
Winograd was Page’s dissertation adviser at the time. Although the developers of Google did not
explicitly apply autopoiesis to its design, their PageRank system utilized the logic of the internal
structure of the web, specifically its linking structure. This is a major break from previous search
engines that were based on a content classification scheme that categorized web pages according
to “high quality human maintained indices” (p. 1). Unfortunately, such systems are “subjective,
expensive to build and maintain, slow to improve, and cannot cover all esoteric topics” (p. 1).
They were also not that meaningful. “Anyone who has used a search engine recently, can readily
testify that the completeness of the index is not the only factor in the quality of search results” (p.
3).
The PageRank system created massive maps containing hyperlinks. The authors
explained:
These maps allow rapid calculation of a web page’s “PageRank”, an objective measure of
its citation importance that corresponds well with people’s subjective idea of importance.
Because of this correspondence, PageRank is an excellent way to prioritize the results of
web keyword searches. (pp. 3-4)
An inspiration for this design had been the citation mechanism used in academia. The
more an article is cited, the more the author is considered important and relevant. Page noticed
that the link structure of the web allowed Google’s search engine to incorporate a similar logic.
This is why their search results tend to deliver superior results compared to engines using
categories or keywords in text to retrieve pages. Categorization imposes a structure onto the
content and is limited in scalability. In autopoietic terms, the search engines at the time were
essentially imposing an external logic—a search index created by people—onto a system that
was closed, self-referential and reproducing itself based on the ongoing production of hyperlinks.
In contrast, the PageRank algorithm looks at the context of the web page in relation to the whole
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system. The algorithms determine what interactions between pages are relevant and calculate a
score that continually changes as more pages and interactions are added to the system. The
resulting engine, later named Google, has become such a staple of our digital lives that
“Googling” has become synonymous with searching for relevant information. Google’s artificial
intelligence is transforming how humans acquire and interact with knowledge.
Autopoiesis in organization studies
The theory of autopoiesis is deep and complex. At first sight, it seems to complicate
rather than simplify the already challenging task of dealing with a world of complex systems.
Taking autopoiesis seriously requires us to acknowledge the closed nature of systems, and by
extension, challenges the utility and validity of observations and analyses made by a detached,
neutral, objective observer. This has real methodological and research implications for social
scientists. Von Krogh and his colleagues (1994) pondered the consequences of adopting
autopoiesis as the foundation for a new “corporate epistemology.” Their essay appeared in The
Strategic Management Journal, one of the most influential journals in organization studies. It
began:
Dear reader,
Please try to forget the reality you have previously constructed and let yourself be open to
the signals this article carries. These signals are truly distinct from those in previous
articles and books within the strategic management field. (p. 53)
In the essay, the authors proposed autopoiesis as an alternative lens to the cognitivist
approach that had come to dominate strategic management theory. Citing Varela’s work, the
cognitivist notion of knowledge is one in which cognition is primarily characterized by
“information processing and rule-based manipulation of symbols” (p. 57). In this view,
“knowledge is abstract, task-specific and oriented towards problem solving” (p. 57). At the heart
of cognitivism is a representationist view of the world; the goal is to create ever more accurate
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representations that correspond to a pre-given world. These representations are then stored in
knowledge structures (p. 58). As I introduced earlier, autopoiesis rejects this representationist
view of the world. “Knowledge is a component of the autopoietic (self-protective) process, it is
history-dependent, context-sensitive and, rather than being oriented towards problem solutions,
knowledge enables problem definition” (p. 58).
Von Krogh et al. assumed that knowledge is embodied in the individual, and therefore,
“languaging is the nexus of organizational knowledge development” (Emphasis in the original, p.
63). They identified “knowledge connectivity”—how knowledge connects to other
knowledges—as key to understanding organizational knowledge. They also emphasized the
importance of the advancement activities of an organization. Conventional studies in strategy
were oriented towards survival activities, such as market position, planning, and controlling.
Advancement activities on the other hand, develop options for the organization. “Advancement
emerges from knowledge development” (p. 64). Many companies do not have such practices in
place. “There are few theories explaining the, limited knowledge on how to research them, and
few outlets in which to publish” (p. 64).
According to the authors, strategic management simultaneously requires both survival
and advancement activities. They go a step further and argued that “firms can be less different in
terms of their survival activities and more different in terms of their advancement activities” (p.
65). Advancement activities include developing distinctions and norms, scaling knowledge,
ensuring knowledge connectivity, and activities related to self-referencing and languaging. The
research of such activities requires new methodology because the observer-independent
paradigm is unacceptable in an epistemology based on autopoiesis. Von Krogh and his
colleagues questioned the systems-distant observer paradigm, which ran “the risk of becoming
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less and less relevant to practice” because theorizing was becoming ever more self-referential
within the closed domains of academia. They proposed methods such as ethnographies and
action research as appropriate for studying the languaging aspect of advancement activities.
“Languaging in strategic management research means that researchers and practicing
managers cospeculate, costudy, and cowrite” (p. 66) concluded the authors. Appreciative inquiry
(AI) as a research method would fit this bill. But the AI summit method in particular, seems to
go beyond the parameters set by von Krogh and his colleagues have laid out. There is no doubt
an AI summit is an advancement activity. A question remains though, in one of the assumptions
von Krogh et al. made about organizational knowledge. They assumed that individual knowledge
scaled up to organizational knowledge. Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation model is
certainly one way to explain the conversion from individual to organizational knowledge. But as
I noted earlier, Nonaka’s model is difficult to apply to AI summits because of the tacit dimension
of personal knowledge. What I observe to be a tacit to explicit knowledge conversion is based on
my self-referential interpretation of a particular summit. Another observer may interpret the
same events differently. Furthremore, such an analysis would not be based on the system’s
internal logic.
A framework based on autopoiesis would require “that one must be able to give a precise
description of the component production processes” (p. 56). Luhmann tried to do so for social
systems and his theorizing culminated into a general theory of social systems. Application of
autopoietic theory in organizational studies have mostly relied on a Luhmannian lens (See
Bakken & Hernes, 2003). In the next chapter, I will introduce the core ideas of Luhmann’s social
systems theory.
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Chapter 6 Theoretical Lens: Social Systems Theory
Introduction
In his book, Mind and Nature, Bateson (1979) chastised our choice of metaphors for
describing and explaining mental phenomena. Words like power, tension, energy, and forces, all
had a “strange physicalism” to them which in Bateson’s view, reflected notions that were ancient
and obsolete (p. 217). Cognition and behavior are phenomena that arise out of the biological
domain. We unheedingly use words borrowed from physics to describe and explain social
phenomena. Power, tension, energy and forces are staples in the linguistic domain of sociology
and organization studies.
Maturana and Varela’s (1987) concept of autopoietic systems gave us a theory for
explaining the biology of mind and cognition. But they had serious reservations towards
applying their theory to social systems. Autopoietic systems “are characterized by a circular
organization of production processes that continually reproduce and replace the components
necessary” (Mingers, 1995, p. 29) to maintain the system’s unity and survival. To apply
autopoiesis to social systems would require “a precise description of the component
processes…and systems” (von Krogh et al., 1994 p. 56). The conventional view of social
systems such as society and organizations is that they are made up of people. Clearly, society and
organizations cannot reproduce people.
An early attempt to apply autopoiesis to organizations was by Morgan (1997), who chose
autopoiesis as one of the metaphors to describe organizations in his book, Images of
Organization. Morgan used autopoiesis in a metaphorical sense to give an alternative view of
organizations as entities that are in “flux and transformation” (1997). Like Heraclitus’ river,
organizations and their processes never stand still; they are constantly changing. An autopoietic
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view of organizations looked very different when juxtaposed against other metaphors such as the
organization as brain or prison.
Luhmann (1995) went much further. He spent much of his later career rigorously
applying autopoiesis to sociology. He recognized autopoietic theory as “the current state of the
art in general systems theory” (p. 11), and developed a theory of social systems around it. His
innovation was to specify what a social system produced. Social systems produced
communications. They were autopoietic systems that maintained their unity of organization
through the ongoing production of communications. Organizations were conceptualized as a
special type of social system, one that maintains itself through the ongoing production of
decision communications.
Luhmann wrote over 50 books and several hundred articles during his lifetime (Seidl &
Becker, 2006). He died in 1998. Luhmann scholars like Seidl and Becker have written that he “is
generally considered of equal rank and standard to the works by such prominent social theorists
as Bourdieu, Giddens, Foucault and Habermas” (p. 10). The bulk of Luhmann’s work has not
been translated into English, however. One of his important works on organization theory
Organisation und Entscheidung (“Organization and decision”) published posthumously in 2000
has yet to appear in English. He remains virtually unknown in the United States. Recently,
scholars in Europe such as Baecker, Seidl, Becker, and Schoeneborn, have been actively
publishing research applying Luhmann’s theories to the study of organizations. For this study
therefore, I will rely heavily on the work of these scholars that have appeared in English
language books (Bakken & Hernes, 2003; Seidl & Becker, 2005b), and journals including
Organization (e.g. Baecker, 2006; Mohe & Seidl, 2011; Seidl & Becker, 2006), Academy of
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Management Review (Kieser, 2007), and Organization Studies (Blaschke, Schoeneborn, & Seidl,
2012; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008).
Similar to von Bertalanffy (1969), who generalized a biological theory into open systems
theory, Luhmann abstracted the principles of autopoiesis and modified them into a general theory
for explaining social systems. Luhmann was already a highly prolific and noted sociologist in his
native Germany when he began contemplating the sociological implications of autopoiesis in the
1980s. Born in 1927, Luhmann began his academic career extending the work of Parsons, whom
he met while studying at Harvard University in 1960 to 1961 (Seidl & Becker, 2005a). In the
early 1970s, he “quickly gained publicity as a relentless critic” (Knodt, 1995 p. xiv) of Habermas,
a sociologist who represented the Frankfurt School of thought. Luhmann went on to develop his
own “grand theory” by proposing a paradigm shift in sociology. He called for a “break with the
structural-functionalism of Talcott Parson” (Knodt, 1995 p. xiv) and instead adopt “theoretical
models developed in the biology of cognition and second order cybernetics” (p. xiv). This
culminated in the publication of Soziale Systeme published in German in 1984, and translated
into English in 1995 under the title Social Systems.
Luhmann (1995) claimed in his introduction to Social Systems that traditional sociology
“adheres to the model of the classical authors” (p. 1) and has not linked to the developments in
systems theory. He described what he saw as a “paradigm change” in systems theory that could
greatly benefit the study of society. There were two moves that brought about this shift. The first
was “to replace the traditional difference between whole and part with that between system and
environment” (Emphasis in the original, p. 6). This move was led by von Bertalanffy who
developed open systems theory. A closed system in this context was defined as a system “for
which the environment has no significance or is significant only through specified channels” (p.
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7). Rather than looking at the difference between the whole and its parts, attention shifted to
discerning different systems.
The second turn, argued Luhmann, came from “a surpassingly radical further step” (p. 8)
in the form of theories of self-referential systems. He conceded there is no generally accepted
theoretical foundation for such theories. “Enough is apparent, however, for us to assess the
consequences for a theory of social systems” (p. 8). He was referring to the theory of autopoiesis.
He explained:
The theory of self-referential systems maintains that systems can differentiate only by
self-reference, which is to say, only insofar as systems refer to themselves (be this to
elements of the same system, to operations of the same system, or to the unity of the
same system) in constituting their elements and their elemental operations. (p. 9)
Given the constraints of only being able to refer to themselves, for systems to differentiate
themselves they have to do the following:
Systems must create and employ a description of themselves; they must at least be able to
use the difference between system and environment within themselves for orientation and
as a principle for creating information. Therefore, self-referential closure is only possible
in an environment, only under ecological conditions. (p. 9)
Everything that is attributed to the environment can only be introduced as a distinction between
system and environment. “The (subsequently) classical distinction between “closed” and “open”
is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness” (p. 9).
The resulting theory is more complex and nuanced. “One can now distinguish the
system/environment difference as seen from the perspective of an observer (e.g., that of a
scientist) from the system/environment difference as it is used within the system itself” (p. 9).
Luhmann identified some of the “remarkable shifts” in general systems theory that this provoked,
“from interest in design and control to an interest in autonomy and environmental sensitivity,
from planning to evolution, from structural stability to dynamic stability” (p. 10).
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Luhmann tried to bring autopoietic theory into the realm of action systems. Some
scholars like Mingers (2003), however, question the validity of applying autopoiesis to social
systems. But Luhmann has emphasized that he was abstracting the principles of autopoiesis
relevant to a general systems theory rather than adhering to them literally. One of the most
important consequences was what Luhmann (1995) called “the radical temporalization of the
element” (p. 11). An element is anything that comprises a system. An element is produced as a
result of being used by the system (Luhmann 1997, pp. 65-66 in Seidl & Becker, 2006, p. 16).
Anything that is not used by the system for its self-reproduction is not an element. When
appropriating the theory of autopoiesis to action systems such as organizations, the theory cannot
hold unless it is taken as a fact that system elements have no duration. Elements of a system
vanish as soon as the system produces them. This is not so in biological systems. Elements have
a shelf life, no matter how short. Luhmann (1995) was saying that the constraint peculiar to a
social system’s autonomy is:
the fact that the system would simply cease to exist in any, even the most favorable,
environment if it did not equip the momentary elements that compose it with the capacity
for connection, that is, with meaning, and thus reproduce them. (p. 11)
Luhmann was conceptualizing social systems as meaning systems. Meaning dissolves no sooner
than it appears. When meaning loses its ability to connect to meaning, a social system cannot
maintain its identity and will cease to exist.
Luhmann’s theorizing has been called radical not only for his application of a radical
form of systems theory, autopoiesis. His work is sometimes characterized as radical
constructivism, a form of social constructionism that “expresses the idea that all cognitions
(ideas) are constructs of the respective cognitive system and do not in any way reflect any kind
of external reality” (Seidl, 2005a, p. 23). Luhmann also assumed that systems exist. Though this
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may not sound radical, some theorists use systems exclusively as a construct or concept used for
analysis. “The most narrow interpretation of systems theory as a mere method for analyzing
reality is deliberately avoided” (1995, p. 120). Systems are real; they are part of our world.
Without systems, “the social world disintegrates, as it is no longer possible to distinguish what is
from what is not, from what is the system and what is the environment” (Bakken & Hernes, 2003
p. 10). That does not imply that social systems are living systems. On the contrary, Luhmann
drew a sharp distinction between meaning and life.
In Luhmann’s hierarchy of systems (Figure 1), social systems and living systems are
separate entities. They are distinguished according to their purpose: to give meaning or to give
life. Since cognitive systems give meaning, they are not living systems either. Luhmann labeled
the cognitive systems of people “psychic systems” and differentiated them from social systems
based on “whether they use consciousness or communication as modes of meaning-based
reproduction” (Luhmann, 2005a, p. 65). This scheme was intended for the observaton of systems,
not as a scheme for the operations of systems. “This kind of approach is only usable only if we
are prepared to accept its anti-Aristotelian premise that social systems, and even psychic systems,
are not living systems” (Luhmann, 2005a, p. 65). In this study, I will substitute the expression
“psychic” with “psychological” where possible to avoid any unintended, mystical connotations
the word psychic might convey.
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Figure 1. Typology of self-referential autopoietic systems. Adapted from Luhmann (1990, p. 2)
The clear distinction Luhmann makes between social and psychological systems, and as a
consequence, social and pscyhological phenomena, is “the most striking” of his conceptual
achievements, according to Seidl and Becker (2005a, p. 9). People do not make up an
organization. People constitute the environment for organizations and vice versa. Constructs like
intrinsic motivation, psychological safety, and the intent of an individual, cannot be employed to
explain the system dynamics of an organization. These are constructs that apply to a specific
individual’s psychological system. The psychological system’s operations are completely closed
off from an organizaton’s system, and cannot contribute any element in its operations. Perhaps
even more counterintuitive but nevertheless important to note, is that the notion of a “person” or
a “human being” does not exist as a systemic unity under Luhmann (Seidl, 2005a, p. 31). A
person, in the world of Luhmann, is a “conglomerate” of psychological and organic systems. “In
other words, ‘persons’ do not exist as such: they are not systems, but a construct of the social
system” (pp. 31-32).
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The advantage of this conceptualization is that we can analyze the logic of social systems
“in its own right, thereby shedding light on the genuine dynamics that social phenomena possess,
independent of individual psychic processes” (Seidl & Becker, 2005a, p. 9). This is especially
useful in analyzing the dynamics of an AI summit because we can begin to unpack the impact of
positivity. The effect of positive psychology is limited exclusively to individual participants of a
summit, and cannot apply to the organization or interaction system. Seidl and Becker (2005a)
have cautioned:
That does not mean, however—and this is where the controversy started—that the human
being is irrelevant to the social system; on the contrary, as Luhmann stressed over and
over again, it only underlines the relevance of the two systems for each other. (p. 9)
One of the reasons why Luhmann’s work has “received comparatively little serious
attention within the international field of organizational studies” (Seidl and Becker, p. 10) is the
complexity of the theory itself. It is based on autopoietic theory, which is a radical departure
from the open systems theory many organizational scholars are used to. The “distinctive
terminology” (p. 10) Luhmann used for the concepts he used is another barrier. Common words
like “communication” and “knowledge” are defined and used in unconventional ways. This is
somewhat unavoidable when new theory that is based on a paradigmatic shift is introduced.
Finally, Luhmann’s social systems theory essentially “brackets out” individuals from the
organizational picture; this has been a source of both contention and confusion. Despite such
limitations, there has been a marked uptick in the application of Luhmann in the organizational
literature. These studies are highly informative in viewing AI summit from a social systems
perspective and will provide the launching ground for developing an alternative view of AI
summits. These will be covered in Chapter 6. At this point, I will briefly go over some of the
core concepts in Luhmann’s social systems theory that are particularly relevant to this study.
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Social systems
Communication as elemental unit.
Luhmann’s innovation in applying autopoietic theory to social systems was to specify
what they reproduce. Luhmann posited that social systems maintain their unity through an
ongoing production of communication. In doing so, Luhmann rejected the notion that social
systems are constituted by action. “It is not action but rather communication that is an
unavoidably social operation and at the same time an operation that necessarily comes into play
whenever social situations arise” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 252). This has significant implications for
organization theory. It implies that all organizational issues are fundamentally issues of
communication.
Luhmann’s conceptualization of communication is sophisticated and unconventional,
which I will subsequently explain in more detail. At the current point in our discussion, I would
like to point out a few key points in Luhmann’s notion of communications. In his view, “only
communication can communicate and that only within such a network of communication is what
we understand as action created” (Emphasis in the original, p. 251). Luhmann was saying that
only social systems have the ability to communicate. People do not and cannot communicate.
This sounds like a wild proposition. It only makes sense in the context of Luhmann’s definition
of what a communication is, and what it is not. According to Luhmann, communication is an
inherently social phenomenon requiring the social coupling of at least two people. A person’s
utterance becomes a communication only when it is perceived and understood (or
misunderstood) by another. The concept of communication that we are used to, was developed
by information theorists of the late 20th century who essentially stripped out the meaning
contained in communication to advance theorizing using mathematical models. Luhmann broke
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from tradition to include understanding as a key component that is part and parcel of
communication. When meaning is brought back into the picture, communication can only be
defined as a social event.
People make their thoughts known through language. A soliloquy becomes a
communication only when there is someone else there to perceive it. At that point, the soliloquy
becomes a social phenomenon produced by the social system. The production and reproduction
of communication, is therefore confined exclusively to social systems. A distinction must be
made between communicating and what Maturana and Varela called languaging. This fine
distinction allows us to study the dynamics of communication in and of themselves.
All social systems maintain their unity by reproducing communication. There are three
basic types of social systems in Luhmann’s classification of systems (Figure 1): societies,
organizations, and interactions. Luhmann described them as:
(1) interactions, the smallest and most elusive form of social gatherings on the
microlevel; (2) organizations as more formalized and stable social systems on the
mesolevel; and finally, (3) society as a whole, which encompasses all forms of social
systems on the macrolevel and can be further differentiated into various functional
subsystems such as the political system, economic system, legal system, and so on.
(Luhmann, 1986, p. 173)
It is extremely important to remember that Luhmann classified social systems into these levels
for observational purposes only. They do not describe their operations. Social systems are
autopoietic. That means that individual systems are always operatively closed from another. We
must put aside conventional notions of interactions as elements of an organization, and
organizations as elements of society. Each type of social system is constituted by the ongoing
production of communications specific to that type. Societies produce societal communications,
organizations produce decision communications, and interaction systems produce interactional
communications among people that are present (Luhmann, 1995).
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Both social systems and psychological systems (i.e. the cognitive systems of people) use
meaning as part of their autopoiesis. “Meaning systems are completely closed to the extent that
only meaning can refer to meaning and that only meaning can change meaning” (p. 37). People
and social systems are dependent on each other to emerge and to continue to exist (p. 59). They
have co-evolved and are bound together. Meaning, in Luhmann’s view, is the “evolutionary
achievement” (p. 59) of this structural coupling. Meaning is a broader concept than behaviorism.
Luhmann did not define meaning, but gave a complicated phenomenological description beyond
the scope of this overview. In short, Luhmann described meaning as “processing according to
differences” (p. 71). If information is the difference that a difference makes, then what difference
that difference makes can be considered meaning. I will return to this in the discussion on
communications.
Structural coupling and interpenetration.
Structural coupling is the mechanism by which two or more closed systems co-evolve
and adapt their internal structures through mutual perturbations. Luhmann did not fully specify
the relationship between organization, interaction and psychological systems. Guided by
Luhmann’s work on societal systems, Seidl (2005c) suggested that the organization is coupled to
interactions and individuals by a special type of structural coupling called interpenetration.
Luhmann developed the concept of interpenetration to define the relationship between human
beings (the conglomerate of organic and psychological systems) and social systems (Luhmann,
1995, pp. 210-254). In social systems theory, human beings are part of the environment of
society and vice versa. When a system’s environment makes its complexity (such as the system’s
“indeterminacy, contingency and the pressure to select”) available for building another system,
this is called penetration (p. 213). The penetrating system’s behavior is co-determined by the
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receiving system. Interpenetration happens when two systems make their complexity available
for one another. The two systems become much more interdependent as a result of
interpenetration. It also means that with increased levels of complexity comes a greater variation
of possibilities that can be exploited (p. 239).
Interpenetration is undoubtedly a very abstract concept. A more accessible description is
the notion of intimacy, which is what Luhmann called the relationship of interhuman
interpenetration. “Intimacy comes into being when more and more domains of personal
experience and bodily behavior become accessible and relevant to another human being and vice
versa” (p. 224). Social systems must be formed for intimacy to happen, because interhuman
interpenetration is “indisputably possible only by communication” (p. 228). Intimacy exceeds the
possibilities of communication, both through language and bodily contact. It includes the
experience of not being able to find the means to communicate. “Each one knows each other so
well that they cannot conceal themselves because this would be another act that would have to be
answered. The rest is silence” (p. 228). Interpenetration is not to be confused or exchanged for
intersubjectivity or shared meaning. In closed, self-referential systems, meaning can never be
shared. “What is social cannot be traced back to the conscious performances of a monadic
subject” (p. 81) and thus, intersubjectivity raises issues that cannot be resolved (p. 146).
The coupling between an organization and its associated interaction systems can be
considered one of interpenetration. Seidl (2005c) explained:
Interactional communications orient themselves not only according to their interactional
structures but also according to organizational structures, that is to say, their
environment…. The interaction observes its own communications with regard to their
significance for the interaction and the organization.” (p. 150)
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An AI summit can be characterized as the particular interaction system of a particular
organization attended by hundreds of psychological systems. It will therefore be important in
applying a social systems perspective, to identify how these systems interpenetrate one another.
Concept of communications
Luhmann’s second innovation in developing a theory of social systems was his
unconventional definition of communication (1992, 1995). He defined communication as a unity
of utterance, information, and understanding. These three units combined form communication.
Communication can be deconstructed into the three units for observation, but in its operation,
only the three together can be called a communication in Luhmann’s social systems theory.
This formulation is a radical departure from how we understand communication today.
The rapid development of information technologies owes a great deal to the communication
theories developed by Shannon, a mathematician and an engineer (Gleick, 2011). In the 1940s,
Shannon developed a mathematical theory of information for encoding information. His theory
basically stripped out the semantic content of messages, and reduced information to bits and
bytes subject to statistical analysis. For Shannon, information represented uncertainty,
probabilities, difficulty of transmission and entropy (Gleick, 2011, p. 219). The resulting
Shannon-Weaver model implied a transmission of information from a sender to a receiver
through a channel. It represented a giant leap forward in the development of computers and
networks. Without Shannon, there could not have been an Internet.
“The birth of information theory came with its ruthless sacrifice of meaning—the very
quality that gives information its value and its purpose” (2011, p. 416) wrote Gleick in the book,
The Information, a chronicle of communication theory. He referred to von Foerster complaining
at a cybernetics conference “only when understanding begins, in the human brain, ‘then
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information is born—it’s not in the beeps” (p. 417). Gleick wrote that in information theory,
“meaning, as ever, remained hard to pin down” (p. 417). He quoted a historian of cybernetics,
Dupuy: “Ours is a world about which we pretend to have more and more information but which
seems to us increasingly devoid of meaning” (p. 418). Luhmann was bringing meaning back into
communication theory.
Luhmann (1992) insisted that the conventional concept of communication is incomplete.
The commonly used metaphor of transmission was problematic, he wrote. An act of transmission
“directs attention and demands for skillfulness onto the one who makes the utterance” even
though an utterance is nothing but a proposal to the receiver of the information to make a
selection. As Drucker said, communication makes demands. The metaphor of transmission,
however, does not account for how the communication is understood (or misunderstood).
Communication happens only when there is a reply.
Similar to Shannon, Luhmann’s (1992) concept of communication strips it of the
psychological and cognitive aspects. He did so by conceptualizing communication as a product
of social systems. He cautioned that he is not saying that it is possible to have communication
without life or consciousness. He is in essence, bracketing people out of the picture in order to
maintain the contours and clarity necessary for a concept to be useful in the construction of
theory. And in his formulation of communication, meaning played a central role.
According to Luhmann (1992), communication is a selection. It synthesizes three
different units of selection: “selection of information, selection of the utterance of this
information, and a selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance” (p. 252). None
of the three can stand alone and must be united to establish communication.
Communication occurs only when a difference of utterance and information is
understood. That distinguishes it from the mere perception of the behavior of others. In
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understanding, communication grasps a distinction between the information value of its
content and the reasons for which the content was uttered. (p. 252)
The distinction of the three units, Luhmann wrote, was borrowed from the speech theories of
Bühler (1934). Luhmann’s conceptualization differed because he did not view communication in
terms of action. He did not see it as a transmission of messages being transmitted successfully or
in error. Communication is a selection and synthesis of the three units. Luhmann defined
information drawing from Bateson (1979) as the “difference that makes a difference” (Luhmann,
2003, p. 43). In accordance with Shannon and Weaver’s model (Gleick, 2011), information is “a
selection from a repertoire of possibilities” (Seidl, 2005a, , p. 28). A communication selects what
is being communicated from a range of possible communications. Utterance refers to how (the
form) and why (the reason) something is being said (Seidl, 2005 #1041, p. 28).
The most important element of Luhmann’s conceptualization of communication is the
inclusion of understanding. Understanding refers to the grasping of “a distinction between the
information value of its content and the reasons for which the content was uttered” (Luhmann,
1992, p. 252). In making the distinction, the content of the communication might be emphasized
over how it was expressed, or vice versa. What matters is that the both aspects must be
experienced to make such a distinction. If such a distinction is note made, the communication is
“a mere perception” (p. 252).
Communication is not perception. Perception is a psychological phenomenon that
belongs to the domain of cognitive systems, not social systems. It has no “communicative
existence” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 252). Perception cannot immediately or directly connect to a
perception in someone else’s mind. “What another has perceived can neither be confirmed nor
repudiated, neither questioned nor answered. It remains closed within consciousness” (p. 252). A
perception can be externalized through language, whether bodily or through words. Individual
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perceptions must accord to the laws of communication system. “Communication leads to a
decision whether the uttered and understood information is to be accepted or rejected” (p. 255).
All communication, thus carries risk (p. 256). It bifurcates reality:
[Communication] creates two versions—a yes version and a no version—and thereby
forces a selection. And it is precisely in the fact that something must happen (even if this
is an explicitly communicated break-off of communication) that autopoiesis of the system
resides, guaranteeing for itself its own continuability. (p. 255)
Luhmann wrote that communication was “an emergent reality” (p. 252). This is highly consistent
with the social constructionist roots of AI. Explained Mohe and Seidl (2011) referring to
Luhmann (1995):
People might utter words or make particular gestures but they have no control over the
way in which these are understood, i.e. what communication is ultimately realized. For
example, an uttered ‘yes’ might be understood as expressing a confirmation, a doubt or a
negation (ironically). Thus, the meaning of a message, i.e. the concrete communication, is
not produced by the speaker but by the listener, or more precisely: by the connecting
communications. (Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 8)
A social system is a system of communications. “Whatever the participants may
understand in their own self-referentially closed consciousnesses, the communication system
works out its own understanding or misunderstanding. And to this purpose it creates its own
processes of self-observation and self-control” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 253).
In summary, under Luhmann’s conceptualization, communication is not a transfer of
information. Communication cannot be broken up into separate elements without losing its
structural unity. “Information has its identity as something occurring at a particular point in time
and not as something that endures in time and is able to be transferred” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 32).
One of the key points of Luhmann’s social systems theory is drawing a distinction between
meaning and information. The concept of information must always “be understood relative to an
actually given, constantly changing state of knowledge” (p. 31). The concept of meaning,
transcends information and “refers to the way human experience is ordered and not, for example,
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to some particular fact or matter in the world” (p. 25). Information loses value when repeated,
but its meaning does not.
Organizations
Decision communications constitute organizations.
According to Luhmann, organizations are an organized form of social systems, and
therefore, are constituted by communication. Other organizational scholars including Weick
(1995), Kuhn (2008), and Taylor (2000) have posited that organizing is a communicative activity.
The body of literature around “communication as constitutive of organization” or CCO is
relatively obscure yet growing (For an overview, see Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011).
Like Luhmann, the CCO perspective rejects March and Simon’s (1993) notion that
“organizations are assemblages of interacting human beings” that resemble something of “a
central coordinative system” (p. 23). Rather, “organizations are built, maintained, and activated
through the medium of communication” wrote Weick (2001, p. 136), hence sensemaking is a
central aspect of organizational life. Taylor (2000) proposed that organizations emerge out of
episodes of conversations, and that the essence of communication is the transfer of intent from
one actor to another. While scholars agree that organizations can emerge from communication,
Schoeneborn (2011) noted that the debate on how communication constitutes organizations is far
from settled. He suggested that Luhmann’s social systems theory is a “prominent example” (p.
663) of CCO, and may help clear up the ambiguities surrounding the processes and minimal
conditions of how communication constitutes organization.
Luhmann’s perspective on organizations is unique in several ways. First, he defined
organizations as a social system that reproduces itself through a specific form of communication:
decision communications (Luhmann, 1995, 2003). Organizations are systems made of decisions.

101

Organizations differentiate themselves by decision making, and “by doing so, recognizes what it
is doing” (Luhmann, 2005c, p. 85). The organizational system is autopoietic, meaning that these
decisions are produced from the decisions that make up the organization. It is self-referential,
meaning that there can be no outside authority that decides what the organization does. All
external references are understood as the organization’s internal operations (Luhmann, 2003, p.
32).
Organizations are operatively closed. “An organization may only be defined based on its
own decisions. It can only learn by itself” (p. 33). Here again, Luhmann strictly distinguished
decision making from the psychological event engaging people. Decisions in and of themselves
have no intent because decisions in the Luhmannian sense are strictly “a matter of
communication” (p. 32). Therefore, they are ephemeral and vanish as soon as they appear. The
implication for organizations is such that so little can be changed—its elements are so fleeting.
Paradoxically though, the fact that an organization “cannot be changed may provide a cause for
new decisions to surface” (p. 36).
Organizations are complex. They have a wide range of options at their disposal. All
autopoietic systems try to limit their options by establishing structures. This is a necessary
condition for maintaining their autopoiesis (p. 39). An organization distinguishes itself from
others by specifying its structures. “Insofar as a decision serves as the basis for another decision”
either in retrospect or in expectation, “a structure is formed” (p. 40). The structure may be
momentary. But so long as they “somehow limit and thus enable a decision concerning how
decisions are taken” (p. 40) they are deemed relevant. “It will draw upon the very structures it
has organized in order to specify expectations that ensure that acts…may be dealt with as
decisions by the system” (p. 33).
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The paradox of decision making.
One of the important features of Luhmann’s theory of organizations is his recognition
that decisions and therefore organizations, are rooted in paradox (Luhmann, 2003, 2005c). The
paradox of decision making lies at the heart of organizations. “It is not that decisions are first
made and then communicated; decisions are communications” (Seidl, 2005a, p. 39). Since
decisions are communication events that do not last, they are constituted by paradox. A selection
always has to be made because in complex systems, the possibilities always exceed what can
actually be realized. Decisions are different from ordinary communications in that they imply
that the decision could have been made differently. They are self-contradictory. Seidl borrowed
Ruesch and Bateson’s distinction of the “report” aspect and “command” aspect of language to
explain this contradiction. “The more clearly the decision is communicated as a selection among
alternatives (report aspect), the less the decision will be accepted by later communications as a
decision (command aspect)” (p. 40). In Luhmann’s words, “the decision conceals what is
decisive” (Luhmann, 2005, p. 85).
Another paradox is the undecidability of decisions. “Something that has already been
determined in all respects cannot be decided. Therefore, a decision involves some degree of
unpredictability, even irrationality, which is precisely why people are tempted to exert influence”
(Luhmann, 2005c, p. 85). If objective analysis yields a certain result, this is not a decision—it is
simply a matter of deductions and calculations (Andersen, 2003). According to Luhmann, von
Foerster made the point most clearly: “Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, we
can decide” (Citing von Foerster, 1992, p.14 in Luhmann, 2005c, p. 86). The paradox is further
complicated in that “the decision itself is neither something in the past nor something in the
future, and it is neither the one side nor the other side of the alternative” (p. 88), as I noted earlier.
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Before a particular decision is made, several possibilities exist. Once the decision is made,
although a second-order observer sees there were other possibilities which have been excluded,
the contingencies are now fixed and are contingent upon the decision made. Decision making in
essence, is a form of limiting contingency.
An organization is not operationally crippled by the paradox of decision making because
it cannot observe the paradox. “It does not see that it does not see what it does not see” (p. 91).
The function of an organization is to unfold this paradox of decision.
To unfold a paradox is simply to shift the observer’s blind spot to a place where it is less
troublesome (in family therapy, which is based on constructivism, we say: to a less
painful place). Against one’s better judgment new, stable identities are introduced, which
can be maintained more easily. (p. 92)
I will now introduce two methods Luhmann proposed for unfolding the paradox of decision
making that are relevant to this study: decision premises and uncertainty absorption.
Decision premises.
Decision premises enable organizations to reduce the complexity of decision making,
while simultaneously opening up the horizon for subsequent decisions (Luhmann, 2005c, p. 95).
“The system constantly oscillates between constraining and extending decision possibilities and
in this way secures its own autopoiesis” (p. 95). There may be some overarching objectives—a
company’s vision statement, for example—that serve as a self-description for guiding decisions.
However, these can never be so narrow that the decisions funnel down towards an inevitable end.
If it were so, Luhmann wrote, they would not be organizations but projects.
Luhmann identified three (Seidl, 2005b) organizational decision premises. These are
programs, personnel, and communication channels. Programs pre-determine how a correct
decision is made. They come in the form of “if-then” conditional scenarios, or in the form of
goals to be achieved. Programs are often interchangeable with plans. Decision premises related
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to personnel determine the criteria for selecting and allocating personnel. Communication
channels determine how communication is structured within an organization. The channels only
run vertically in a classic hierarchical structure, whereas in a matrix organization they could run
horizontally. The three decision premises converge in the form of positions. A position is guided
by a certain program, filled by certain personnel and equipped with certain communication
channels. These positions serve to constrain the possibilities for organizational change in the
status quo. A position enables variation but also binds reality within certain conditions: “One can
change the incumbent, the job profile or the reporting relationship—but not all at the same time”
(p. 94).
A decision on decision premises is made “on the level of second-order observation” (p.
95). A manager decides on a position based on their observations of the situation at hand.
Luhmann noted:
As a rule, we associate terms such as planning and steering with the notion that this is
done from above and is thus justifiable on the basis of a better overview, though without
precise knowledge of details. This may be the case in some instances. However, the
theory of the second-order observer is not dependent on the mystifications of the
hierarchy. It emphasizes that this is a very specific observation in very specific situations;
and of course, an observation which has to base itself on upon what it cannot see. We
cannot evade this fundamental paradox. (p. 96)
Uncertainty absorption.
A second mode for unfolding the paradox of decision making is through uncertainty
absorption. It is a concept originating with March and Simon (1993). “Uncertainty absorption
takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the
evidence itself, are then communicated” (p. 186). Uncertainty is absorbed “when decisions are
accepted as decision premises and taken as the basis for subsequent decisions. …And the whole
point is: it is not the decision operation itself, but a process that connects decisions” (Luhmann,
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2005c, p. 96). It is analogous to Weick’s (1979) reduction of equivocality in the sensemaking
process between individuals in an organization. Uncertainty absorption is the mechanism by
which organizations bring forth a reality. Wrote Luhmann (2005c):
Every organization operates in a world that it cannot know. This world is transformed
through uncertainty absorption into a known world; it is replaced by a known world. This
requires in retrospect a first decision, which inscribes a distinction into the world, for
example, by defining a purpose, by forming a “coalition” of (future) members with a
corresponding clientele as environment, or simply by establishing another organization.
(p. 99, footnote omitted)
According to Seidl (2005b), an organization pulsates between the reduction and production of
uncertainty. “Every decision produces new decisions; on the one hand, by reducing uncertainty,
and on the other hand, by producing new uncertainty, which brings forth the need for a further
reduction of uncertainty in the form of a further decision” (p. 43). When too much uncertainty is
absorbed, organizational structures can ossify and result in core capabilities turning into “core
rigidities” (Leonard‐Barton, 2007).
Relationship between organization and environment
One of the confusing aspects of Luhmann’s theorizing in particular and autopoiesis in
general is the relationship between a system and its environment. Autopoietic systems are closed
in their operations, but they cannot “operate without having an impact on and through the
environment” (Luhmann, 2003, p. 40). An environment irritates a system. Such irritations
become meaningful to an organization when it “can recognize the difference this will make for
its decision-making activity, when the environment in some way or other is changed or not” (pp.
40-41). Information is always produced by the system. There is no “fact existing independently
from observation and evaluation” (p. 41) and the system will tend to produce information
according to its internal preferences.
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There are two structural limitations on the decision-making context, however. The first is
the concept of redundancy. “Redundancy achieves its highest value when one piece of
information suffices for a definition of the system” (p. 41). On the other hand, redundancy
decreases when a “decision provides less and less insight into what has been decide before and
what might be decided ahead” (p. 41). The other limitation is called variety. Variety describes
the range of decisions it makes. If all the decisions are similar, variety is small. When the range
expands, variety is greater.
Redundancy and variety are closely intertwined. The general tendency of organizations in
relation to its environment is to increase the system’s redundancy. This is due in part to
uncertainty absorption. Structures are condensed, and as a result, “an improved overview of what
still remains possible within the system is achieved” (p. 42). This is why aging organizations
tend to have more rigid structures, Luhmann noted. But an organization may also increase the
variety of its decisions in reaction to noise: turbulent changes in its environment. Luhmann
cautioned, “the variety of decisions may well increase unnoticed, with the question of a structural
adaptation appearing as a secondary matter and only in connection with the already changed
decision-making situation” (p. 42). Luhmann imagined organizations “as continuously
oscillating between acceptance and rejection of noise [from the environment] and between loss
and reconstitution of redundancy [within the organization]” (p. 43).
Organizational knowledge and nonknowledge
The social systems lens imposes a processual view of organization. For the organization
to maintain its identity and existence, it must constantly reproduce a ceaseless stream of decision
communication events connected to future decision communication events. The specific mode of
reproduction is uncertainty absorption, often through the use of decision premises. Organizations
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are always transforming in a state of flux like Heraclitus’ river (Morgan, 1997). Given this
conceptualization, what then is organizational knowledge? Plato’s notion of knowledge as
justified true belief cannot apply to the Luhmannian organization, because social systems cannot
think; only individuals can. Neither can individual knowledge ever be directly transferred to an
organization, because they are two separate, autonomous systems that are operationally closed to
each other. This is the point at which social systems theory diverges from Nonaka’s (1994)
organizational knowledge creation theory. Nonaka’s theory hinges on the transferability of
knowledge between individuals and organizations. It also assumes that knowledge is a resource
that can be accumulated, managed, and shared. Luhmann’s theory forces us to challenge this
assumption.
Based on his interpretation of social systems theory, Seidl (2007) conceptualized
knowledge as structures that determine how an organization deals with information. Knowledge
orients a system’s observations. It guides it in where to draw the distinction between noise and
information (p. 17). Observations are structured according to two questions. First, does the
difference make a difference? Second, what difference does the difference make? Both are a
form of selection. The first distinction is a selection of what to observe and where to pay
attention. Language plays a significant role by providing a schema for observation. The specific
context of concrete observations such as time and space can be stripped away and “condensed”
(Spencer-Brown, 1979, cited p. 17) into a generalized distinction like “dog” and “fast” (p. 17).
These distinctions can be applied as a heuristic in concrete situations. The second distinction is a
selection of the meaning of the observation. This regulates how one observation connects to
other observations, both actual and potential (p.17). Seidl gave the following example:
Organizations might observe repeatedly that companies that put down the prices of their
very high-priced luxury goods leads to a loss of customers. From this, one might
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condense the “knowledge” that putting down the price the very high-priced luxury goods
leads to a loss of customers. (p. 18)
Broadly defined, knowledge represents all the structures of an organization. Seidl
proposed that organizational knowledge can therefore be described as decision structures. An
organization has two types of decision structures. The first are formal decision structures that are
“the explicit product of earlier decisions” (p. 21). When an operation deviates from those
structures, the expectation is that the system changes its structure. The second are decision
structures based on organizational culture. These are undecidable decision premises that are not
explicitly decided. Structures are expected to be retained in the case of deviating operations.
Decision premises related to the values of an organization are hard to change because they are
stabilized by norms not cognition.
According to Seidl, the purpose of knowledge is to both reduce and increase complexity.
Complexity pressures a system to select, for a system has far more possibilities of operations
than it can actualize (p. 19). Overtaxing the selection at each moment endangers the reproduction
of the system (Luhmann, 1995). Knowledge pre-selects the possibilities available to the system
by excluding and eliminating others, thereby relieving some of the pressure to select. “Structures
draw a distinction within the possibilities—creating two different sets of possibilities—and
indicate one of the sets, making it the subset of available possibilities” (Seidl, 2007, p. 19). The
system is blind to the possibilities that have not been indicated. When knowledge is produced, it
simultaneously produces what Seidl calls nonknowledge—the set of possibilities that were not
indicated and lies beyond the boundary of the distinction (p.19). One might think of it also as
latent knowledge. This mechanism is rooted in another paradox. Knowledge limits the available
possibilities and reduces complexity. But the same mechanism serves to increase complexity
because new possibilities open up by reducing the original possibilities (p. 20).
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The idea of nonknowledge is important for organizations, due to an organization’s
specific mode of operation, namely uncertainty absorption. “During the succession of decisions,
he uncertainty involved in earlier decisions is absorbed; in the communication of decisions, the
uncertainty involved in earlier decision making is not communicated” (p. 21). An individual
might remember the uncertainty. A face-to-face interaction can question an earlier
communication, recall the uncertainty, and select differently from the structural selection. But an
organization is structured such that it forgets. Therefore, the unobservability of nonknowledge is
made extreme.
“For a system, intelligence means that it orients its observation not only according to its
knowledge but also according to representations of its nonknowledge” (p. 23). While a system
cannot directly access its nonknowledge, its internal operations can make representations of the
nonknowledge. In this sense, an AI summit is an interaction system that forces its participants to
explicitly communicate about the organization’s nonknowledge. It does so through selfdescriptions of the organization and its operations. It also overcomes organizational blindness
through interactions with external stakeholders. External stakeholders, such as customers, can
illuminate what the organization doesn’t know by talking about their relationship. In either case,
the information presented as nonknowledge is not the nonknowledge itself but the
representations and interpretations of nonknowledge.
Organizational interactions
The interaction system is where people interact through face-to-face contact (Luhmann,
1995). It reproduces communication based on the interactions of the people present. This marks a
point of differentiation to Nonaka’s notion of ba or shared context, which is neither bound by
space nor time (Nonaka et al., 2000). Luhmann’s interaction systems are bounded. “They include
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everything that can be treated as present and are able, if need be, to decide who, among those
who happen to be present, is to be present and who not” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 412). For example,
in a meeting, if a participant is texting on their phone, the interaction system may mark that
person is absent. If it were the CEO texting though, the system may mark her as present, and
interpret her texting as an interaction—the other participants may understand this as an utterance
containing the information “the CEO is ignoring us.” The latter would be an example of
interpenetration between the organization and interaction systems. The interaction system is
penetrating the organization’s system, effectively borrowing from the organization’s decision
making structure (the CEO’s position) in making the distinction between present/absent.
The same event (the CEO texting) would be observed and interpreted differently by the
organization and the interaction system, because each system is operatively closed and produce
different kinds of communications. In other words, the meaning and significance would differ.
“Not everything that is communicated in the interaction has to be put in the form of a decision
and thus made available to the organization” (Seidl, 2005, p. 160). If a participant wants to
explicitly make a connection to the organization’s decision making, they may articulate the
communication as a declaration (p. 161). Recording the minutes of a meeting, for example, is a
strong signal to the organization “that the communication lends itself to being treated as an
organizational decision” (p. 161). Some interactions may be explicitly kept “off the record” to
prevent being interpreted as a decision. Often, no decisions are made at all (p. 149).
Seidl conceptualized four types of interactions that can be deemed organizational based
on empirical observation. Deciding interactions, decision-preparatory interactions, semidetached interactions, and unrelated interactions (pp. 149-150). Of these four, the first two will
be significant in analyzing an AI summit. A deciding interaction produces “interactional
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communications that can be treated by the organization as (organizational) decisions” (p. 155).
In other words, a deciding interaction contributes to the organization’s autopoiesis. Decisionpreparatory interactions are interactions that lay down the conditions for later decisions, for
example, by exchanging relevant information, but fall short of making a decision. Semi-detached
interactions are interactions that “communicate about decisions without focusing directly on
influencing decision making” (p. 150) such as gossip. Unrelated interactions are those that are
not related to the organization at all.
Towards a social systems perspective of AI summits
Luhmann’s theory of social systems is vast and complex. It is impossible to condense his
theorizing into such a brief overview. Seidl and Becker (2005a) remarked “it is often said that
when starting to read Luhmann it takes a hundred to two hundred pages before one actually
understands anything” (p. 10). The purpose of this chapter was to distill Luhmann’s ideas and
focus only on those concepts that are relevant to the study of AI summits as a forum for
knowledge creation. In summary, I would like to reiterate some of the key points of social
systems theory that are important to the theorizing ahead. Luhmann posited that social systems,
such as organizations and interaction systems, are autopoietic. They maintain their autopoiesis
through an ongoing production of communications. Communication, according to Luhmann is a
synthesis of information, utterance and understanding and is defined as an event that vanishes as
soon as it is produced. Organizations reproduce decision communications. Interaction systems
reproduce interactional communications. People belong to a separate autopoietic system, a
conglomerate of an organic system and a psychological system.
In accordance with the biological theory of autopoiesis, all autopoietic systems in
Luhmann’s social systems theory are operatively closed systems. They can only refer to
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themselves, so no outside authority can directly change their structures. However, organizations
have a special relationship with the interaction and psychological systems they associate with.
They are structurally coupled in such a way that the systems can penetrate each other and access
the complexity of their respective structures. This is analogous to a relationship of intimacy
between people. An analysis of the social dynamics of such structural coupling between the
component systems of an AI summit will be the primary focus of this study.
Organizations do not have the ability to think; they can only communicate. Therefore,
knowledge cannot be defined as an organizational version of “justified true belief” as Nonaka
and others previously proposed. For this study, I am guided by Seidl’s (2007) definition of
knowledge. He proposed that knowledge in social systems theory should be considered the
equivalent of organizational structures. Organizational knowledge determines how an
organization deals with information. They orient how an organization observes itself. Decision
premises, defined by Luhmann as personnel, communication channels and programs, are a form
of organizational knowledge. They are what we conventionally refer to as an organization’s
structure. Seidl further proposed the concept of organizational nonknowledge, the knowledge
that an organization can potentially access, but does not currently distinguish as information for
making a decision. Organizational intelligence is increased when an organization has the ability
to orient its observation towards such nonknowledge. An AI summit may be one method that
enables such observations to happen.
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Chapter 7 A Social Systems View of AI Summits
Introduction
An appreciative inquiry (AI) summit brings together hundreds of stakeholders both inside
and outside the organization to engage in intensive strategizing activities over several days. I
concluded from a review of the existing literature that one aspect of AI that has not yet been fully
explored is the capacity for large group methods such as the AI summit format to generate
organizational knowledge. AI is deeply grounded in social constructionism. Of the various AI
methods, the AI summit format evolved from research developments in group dynamics that
eventually converged with systems theory. I then introduced the theory of autopoiesis, which not
only provides a biological basis for the social construction of knowledge, but also extended
systems theory beyond open systems. The notion of systems as interactionally open, but
operatively closed, is an idea so radical that some scholars, such as Luhmann, consider it a
paradigm shift in systems theory. Luhmann took the principles of autopoiesis, and applied it to
social systems. The goal of this study is to apply a social systems lens to the practice of AI
summits, to identify some of the systems dynamics and structures that differentiate it from other
strategizing practices.
Recently, management scholars such as Seidl have begun studying organizational
dynamics through the lens of Luhmann’s social systems theory. While critics of Luhmann have
objected to the extension of a biological theory to social systems, Seidl and his colleagues have
shown that social systems theory is nevertheless a useful lens with which to analyze
organizations. Seidl is a major contributor to an emerging research program in strategic
management that focuses on strategizing activities and practice (SAP). In trying to understand
how and why an AI summit as a whole functions the way it does, I situate the summit first and
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foremost as a strategizing practice rather than a change intervention. I posit that the purpose of
an AI summit is to generate and accelerate the creation of organizational knowledge. This turns
away from the conventional view that AI aims to generate transformational change.
Two streams of research by Luhmann scholars in the field of strategy are particularly
relevant in applying a social systems lens to AI summits. The first is an extension of Luhmann’s
study of the communication problems inherent in management consulting. Mohe and Seidl used
social systems theory to explore the communications dynamics of a consulting project. They
looked at the relationship between the consultants, the organization and the contact system
through which the consultants and their clients interact. Most AI summits are facilitated by
external consultants who specialize in AI. An AI summit can therefore be conceptualized as a
management consulting engagement. Building on Mohe and Seidl’s work, I develop a conceptual
model of an AI summit that incorporate Luhmann’s system types and structural coupling
mechanisms.
The second line of research expands Luhmann’s concept of episodes to the routine
strategizing practices of an organization. Their concept of strategic episodes is quite consistent
with the findings of a study of AI summits reviewed in Chapter 3 that described an AI summit as
a space that allows the temporary suspension of hierarchy and command-control type decision
making (Powley et al., 2011). An AI summit, therefore, can also be conceptualized as an
extended strategic episode that consists of a series of strategic episodes that unfold over multiple
days. The degrees to which organizational routines are suspended differ quite substantially over
the course of the 4D cycle. The constant oscillation between strategic and operational contexts
appears to be a key dynamic that is unique to an AI summit. I conclude this chapter by proposing
a topology of episodes that can be used to analyze such systems dynamics.
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AI as management consulting
Most organizations do not have the expertise or capacity to run an AI summit entirely on
their own. The AI summit method is well documented (Ludema et al., 2003) and there are many
resources available on how to conduct a summit. However, even those companies that use the AI
approach as a routine practice in their business operations often choose to contract with an
external AI consultant. AI summits, similar to most OD interventions, can be framed as a form of
management consulting. An AI summit requires a significant investment in time, money and
labor. The Brazillian company, Nutrimental, for example, shut down its entire operations for a
few days so that all of their employees and major external stakeholders can attend. The resulting
summit had 700 participants (Barros & Cooperrider, 2000). Such an endeavor can be risky,
especially if leadership is reluctant to allow lower-level employees into the inner circle of
strategy (Powley et al., 2011). Contracting with an AI consultant can spread the risk somewhat.
If an intervention fails, the company can always blame the consultant.
AI summits require months of planning. Cooperrider and Whitney (2005) wrote that the
AI consultant supports the AI process in four ways:
•
•
•
•

Introduce AI to the organization and train people as internal agents of inquiry,
interviewers, and facilitators.
Design the overall project flow through the AI 4-D cycle, providing guidance about when
and how to involve the optimum number of stakeholders.
Facilitate AI activities throughout the process.
Continually seek ways to give the process away, to support organizational members in
making it their own. (p. 46)
In an AI summit project, the consultant would facilitate pre-summit activities including

training and planning meetings. They may also facilitate the actual summit conference. Although
the overall consulting project for an AI summit is similar to other management consulting
engagements, the AI summit itself has some very unique characteristics when compared to
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conventional off-site strategy workshops. I am guided by a recent theoretical study by Mohe and
Seidl (2011) in developing conceptual model of AI summits using social systems theory that can
highlight what those points of differentiation may be.
Mohe and Seidl published an article in the journal Organization, theorizing the clientconsultant relationship in management consulting using social systems theory. They were guided
by insights made by Luhmann in a case study first published in German in 1989 (published in
English in 2005) on the problems underlying management consulting engagements. Luhmann
argued that in any relationship between consultants and their clients, there is a fundamental
communication barrier. Regardless of the discipline the consultant draws from, Luhmann
claimed that the basis for consulting usually consists of a specialized competence that comes
from generalizations that are derived from empirical research.
Known statistical probabilities are applied to each individual case, even though they are
meaningless in individual cases. One makes such mistakes discreetly, only to compensate
for them by means of detailed analyses of the object in question. In certain rare cases,
these analyses are subsequently evaluated for the purpose of controlling and correcting
the scholarly hypothesis. (Luhmann, 2005b, p. 351)
In such a client-consultant relationship, Luhmann wrote, “there are no deep-seated problems of
communication” (p. 351).
A social systems perspective shows a different picture. The thrust of Luhmann’s
argument was that communication barriers are inevitable because the consultants are
operationally closed from the client company’s organizational system. Consultants constitute the
environment in which the client company operates. Luhmann emphasized that “no system can
communicate with its environment” (p. 353). The typical consulting engagement masks a
fundamental problem grounded in communication, the impossibility of direct communication
and knowledge transfer between consultant and client (Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 14).
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A Luhmannian perspective “directs the attention of the researcher towards specific issues,
which have not been properly acknowledged before” (p. 18). Mohe and Seidl (2011) extended
Luhmann’s work, and developed a conceptual model of the client-consultant relationship (Figure
1) using social systems theory. The relationship is defined by the coupling of three social
systems: the client organization, the consultant organization, and the contact system. The contact
system is where the consultant interacts with their clients. Mohe and Seidl chose to bracket out
the coupling of individual people to social systems, and narrowed their model to the
interdependencies between the various social systems. Mohe and Seidl offered three
methodological steps in examining client-consultant relationships empirically. First, the
researcher must identify the different communication systems in the relationship and
“reconstruct their respective communication logics” (p. 18). Second, identify the specific
mechanisms of structurally coupling between the systems. Third, examine how the structurally
coupled systems’ “mutual perturbations are internally (re) constructed” (p. 18).
In a conventional consulting engagement, members from the consulting firm come in
contact with members of the client company to meet a specific need, such as strategy
development. The consulting firm and client are two different, autopoietic systems that are
structurally coupled to each other through an interaction system that Mohe and Seidl (2011)
called a “contact system” (p.13). Communication barriers are an issue because the consultants
bring their idiosyncratic communication logics to the client company, which has its own set of
idiosyncratic communication logics, further confounded by the idiosyncratic communication
logics of the contact system.
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Figure 1. Mohe and Seidl’s (2011) conceptual model of a consulting intervention (p. 14).
In developing the “right” strategy for the company, the consultants inquire into the
company’s operations to gather and analyze data according to the consulting firm’s proprietary
methodologies and frameworks. Already, there is room for misunderstanding and
misinterpretation by the consultants, as they are observing the organizational system as secondorder observers. A strategy workshop is often the forum in which the consultants present their
findings to top management and the board. Seen through a social systems perspective, this is
what is really happening:
The description of the client’s problem and the consultant’s methods for solving the
problem are constructs of the contact system—they are themselves necessarily based on
“productive misunderstandings.” In other words, the “solution” presented by the contact
system to the client system is not a solution to the problem as perceived by the client
system. Consequently, rather than constituting input from the contact system into the
client system, the “solution” constitutes an unspecific perturbation that the client system
processes according to its own logic. The structural coupling between the systems merely
ensures that the client system takes some form of action as a result of that perturbation.
(Mohe and Seidl, p.13)
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Yet as Luhmann (2005b) noted, “For whatever reasons, the consultants may be inclined to
present their knowledge as certain and their proposals as based on careful work” (p. 351).
Communication problems are assumed away.
It is interesting to recall that OD consultants began experimenting with large group
methods like the AI summit out of frustration with conventional methods for strategic change
consulting. The Luhmannian perspective suggests that a core issue is one of communication
barriers. One of the core characteristics of an AI summit is that sets it apart from conventional
contact systems is in the way it puts the whole system in the room to engage in strategizing
activities. This suggests that the dynamics of an AI summit is radically different from the contact
system of a strategy development meeting comprised of a handful of consultants and core
executives from the client company. I will now apply Mohe and Seidl’s three step methodology
to examine the contact system of an AI summit from a social systems perspective.
A social systems model of an AI summit
The first step in Mohe and Seidl’s methodology is to identify the communication systems
in the client-consultant relationship. I modify this to enable us to model large group methods of
strategizing. As I will argue later, large group methods are essentially strategy development
workshops facilitated by an external consultant. I will limit the conceptualization of the method
to the actual conference itself and exclude any planning and post-conference activities and
meetings. What I am trying to model, therefore, is the relationships in a contact system during a
strategy meeting. Although Mohe and Seidl only modeled the social systems of a contact system,
I have chosen to incorporate the psychological systems of individual participants into the model.
This is because the notion of “the whole system in the room” in AI implies that who is present
and who is absent has implications on the outcome. I will also cover step two of the process,
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which is to identify the mechanisms of structural couplings between the systems. I will defer step
three to Chapter 8.
Generic strategy meeting model.
I start with a model of a generic strategy meeting (Figure 2). The systems involved are
the organizational system of the client, the interaction system, and the psychological systems of
the participants of the meeting. Each system is operatively closed from one another; however,
each can trigger perturbations in one another through interactional communications. The same
event can trigger different perturbations in different systems, because each system operates
according to their own internal logic. The purpose of the meeting is to develop strategy for the
client organization. Therefore, I exclude the external consultant’s organizational system from
this model. In some special client-consulting relationships in which the consulting company has
a deep and intimate relation with the client company, it may be necessary to include the
consulting company system.

Figure 2 Social systems model of a generic strategy meeting
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A strategy meeting is usually considered highly confidential. It is an internal meeting,
with participation is limited to the “inner circle” such as the top management team, board
members and external advisors such as a consultant. The interaction system is structurally
coupled to the organizational system as a strategic episode. The company temporarily suspends
its operational routines so that it can reflect upon itself strategically. The interactions that take
place at the meeting are organizational interactions. Since this is a strategy meeting, decision
interactions and pre-decision interactions will tend to dominate.
The nature of the relationship between individual participants and the organizational
system is governed by their positions. Only the top management team is present and therefore,
any decisions they make during the meeting must connect back to the rest of the organization
after the meeting. The decision may cascade down the organization, but the possibility of a
decision not connecting to another somewhere down the line always remains. In other words,
there are potential internal communication barriers. This problem is often referred to as problem
of execution or implementation of the decided strategy. However, in Luhmann’s framework, an
organization only produces decisions—not actions—and therefore, an execution problem is
really a breakdown of the decision production process in which a certain decision fails to
produce another. The consultant and all the communication barriers Mohe and Seidl identified in
the client-consultant relationship are all present as well. The relationship between the
participants and the interaction system will depend on historical precedents of the company.
Participants will conform to the meeting practices that are expected, in terms of turn-taking,
voting, rituals etc.
Large group method model.
I now expand this generic model to a large group method in Figure 3.

122

Figure 3 Social systems model of a large group methods conference
There are two major differences from the generic model: the composition of the
participants, and the strategizing activities that take place during the strategic episode. More of
the organizational members are present. Thus, the structural coupling between the participants
and the organization is much tighter, as represented by the increased number of positions.
Having lots of organizational members present should have the effect of reducing some internal
communications barriers, as the level of redundancy decreases and variety increases.
Furthermore, external stakeholders such as customers and suppliers are also participating. When
a customer talks about their experiences with the company, they are perturbing the company’s
system in a manner that is likely consistent with the logic of the organization that the customer
represents. Such perturbations may have consequences on the decision making interactions that
take place. The consultant’s role is that of a facilitator. They are not there to provide expert
knowledge on strategy. Their role is to structure the interactions of the conference so that the
participants can conduct their own data collection and analysis through the strategizing activities
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in order to develop and make strategic decisions. In this sense, if the methods are effective, the
communication barriers between the consultant and client become a non-issue, because the
organizational members themselves are the strategists.
AI summit format.
Finally, I further expand the model to a specific large group method, the AI summit
format in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Social systems model of an AI summit
An AI summit differs from most of its large group peers in two major ways. First, the
method adheres to the principle of positivity and focuses exclusively on strengths and
opportunities. Second, the scale of the conference is much larger than most other methods. Using
virtual conferencing technologies, for example, World Vision conducted a summit which had
several thousand participants. How do these two points affect the dynamics of the conference
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compared to the two models I described above?

Before doing so, let me reiterate the key

components and relationships in the model for clarity.
I conceptualize an AI summit as a strategic episode comprised of three different types of
autopoietic systems: an interaction system, an organizational system, and psychological systems.
The interaction system is the actual proceedings of the strategizing conference. There is only one
organizational system that is structurally coupled to the interaction system: the company hosting
the summit. Organizations external to the company such as customers and consulting firms, are
only indirectly coupled to the conference by virtue of the individual representing them. Every
individual participating in the summit is a separate psychological system—closed, selfreferential and autonomous. For the sake of simplicity, the psychological system in the diagram
in shows one system, but in reality, there is no “collective” psychological system. There are as
many different psychological systems as there are participants. Furthermore, the composition of
participants usually fluctuates as the conference proceeds, as not all participants are present
throughout the entire conference.
Each system is self-referential and operationally closed. Each operates under
idiosyncratic logics and assumptions. The interaction system is the environment for the
organization and the individual participant. Systems can interact with one another, but cannot
directly change what lies inside the other system’s boundaries. Systems can merely perturb the
other system, and the perturbed system selects its response based on its own logic, not that of a
second-order observer.
As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Seidl has posited that the structural coupling of the
organization with the associated interaction and psychological systems takes a special form
called interpenetration. When systems interpenetrate one another, they become more
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interdependent. Each system makes its complexity available to the other, hence increasing the
variety of possibilities that can be exploited in any given situation. An employee of an
organization is structurally coupled to their organization system in a very special way. The
relationship between the two systems constitutes interpenetration. An employee is an insider who
knows their organization much more intimately than an outsider. An employee can make finer
distinctions regarding an organization and its decisions, because they grasp the complexities of
the organization. Activists may call for Nike to stop producing sneakers in factories that employ
child labor, to which a Nike employee might respond, “It’s not that simple.” The Nike employee
may fully agree with the activists, but they also know of the barriers that prevent Nike from
immediately making that decision.
Like other strategy meetings, psychological systems—the participants—are each
individually coupled to the organizational system through their positions. Organizational
members in particular, unlike external stakeholders, can penetrate into the organizational system
and vice versa. The sheer number and variety of the organizational members present at an AI
summit, means that in the gross, the web of couplings between the organization and the
participants is extremely tightly and finely woven. But at the same time, the strategic context of
the conference also temporarily releases the participants from the existing structures, such that
ordinary channels of communication, programs, operational routines are suspended. Internal
communication barriers can therefore be substantially lowered. AI’s emphasis on positivity may
have an additional impact on the participant’s psychological systems through the effects of
positive emotions. Positive emotions may have a role in further lowering communication barriers
by broadening cognition (Johnson, Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010) and enhancing psychological
safety (Edmondson, 1999). Emotional contagion seen in large groups can stimulate the levels of
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positive emotions even higher. Such positive emotions could have a priming effect that carries
over to some of the activities later in the 4D cycle that are more conventional forms of
strategizing that do not necessarily emphasize the positive.
The relationship between the interaction system (i.e. the actual summit proceedings) and
the organizational system is also moderated by the AI method, but in a different manner. In the
case of individual participants, the interaction system can penetrate the complexities related to
human psychology and their bodily functions. People produce thoughts in order to maintain their
autopoiesis. They are subject to their biological makeup, such as the physical embodiment of
emotions and feelings for example. This suggests that the principle of positivity will impact
people mostly in terms of positive psychology. AI’s deliberate focus on the future and on
strengths may orient their thoughts on experiences that they have forgotten or had not even
imagined.
The events of an AI summit influence the organizational system differently. First, the
principle of positivity orients an organization to deliberately develop self-descriptions that draw
on the positive dimensions of an organization. An organization maintains its autopoiesis by
producing decisions that try to absorb uncertainty. Consequently, an organization tends to ignore
the historical details leading to a particular decision. Decisions are further condensed into
decision premises relating to roles, personnel and communication channels. An organization,
therefore, is forgetful.
The working assumption of AI is that people have a tendency to pay attention to
problems. If this is so, then the organization’s operational routines are conditioned to deal with
problems. Drucker has suggested otherwise: to starve the problems and feed the opportunities.
An AI summit affords an organization the opportunity to reflect upon a blind spot—areas of
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strengths and opportunities that may have been relegated to an organization’s nonknowledge
(Seidl, 2007). For example, an entrepreneurial company that is growing rapidly runs the risk of
forgetting the core competencies and values upon which it was founded as it adds new layers of
management and hires new people. An established company that is stuck in a rut may be able to
reassess its portfolio by purposefully seeking pockets of innovation that are hidden in
organizational nooks and crannies. In both cases, such information may have been either taken
for granted, or overlooked and pushed into the dark side of knowledge. AI’s positivity principle
affects the organization in large part, because of the novelty and rarity of orienting its attentions
to areas of strengths.
The AI summit format adds a crucial dimension to the strategic episode: the impact of a
democratic form of strategizing. It is the combination of a positive orientation with participative
decision making that is at the heart of AI summits. It is possibly the source of the “positive
energy” that so many AI practitioners and participants talk about in their descriptions of an AI
summit. In my opinion, the metaphor of energy unwittingly masks the underlying social
dynamics that are driving the summit. Luhmann’s social systems lens draws our attention to the
structural coupling between the organization, the interaction and psychological systems, enabling
a more nuanced view of what is going on. Individual participants are coupled to the organization
system through their positions in a special way—through interpenetration. AI summits can
therefore take advantage of the fact that hundreds of its employees are present.
The AI summit effectively establishes a web of temporary communication channels
among its organizational members that enable decisions to be produced and connected in novel
ways. One would expect that the sheer volume of decision-making and pre-decision making
interactions would be significantly higher than a traditional strategy meeting. It is also significant
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that the summit is heavily oriented towards decision-making interactions, not just pre-decision
making interactions. This is possible because of the intense structural coupling between the
hundreds of organizational members to the organization system through their positions. Having
the whole system in the room is the equivalent of having the organization’s structure physically
present in the room through the presence of the vast number of participants. The organization can
tap into the complexities of its participants, including institutional history, subject matter
expertise, transactive memory (Wegner, 1987), skills, cognitive biases, personalities and
subjective experiences, that are accessible by the participant but to which the organization is
blinded. Not only does the interaction system structure interactions to facilitate strategic
reflection, but it also provides an opportunity for decisions to be produced in real time while the
strategic episode is ongoing. I expand on this in the next section, drawing on literature about
strategic episodes.
Strategic episodes
Luhmann’s social systems theory compels us to see organizations and other social
systems as an intricate intertwining of processes. It is consistent with a growing body of
literature in strategic management that emphasizes the study of strategy process. In 1992, van de
Ven made some suggestions for “understanding how organizational strategies are formulated and
implemented and the processes of strategic change” (p. 169). Of the four types of theories of
process that van de Ven identified—life cycle, teleology, dialectics, and evolution (p. 176)—
Luhmann’s theory would loosely fall under evolution, as it draws on a theory of biology in
which “change proceeds in a continuous process of variation, selection, and retention” (p. 179).
Such factors like timing, the sequence of events, the variety of options available, the premises for
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selection and changes in structure, play a crucial role in understanding how strategy is
formulated in an organization.
As in any evolutionary approach, temporality is of crucial significance in Luhmann’s
theory. To facilitate his theorizing of societal change, Luhmann developed a concept he called
episodes. An episode is a sequence of communication marked by a beginning and an end. At first
sound, this seems trivial. But the notion of episodes is vital in explaining how a closed, selfreferential system can achieve structural change. Luhmann developed the concept of episodes in
reference to societal change. Hendry and Seidl (2003) extended it to the context of organizational
change. “Episodes provide opportunities for the normal constraints of communicative practice to
be suspended and alternative communicative practices explored” (p. 180). They defined a
strategic episode as the mechanism by which organizations can temporarily suspend its operating
structure to reflect upon and change those structures. It allows for an organization to reflect upon
its nonknowledge, the blind spots in its knowledge.
Here, we must once again, jump into the rabbit hole of Luhmann’s theorizing. The
original concept of episodes captured the temporal aspect of the relationship between the societal
system and its associated interaction systems. In the context of the greater society, Luhmann
(1995) explained that episodes are possible because of our “certainty that societal
communication has been going on before the episode begins” (p. 407) and that we presuppose
that there will be “sediments of earlier communication” in the episode. Episodes “are possible
only because one knows that societal communication will still be possible after the episode
concludes” (p. 407). Episodes “serve to achieve structures that cannot be made congruent with
society and yet equip it with complexity by building in differences” (p. 407). Noted Luhmann,
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“Complex societies are stable precisely because they can be broken down; they acquire
permanence because their composition can change” (p. 407).
Luhmann’s concept of societal episodes can be extrapolated to organizations. It is
through episodes that an organization can be relieved of the stress of being an organization—the
constant stress of absorbing uncertainty—to explore its nonknowledge, and possibly change its
existing structures and decision premises—its organizational knowledge.
A strategic episode is an episode in which the context of the participants’ conversations
temporarily switches over from an operational context to a strategic one. From an organizational
systems perspective, this switch is not about a change in mindsets. Mindsets belong to the
cognitive domain and, as such, are confined to psychological systems. An organization is a social
system and cannot have a mindset of its own. What changes in a strategic episode is the context
in which the organization observes itself. It temporarily suspends the decision making premises
of the organization, so that it can make modifications to those premises if necessary. It can do so
because of the temporal and special nature of strategic episodes. “The episodic strategic
communications are marked as exceptional and take into account that they will come to an end at
some point, after which a switch back into the established (operational) context, with its
established structures, will take place” (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 184).
The way in which interactional communications during a strategic episode are structured
will clearly have consequences for the outcome of the episode. Noted Seidl and Hendry, “If all
those involved are allowed to voice their concerns, a specific topic will be discussed differently
from when only the more senior staff are allowed to voice any criticisms” (p. 184). The selection
of who gets to participate and how will be an important factor to consider when analyzing
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strategic episodes. Hendry and Seidl suggested an analytical framework for studying strategizing
by attending to three critical aspects of episodes:
(1) the ways in which they are set up, within which the focus is on the determination of
which structures are or are not suspended and on the necessary ‘decoupling’ of the
episode from the organization as a whole;
(2) the ways in which they are terminated, within which the focus is on the mechanisms
for ‘re-coupling’ the strategic reflection with the organization; and
(3) the ways in which they are conducted, within which the focus is on the discourses
generated and the types of reflection achieved. (p. 189)
An AI summit can be conceptualized as an interaction system which functions as a
strategic episode for the organization. The organization decides who participates in the episode
according to the principles prescribed by AI, such as whole system participation. The conduct of
the episode is constrained by the processes prescribed by the AI summit format, including the
expectation of pre-defined deliverables at the end of the strategic episode. The episode
terminates when the summit ends. The end time is decided by the organizers before the summit.
Situating the AI summit as a strategic episode has the advantage of enabling a more systematic
comparison with other strategy workshops. An AI summit can be further conceptualized as a
special type of strategic episode which consists of a series of back-to-back strategic episodes
over multiple days. This surely has implications for the outcome of an AI summit compared to a
regular strategy workshop. For example, the cumulative amount of man-hours devoted to
collective strategizing during an AI summit is exponentially higher than a typical strategy
meeting. Other characteristics can be observed as well by analyzing each individual episode.
Later in this chapter, I introduce a typology that can aid such an analysis. Before doing so, I
would like to diverge slightly to make an important point, namely that strategic episodes are
valid not only as a method for changing strategies, but also for stabilizing and reinforcing
existing ones.
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Jarzabkowski and Seidl (2008) used the Luhmannian framework in their study of strategy
meetings at a university in the UK. An interesting finding was that in a “loosely coupled” (Weick,
1976) professional organization like a university, strategic episodes serve to stabilize and steady
its strategic orientation. A loosely coupled organization is one that is flatter and more autocratic.
The suspension of structures during strategic episodes in such an organization appear to have
different connotations relative to “the traditional tightly structured machine bureaucracy implied
by Hendry and Seidl” (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008, p. 1417). A strategy meeting at a university
enables its participants to relinquish departmental and/or professional interests. Powerful faculty
members, for example, may be more willing to accept the “authority structures implicit in a
meeting” (p. 1418). This raises the profile of administrators and top managers whose authority
tend to be corroded in the day-to-day reality of university life (Citing Cohen and March 1974 and
Denis et al. 1996, 2001 in Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). The authors speculated: “Given the
fragmented, goal-divergent, pluralistic interests within universities, meeting practices might
serve an important function in stabilizing the university’s overarching orientations and giving
authority to one group to shape the university in particular directions” (p. 1418). This implies
that the effect of suspending the everyday assumptions of an organization will depend on the
context of each organization.
Many case studies of successful AI interventions deal with organizations and
communities that are “tightly coupled.” If a company is seeking transformational change, the
implicit assumption is that it is stuck in its past, unable to adapt to the turbulent changes in its
external environment. Internal conflict, bureaucracy, and/or a command-and-control culture, may
be the barriers to change. AI can provide the means for the organization to suspend those
realities by temporarily uncoupling the organization from its everyday operations to discuss and
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create an alternative future. More recently, AI summits have been successfully deployed in more
loosely coupled environments. The City of Cleveland, for example, has been conducting annual
AI summits since 2009 to galvanize a scattered community toward a common purpose. Their
goal is to generate concrete projects aligned to the mission of building “a green city on a blue
lake” (Jackson, 2009). This is an intra-organizational effort in which the organizations involved
are coupled very loosely, if at all. Such initiatives suggest that an AI summit can be useful in
various contexts.
Typology of strategic episodes
Not all strategic episodes are created equal. The context, participants, and activities will
differ from episode to episode. Moreover, the nature of the coupling relationship between the
organization and the interaction system needs to be considered, as this will influence whether
decisions made during the episode can reconnect back to the ordinary operations of the
organization. A strategic episode marks a temporary suspension of existing structures, routines
and assumptions. Put another way, it is a temporary suspension of organizational knowledge.
Each dimension of an episode can be coded according to the degree of suspension it
achieves ranging from extremely high suspension (strategic) to no suspension (status quo). I
conceptualize the AI summit as a strategic episode that is made up of a series of episodes. Each
episode will vary in the degree to which existing structures are decoupled. Sometimes,
organizations will conduct routine business during the AI summit—after all, it is rare for so
many of its organizational members to be present at the same time in the same place. I posit that
one of the unique social dynamics of an AI summit is the constant oscillation between strategic
and operational contexts. I suspect that such oscillations may play a role in how decisions
produced during the episodes connect back to the autopoiesis of the organization.

134

I would like to point out the intended unit of analysis in this typology is episodes, and not
individual participants. An alternative approach would be to code each individual participant
separately. The strategic orientation of the action planning exercise in the Destiny phase will
differ widely from individual to individual. For middle managers, strategic planning may be a
routine activity that is not much different from what they do on a day-to-day basis. While they
may be more inclined to think strategically due to the nature of the overall context of the
conference, they nevertheless will be prone to ground themselves in reality, especially if they are
to be held accountable for future results. In contrast, for employees at the fringes of the
organization as well as external stakeholders, the exercise is so out of the ordinary that they may
be better able to think out of the box. Conflict, gridlock or breakthroughs may ensue, depending
on the dynamics of the group. Luhmann’s theory is not very helpful in understanding the
dynamics between individuals, however. Other theories drawing from social psychology,
behavioral economics and philosophy (e.g. critical systems heuristics, W. Ulrich, 2005) may
have more utility when the unit of analysis is the individual.
In this typology, I categorize episodes according to the strategic orientation of the overall
episode, group composition, the nature of the activities and the degree of structural coupling
between the interaction system and organizational system (Figure 5). Figure 5 shows the overall
picture of the typology I am proposing. An individual episode can be broken down into at least
four components: overall strategic orientation of the episode, activities, diversity of the group,
and the degree of decoupling from the organization’s existing structures. One can imagine a dial
that increases or decreases the degree to which the status quo is suspended 1. Each component has
its own dial that controls the level of suspension. The components in concert produce the
1

The image of a dial was inspired by Scott Page in his lectures on complexity in The Great
Courses.
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episodes of the interaction system. Over time, these episodes produce interactions that perturb
the organization system, which may respond by producing decisions. Some of these decisions
may have an effect on existing organizational structures—namely the organization’s knowledge
base.

Figure 5 Topology of episodes
Strategic context.
An individual episode can be described by the overall degree to which the episode expect
its participants to suspend organizational routines and reality. A sliding scale ranging from high
suspension to no suspension can characterize the strategic orientation of the episode. I propose
the following four point scale in descending order of suspension: strategic, somewhat strategic,
business-as-usual, and ritual. Detailed coding criteria would be required for an empirical study.
This scale is useful in showing how a series of episodes oscillate between the two extremes over

136

time. Many of the episodes in the Discovery phase could be coded as “strategic” as the
participants engage themselves in activities like appreciative interviews, which focus their
attention specifically on the organization’s strengths. In contrast, a presentation by the CEO on
industry trends can range anywhere from “strategic” to “ritual” depending on the content and
context. It could be coded as “somewhat strategic” if the majority of the participants were frontline employees. For them, receiving such information from the CEO is not a routine event. If this
were a smaller strategy workshop involving only the top management, the episode could be
coded as “business-as usual.” An award ceremony during the summer recognizing high
performers can be characterized as a “ritual” that reinforces the existing incentive structure.
Diversity.
The composition of groups changes quite dramatically during the course of the summit,
creating another level of oscillation between the strategic and the routine. This has implications
because heterogeneous and diverse groups—the so-called “max-mix” groups—will inevitably
produce new communication channels. If those temporary channels become permanent, then it
opens up the potential for novel decisions to be produced. A homogenous group does have the
potential to produce new pathways, if the topic of discussion during the episode is highly
strategic in nature. Otherwise, a min-mix group is more likely to gear towards the routine.
In this typology, group configurations are categorized along the degree of suspension of
existing functional roles within the organization. Four categories are proposed: diverse, selfselected but mostly diverse, self-selected but mostly routine roles, and routine roles. The plenary,
large group session in which every participant is present would likely represent the highest level
of diversity in the room. In contrast, an episode that divides the participants up into groups
according to their corporate functions could be coded “routine.” In the second half of the 4D
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cycle, Design and Deploy, participants often self-select themselves into groups. Some groups
may be skewed more towards routine than diverse or vice versa.
Diversity indices that are used in biology can be applied in the analysis to quantify the
different levels of diversity of groups. The Simpson Index (Simpson, 1949) calculates the degree
of concentration of certain species in a given population. This diversity index takes into account
both the richness of species and the evenness with which individuals are spread out among
species. Statistical software packages such as PAST (which was developed for paleontologists)
can be used to compare the diversity indices of different populations. I will give an example of
how the index can be used in Chapter 8.
These diversity indices only show the level of diversity and not the qualitative difference
between groups that are more or less in alignment with existing functional roles and positions in
the organization. These would have to be coded separately. Care is needed in the unit of analysis.
One of the hallmarks of large group methods is the use of small groups in large group
configurations. Comparing the large group session against other small group activities may be
comparing apples to oranges. Luhmann’s theories give no guidance for analyzing group or
individual dynamics on such a micro-level. I defer to future studies that may better describe and
explain the different impacts of group composition on the knowledge creation process.
Activities.
The actual strategizing activities of an AI summit episode are decided by the organizers.
Most if not all are strategizing activities that conclude with a particular deliverable. Common
activities include discussions, interviewing, cognitive mapping, presentations, prototyping,
strategic planning, and brainstorming. These activities can be coded according to a scale

138

developed corresponding to the relative creativeness and unusualness of the activity, such as
creative, somewhat unusual, normal, and ritual.
Some summit activities are unique to the AI methodology. Appreciative interviews,
positive core mapping, and creative dreaming (Ludema et al., 2003, p. 33) are hallmarks of AI.
These strategizing activities focus attention on strengths and opportunities in a format that is outof-the-ordinary for most participants, and could be coded as “creative.” Others, such as
brainstorming, practical tactical planning (Ludema et al., 2003, pp. 197-198) and the formation
of innovation teams (Ludema et al., 2003, pp. 193-196) are more traditional planning exercises.
It is the context in which such exercises are conducted—the unconventional setting and unusual
combination of the individuals who are participating—that makes them creative, not the
activities themselves. These could be coded as “somewhat unusual” or “normal” depending on
the organizational context.
Decoupling.
The final dimension I identify is the degree to which the organizational system is tightly
coupled to the interaction system. The tighter the coupling, the more likely a decision may
endure and produce further decisions, because the decision can enact existing decision premises.
If the coupling is loose, a decision may vanish for lack of communication pathways that can
produce more decisions. The level of coupling affects how a system selects decisions and
interactions for further consideration. An interaction system that is not coupled to the
organization system at all will have great potential for working with innovative ideas. The
community summit on sustainability organized by the City of Cleveland is an example of a
summit with little coupling to any one organization system, due to the wide variety of
organizations participating. On the other end of the spectrum, if the two systems are structurally
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coupled (e.g. a summit in which all of organizational members are participating), then the
decision making premises of the organization likely to carry over to the summit and vice versa.
The consequences for such coupling on organizational knowledge creation depends on
the structural rigidity of the organization engaged in the summit. At a summit of a highly rigid,
bureaucratic organization, a decision by a person in a certain position during the strategic
reflections at an AI summit will automatically connect back to the existing organization and
become an organizational decision, if the summit is structurally coupled to the organization’s
system. If the CEO seems wildly in favor of an innovative idea, then it is more likely that the
middle managers who can execute the idea will align themselves around it, and subsequently
involve themselves in a project team. Conversely, a disruptive, innovative idea may have less
chance of being selected during the summit if a high-ranking executive who feels threatened by
the idea shoots it down, and as a result, prevents any further decisions related to the idea from
being produced. Furthermore, if some key decision makers who yield significant power over a
bureaucratic organization are missing from the summit, the coupling between the organization
and interaction system could be characterized as loose. What happens at the summit may have
little bearing on the organization because of the absence of those decision makers. An innovative
idea might have legs during the summit, only to lose momentum after the summit concludes. The
absence of front-line employees could have similar consequences.
The impact of decoupling in the context of organizations that are loosely structured is less
clear. Having all the organizational members present at a summit (i.e. structurally coupled) may
serve to temporarily tighten the couplings within a loosely structured entrepreneurial startup. The
summit can help stabilize organizational knowledge in this case. The flipside is that if the
summit is only loosely coupled to the organizational system, then the conference might not have

140

much impact on the knowledge base of the organization. One could speculate that positive
momentum would not be enough to produce changes in organizational knowledge in this
scenario. There is relatively little research on the impact of AI interventions on entrepreneurial
companies. Luhmann’s theory guides us to study the nature of the coupling between the
interaction and organization system. Further theoretical and empirical studies are necessary to
develop frameworks for understanding the consequences of these couplings on the outcome of
AI summits, especially on entrepreneurial companies.
Summary
In this chapter, I drew on research by Seidl and his colleagues to begin developing some
conceptual frameworks for viewing AI summits through a social systems lens. An AI summit
can be observed as a strategic episode which allows an organization to suspend its existing
structures to reflect upon itself in a strategic context. The social dynamics of the episode are
driven by the structural coupling of three types of autopoietic systems, the organizational system
(the AI summit’s host organization), an interaction system (the AI conference proceedings) and
hundreds of psychological systems (individual participants of the AI summit). The structural
couplings of the three systems are special. Not only can they trigger mutual perturbations in their
respective systems, they can penetrate the system and leverage the internal complexities of the
other system. Employees of an organization come to know their organization so intimately, that
they will take into account the complexities of organizational life when performing their
organizational duties. For example, employees might anticipate the subtle but inevitable internal
power struggles that could result from a certain decision, and adjust their actions accordingly.
I posit that this coupling mechanism reduces both external and internal communication
barriers in developing and executing strategy. As a consequence, the organization is also better
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able to access knowledge that is ordinarily inaccessible—its nonknowledge—and use this
knowledge as the basis for producing decisions. The coupling mechanism also serves to orient
the interactions such that decision interactions are produced while the strategic episode is
ongoing, condensing the time required to execute a chosen strategy.
In order to further identify some of the signature social dynamics of an AI summit, I
develop a typology for comparing different episodes. I focus on the strategic orientation of the
episode, the degree to which the episode requires a suspension of the organization’s existing
structures. I identified four dimensions of an episode: the general context, diversity of
participants, creativity of activities, and the degree to which the interaction system is decoupled
from the organization. Compared to other practices of strategizing, the AI summit is
differentiated by the variety and number of episodes that occur during the course of the overall
strategic episode. Each episode can be coded by these dimensions along a scale that denotes the
degree to which organizational routines are suspended. More detailed coding criteria need to be
defined for an empirical study. Based on how an AI summit is typically conducted, an AI summit
can be conceptualized as a series of interlocking episodes that together, systematically comprise
a strategic episode. As the summit progresses, the episodes oscillate between varying degrees of
suspension that create a dynamic that is unique to the format. In the next chapter, I develop these
ideas further and connect them to how an AI summit might generate organizational knowledge.
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Chapter 8 The AI Summit as a Knowledge Creation System: An Illustrative Case
Introduction
In this chapter, I explore in more detail the third step in Mohe and Seidl’s (2011)
proposed methodology for analyzing the “contact system” of a consulting project, as it applies to
an AI summit. A contact system is where consultants and their clients meet during the course of
a consulting engagement, often to discuss and develop strategy. As I argued in the previous
chapter, the AI summit can be viewed as an OD consulting project, as there is usually an external
AI consultant involved during various stages of the AI summit project lifecycle. For this study, I
limit the analysis to the actual AI summit conference itself. It is a part of the overall contact
system in the client-consultant relationship.
In Chapter 7, I conceptualized the AI summit as a contact system that consists of the
hosting company’s organization system, the conference proceeding’s interaction system, and the
hundreds of psychological systems belonging to the individual participants. These systems
interpenetrate one another, enabling not only mutual perturbations in their structures, but also
giving them an ability to take advantage of each system’s internal complexities. To borrow a
term Luhmann used for interpersonal relationships, the structural coupling between the systems
is intimate. The principles and activities of the AI approach influence and serve to structure the
interactional communications that take place at the strategy conference.
Having identified the component system and the relationship between the systems, I
move onto the third step: “examine how their mutual perturbations are internally (re)constructed”
(Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 18). By now, the concept of mutual perturbations and closed but
simultaneously open systems is hopefully familiar. All three components of the contact system
are autopioetic. They also share a common feature in that they are meaning-making systems.
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Each system operates using different modes of production. An organization produces decision
communications, an interaction system produces interactional communications, and a
psychological system produces thoughts. They are closed from each other in terms of how they
produce meaning. Nevertheless, the systems are structurally coupled. This means that the same
event can simultaneously trigger mutual perturbations in their internal structures in such a way
that they are able to co-evolve.
Mohe and Seidl (2011) concluded in their theoretical study that a consulting project can
be described by a third-order observer (such as a researcher) as processes of “co-evolutionary
knowledge creation…between the client, consultant and contact system” (p. 18). The word coevolutionary should not be taken lightly. Mohe and Seidl’s controversial argument was that
under Luhmann’s theory, knowledge transfer between the consultant and client is “entirely
impossible because these [systems] are operatively closed” (p. 17). All a consultant can hope for
is that the misunderstandings with their clients “be productive to some degree” (p.17). Clegg and
his colleagues (Clegg, Kornberger, & Rhodes, 2004) described the parasitical role of
management consultants “as a source of ‘noise’ that disrupts established ways of doing and being
by introducing interruptive action into the space between organizational order and chaos” (p. 31).
What is noteworthy about an AI summit is that the social dynamics of the contact system
differ significantly from a typical consulting project by design. The origins of AI lie in action
research, a mode of inquiry where the ideal state is a partnership between scholar/consultant and
practitioner/client in building theory. Large group methods evolved, in part, in response to the
deep-seated communications problems that Luhmann identified. That the consultant’s role
drastically diminished in AI is only one of the points of differentiation. More significant is the
active engagement of hundreds of organizational members who are traditionally excluded from
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the inner circle of strategy. Not only are they present, but they are also expected to contribute to
the organizational outcome.
This brings me back to my original research question: How and why does an AI summit,
as a whole, create organizational knowledge? The question implies that one of the purposes of
an AI summit is to create organizational knowledge. I use examples from a case study of an AI
summit I attended in 2008 to examine in more detail the co-evolutionary processes of knowledge
creation. But first, I would like to clarify what organizational knowledge creation means in social
systems theory, and how it might be created at an AI summit.
Knowledge creation at an AI summit
Some scholars have situated AI as an incubator for innovative ideas. Richer and her
colleagues looked at an AI intervention at a hospital in terms of how the participants generated
innovative ideas that might transform the workplace. They drew on Nonaka’s knowledge
creation theory to explain how AI created a shared context from which organizational knowledge
emerged. If we are to accept Mohe and Seidl’s argument regarding the impossibility of
knowledge transfer, however, this has detrimental consequences for knowledge management in
general, and Nonaka’s theory in particular. Luhmann essentially made the case that knowledge is
not a resource that can be transferred, shared, controlled and managed. If so, then the resourcebased view of the firm (Barney, 1996), upon which Nonaka’s theory is based, can not apply to
knowledge.
According to Seidl’s interpretation, knowledge, in the Luhmannian sense, is defined as
how systems deal with information, not the information itself. This is an important distinction.
As Spender (Spender, 2007) noted, theories of knowledge often implicitly or explicitly use a
schema that distinguishes between data, information, knowledge and wisdom. According to

145

Spender, this is known as the DIKW model, proposed by Ackoff in a 1989 paper (p.183). The
model is like a ladder “of increasing cognitive power” (p. 189). The bottom rung is data which
has no meaning. A step up is information—meaning added to data. Knowledge is “useful
aggregations of information.” At the pinnacle is wisdom, “bringing understanding into the
context of the human condition” (p.189). Spender wrote that this widely-used model “may be
more popular than useful since its axiomatic differences remain submerged beneath poorly
defined terms” (p.189).
In social systems theory, knowledge is analogous to a lens. How the system sees will
depend on the type of lens it uses. The same object will look wildly different through a telephoto
lens than through a fisheye. “Observation is not knowledge. Rather, knowledge is something that
guides observation” (Seidl, 2007, p. 16). Each lens is constructed using a particular structure.
The structure of a fisheye lens, for example, creates an image that widens what the camera can
see. The camera can see more of what is in the frame, but with a price: fisheye lenses strongly
distort vision in such a way that the object looks as though it is curved. In this analogy,
knowledge is not the image that the camera sees. Knowledge is the lens itself. Knowledge is
therefore structure. And it follows that organizational knowledge is the equivalent of
organizational structure.
Organizational knowledge determines the organization system’s evolutionary path and
process. The system’s structure—that is its knowledge—determines and selects whether the
difference makes a difference, and if it does, what difference it makes. “From the infinite number
of possible observations, [knowledge] selects certain possibilities of observations and excludes
the remaining possibilities” (p. 18). Since knowledge is the system’s internal structure itself, it is
not a resource that can be transferred in and out of the system. An organization’s internal
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structure determines how it selects and produces decision communications. This is what decision
premises do, and thus, decision premises are an important element of organizational knowledge.
Taking a Luhmannian view of knowledge does not mean we ought to discard Nonaka’s
theories and other theories drawing on a resource based view of organizations. On the contrary,
the SECI model is extremely useful in understanding how organizations can fully leverage the
collective knowledge of its individual members both inside and outside the organization.
Operationalizing tacit knowledge through cognitive mapping (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001), for
example, is a technique that is often used in an AI summit to identify strengths and opportunities.
Viewing knowledge as structure fixes our gaze onto a different part of the organizational
landscape. We are simply transforming one side of the equation into another form. The concept
of knowledge as cognition is only possible for systems with a cognitive system, in other words, a
psychological system in Luhmann terms. For organizations, knowledge is the equivalent of its
organizational structure that determines how it deals with information in order to select and
produce decisions.
In this brief illustrative case study, I limit my observations to one type of organizational
knowledge/structure, decision premises. Structure, broadly defined, can extend to an
organization’s culture, including its normative values. These are typically harder to change and
more difficult to observe. Structural changes in the cultural domain might happen during the
course of an AI summit, but it would be a stretch to attribute such changes only to the summit.
Decision premises on the other hand are malleable. New decision premises are much easier to
create than a new value system. Decision premises are decidable. The structures are changed if
the operations/observations are inconsistent with the structures (Seidl, 2007).
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To recap, Luhmann (1995) defined decision premises as consisting of a combination of
personnel, communication channels and programs. These are often bundled into positions. In an
AI summit, individual participants (i.e. psychological systems) are structurally coupled to the
organization through the positions they hold. An essential element of an AI summit is that
hundreds of organizational positions are coupled to the interaction system by virtue of the
presence of so many employees. The summit is not an exact replica of the organization. An AI
summit is in essence, a strategic episode in which existing structures (i.e. knowledge) are
temporarily suspended (Hendry & Seidl, 2003). But it comes close to simulating the
organizational system because of the intimate connection participants have with their
organization through their positions.
An AI summit allows an organization to not only modify, stabilize or reinforce existing
decision premises (i.e. knowledge), it also opens up opportunities to generate new ones. The
most obvious is the production of new channels of communication. Temporary communication
channels are established that are expected to last until at least the end of the strategic episode. At
the very beginning of a summit, table groups are usually deliberately set up for maximum
diversity. A marketing executive may be placed next to a truck driver for example. Some
channels may persist beyond the strategic episode. At the U.S. Navy, informal communication
networks emerged after the summit (Powley et al., 2011). This would be an example of a mutual
perturbation—a perturbation in the internal structures of the organization and psychological
systems—that facilitate the production of more decision communications and thoughts into the
future.
The summit is designed to stimulate reflections on the blind spots within the organization,
especially an organization’s positive aspects. Knowledge that lies outside an organization’s field
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of vision—its nonknowledge—is made temporarily available through the strategizing activities
that take place. Areas of strengths and opportunities that were mere potentialities prior to the
summit can be made explicit, and become the object of decisions. New programs and initiatives
are generated as a result. Figure 1 is a visualization of this process.

Figure 1. The translation of nonknowledge into knowledge enables new positions to emerge
during the strategic episode, often in the form of self-organized project teams.
Time 0 represents the decision premises and organizational knowledge base at the
beginning of the summit. The distinction between knowledge and nonknowledge shifts as a
consequence of strategic reflection. Some personnel may self-assign themselves to a particular
new initiative. Communication may happen through new channels. Such emerging positions,
however, are tentative arrangements. Only when they can carry over to the organization’s regular
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operations after the summit, will the dotted lines of the emerging organizational structure (i.e.
knowledge) become solid. This is why the self-organizing project teams that often emerge from
the strategizing activities are so crucial to a summit’s success. These are the vehicles through
which an organization can continue to produce decisions long after the summit continues. This
suggests that maintaining a positive “momentum” after the summit is not enough. The key to an
AI summit’s success may be dependent on whether the organization decides to convert these
tentative arrangements into more permanent structures. If the knowledge structures stick, they
would form the basis for producing new options for decisions, allowing the organization to
follow a different evolutionary path.
A social systems view of an AI summit requires one to focus on how decisions connect to
decisions that produce decisions about its decision premises. It begs us to pay more attention to
the relative fragility or robustness of connections between decisions. Depending on the resiliency
of the connections between communications, any tentative changes made to existing decision
premises during the AI summit will vanish when the strategic episode ends, and the status quo is
restored.
Diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 2003) suggests that decisions related to
disruptive, innovative ideas, are fragile. As Schumpeter put it, innovation is creative destruction.
Those who are on the receiving end of destruction will likely resist. Some people may be
supportive of the innovation, but may not have the means nor the knowledge to adopt it. The
structures and premises needed for the innovation to diffuse may conflict with existing ones.
New communication channels, programs, and people will most likely need to emerge. This is
why Drucker (1993) advised companies to set up entrepreneurial ventures outside and beyond
the reach of the organization’s normal operations.
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Given the social dynamics I identified earlier, an organization wide strategic episode like
an AI summit, may function to make more robust, the pathways for connecting decisions relating
to fledgling, innovative ideas that would otherwise disrupt the existing organizational structures.
This is achieved through a temporary suspension of the status quo to enable strategic reflection.
The more disruptive an idea, the greater the requisite degree of suspension. An incremental
improvement would not require as much suspension, and hence, the connections between
decisions will not be as fragile as a novel innovation. Nevertheless, existing decision premises
may still need to be modified to accommodate the incremental improvement. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between the degree of suspension and the impact on existing structures.

Figure 2 The degree of suspension differs leads to different impacts on existing
organizational structures.
In the subsequent section, I draw on my own experience of attending a corporate AI
summit to illustrate some of the points I have made above and in the previous chapter.
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The TireCo AI sales summit—an illustrative case
Case background.
In February 2011, I was given the opportunity to participate in a corporate AI summit of
a tire company in the mid-west. Many of the most famous case studies of AI interventions
involve established companies that were seeking transformational change. This company, which
I will call TireCo in this study, was very different. The US automotive industry had been hit hard
by the financial crisis. The US government had to bail out GM. Yet this small, young tire
company in Ohio was growing at nearly 40% a year. About 10 years earlier, the privately-held
company introduced a new business model for selling tires. Most tires in the US were sold
through retailers in the aftermarket for cars. Few consumers considered car dealers as a point of
purchase for tires. TireCo saw this as an opportunity. Their mission was simple: find ways to
help car dealers sell more tires. TireCo began as a niche player catering to the tire needs of car
dealerships. Despite the bleak state of the auto market, TireCo’s business grew at a tremendous
clip. By 2011, TireCo had grown its reputation in the tire market and had contracts with many of
the auto industry’s largest players including Mercedes Benz and Toyota.
About five years after its founding, TireCo brought in a team of executives who had
previously worked for a Fortune 500 company that had used AI in their strategic business
planning process. TireCo’s top management team decided to incorporate AI into its business in
order to manage their next stage of growth. Among them was the Chief Sales and Marketing
Officer (CSMO), who Cooperrider (Personal communication, 2011) regarded as among the most
seasoned practitioners of AI summit. In her capacity as an executive in HR and OD, she had
overseen dozens of AI summits at her previous company. She had been working with
Cooperrider for over 10 years. By 2010, TireCo had been conducting AI summits on a regular
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basis, usually once a year. Each summit focused on a different challenge that reflected the
company’s phase in their lifecycle. For example, two years prior, TireCo developed its core
values and guiding principles using the AI summit format. This was followed by the
development of a roadmap for the future—a mid-range strategic plan.
In order to keep up with their double-digit growth in revenues, TireCo found itself in a
hiring frenzy. New personnel came on board on a weekly basis. By 2011, the company’s head
count had risen to about 700. The past year’s AI summit was attended by 80% of its employees.
However, with the growth spurt in headcount, there were no local hotels that had the capacity to
hold a corporate-wide AI summit. Management made the decision to conduct two, back-to-back
summits, one focused on sales, the other on the supply chain. Cooperrider was the external
consultant for TireCo. He introduced me to the CSMO, who invited me to participate in their
four day summit as an external stakeholder.
Methodology.
The reflexivity of the observer is an important consideration in adopting a social systems
view. I will therefore briefly describe my involvement in the summit. Less than a year before
TireCo’s summit, I took an MBA course on AI under the instruction of Cooperrider. I had been
interested in AI for several years, having come across a book on AI (Fry, Barrett, Seiling, &
Whitney, 2002) in 2007 while doing informal research on grassroots leadership. As part of the
course requirement, I worked on a group project to design a community AI summit that could
bring stakeholders together to discuss and develop plans to alleviate the transportation challenges
of Los Angeles. That same year, I entered the doctoral program. My original research plan was
to investigate the effects of positive psychology on the outcomes of an AI summit. I was
particularly interested in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of flow, the psychological state of
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being completely immersed in the task at hand. Previous accounts of AI summits, including
video footage from the US Navy summits, suggested that participants may be experiencing flow
during the conference. In January 2011, I proposed a pilot study to Cooperrider that could help
me gauge the feasibility of measuring participants’ flow states during an AI summit using a
method called experience sampling (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007).
When I initially proposed the study to Cooperrider, I was planning to be a detached,
neutral observer of a summit. He told me that he was facilitating a major AI summit of a tire
company, and that he would be happy to refer me to their CSMO under one condition: I would
fully participate as an external stakeholder. This made me slightly nervous. Most of the research
methods I had studied as a graduate student emphasized the importance of the independence and
neutrality of the researcher. I am trained as a journalist, a field that takes a similar approach.
Participant observation is tricky, and can take years to master. On top of this, I was not sure that I
could contribute much to the sales summit, given that I knew next to nothing about tires. I was
skeptical as to what value a complete outsider with no vested interest in the company could bring.
TireCo’s CSMO however, saw no issues at all, and immediately extended me an invitation. I
would pay for my own travel expenses. TireCo would cover all conference expenses, in
exchange for a post-summit writeup I would submit to the company later that spring.
Attending TireCo’s summit for four days straight, morning to evening, as a second-order
observer (i.e. participant-observer) completely changed my perspective of what an AI summit
was about. So much of the literature on AI focused on the positive and transformational aspects
of AI. But at a summit in the context of a corporate setting such as TireCo, I observed (and also
experienced) negativity and conflict during the activities, especially in the second half of the 4D
cycle, Design and Deploy. Such conflict though did not appear to have a detrimental effect on

154

the outcome of the summit. At the end of four days, the summit delivered 15 business plans that
promised to enhance its competitive edge in tire distribution. Prior to going back to graduate
school, I spent nearly 10 years as a conference interpreter specializing in meetings and
conferences in the business sector. I have participated in hundreds of meetings at many different
companies ranging from routine business meetings to highly sensitive board meetings. Often,
these meetings were related to strategic planning. I was therefore in a position from which I
could compare TireCo with other companies’ practices. Indeed, I did leave the summit with
positive energy and a general sense of excitement. What I had not anticipated was the practical
utility of the AI summit format as a generic strategizing tool. Three things struck me about the 15
business plans that were presented at the end of TireCo’s summit: the speed with which they
were produced, their quality, and the organic formation of implementation teams.
At the same time, I found issues with my original research agenda. It was not clear to me
how the psychological states of an individual could be aggregated to the meso (group) and macro
(organization) levels over the course of the four day summit. Flow is a construct developed to
measure individual states. While there is some research suggesting evidence of flow contagion
(Bakker, 2005), the study of flow in groups and its impact on organizational performance is
underdeveloped. The social dynamics that the summit generated were extremely complex on
many different levels. For example, I had not considered the level of impact different group
configurations have on the conduct of activities, emotions, and outcome. Personalities, positions,
and the types of activities seemed so interdependent, that it would be challenging to develop a
useful model. In fact, this same issue would apply to other psychological constructs as well. I felt
at the time that there was just so much going on during the conference on a macro level that
deconstructing it into observable elements may be counterproductive.
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I decided to change my research focus. I went to TireCo’s summit with literally no
knowledge of the company, beyond a few news articles and what little information they had
available on their website. The company was financed through venture capital. It was still at a
stage where they were laying low, consciously staying under the radar as they ramped up their
business. After four days of participating in intense and strategic planning activities, I left the
summit with the sense that I had an intimate understanding of the inner workings of TireCo,
which would have taken me months, perhaps years to accumulate had I been working as a
journalist or interpreter. No amount of reading reports and articles could have given me what I
felt I knew about the company after the summit. It was the experience of being in a microcosm
of the organization in which results mattered and people were held accountable to those results
that was the source of this knowledge.
Summit overview.
Annual sales conferences are a common business practice for many companies. Once a
year, sales people from different geographies assemble in a conference room to listen to their
executives present the sales strategy and business plan for the upcoming year. This was what
TireCo’s Chief Sales and Marketing Officer was referring to in her opening remarks: “We’re not
here to present you a business plan.” She talked about how TireCo’s conference was different.
“We are asking you to create the plan,” she emphasized. The summit was taking place in the
ballroom of a luxury hotel, about a 10 minute drive from TireCo’s corporate headquarters.
Roughly half of the entire company was present in the room. The entire selling organization was
there. There were also 40 customers in the room—mostly dealerships and representatives of auto
makers. The fact that customers were also part of the strategizing activities was emphasized
several times during the day by both executives and the facilitator. The topic statement guiding
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the work for the entire three and a half days had been formulated by the pre-summit steering
committee. “Efficiency. Effectiveness. Execution. Accelerating leadership at every level to drive
dealer solutions which will positively shift the consumer experience.” The statement was also
printed in a 41 page handbook, which we used throughout the conference.
The sales summit is conceptualized as a strategic episode in which existing decision
premises, such as positions and rank, are temporarily suspended so that participants can reflect
upon and describe TireCo from a strategic point of view. Following the social systems model
developed in Chapter 6, the organization system was TireCo. The interaction system was the
conference proceedings of the AI sales summit. According to the scheduled participant list, just
over 360 people were registered to attend at least part of the conference. For the remainder of
this case study, I will be using the scheduled participants list as the basis for analyzing
participation. At any given point in time during the summit, the number of participants ranged
from about 280 and 330 for the strategizing sessions. Participation was lower for social events.
Each individual represents a separate and operatively closed psychological system. They are
closed because one cannot directly access the thoughts of another. Of the registered participants,
315 were TireCo employees, executives or board members. This means that 315 psychological
systems were structurally coupled to TireCo’s organizational system through 315 positions.
Roughly two thirds (66%) of the participants belonged to TireCo’s sales departments, 20% were
other TireCo employees, executives and board members, and just over 10% were customers.
For the purpose of the present study, I define an episode as a block of time that the
summit organizers have distinguished as a distinct session. In the TireCo case, the organizers
drafted a timed agenda that listed all the planned activities at the summit. There were over 50
episodes throughout the summit, including scheduled breaks. These episodes varied dramatically
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in strategic context, group configuration, type of activity, and the degree to which the
interactions were decoupled from the organization system. While the majority of participants
attended all the episodes, there was a conspicuous absence of customers and executives during
the action planning activities of Day 3 and Day 4 in the Design and Deploy phases of the 4D
cycle. Furthermore, there was a dramatic contrast between the group activities in the second D of
the 4D cycle, the Dream phase, and the business planning exercise in the final D, the Deploy
phase, in terms of positivity and the creative nature of the exercise. In terms of a strategy episode,
creating and presenting images of the future through group skits required high degrees of
suspension of existing structures. Developing actionable business plans, on the other hand, was
an activity that is much closer to a routine activity, not necessarily for the individuals involved,
but from the organization system’s perspective. Existing structures and the social dynamics that
come with it appeared to play a greater role in the Deploy phase. The upside in terms of
knowledge creation is that when people in positions to make changes in existing premises for
decision making, the changes are more likely, thereby increasing the possibility of the
interactions during that episode to connect back to the organizational system.
Some episodes were unrelated to the AI methodology and could be considered more a
routine business practice than a strategic episode. For example, the morning of Day 2 was
devoted to training and professional development sessions. There were also various social events
such as a team-building social, employee recognition ceremonies, and divisional dinners. Since it
was rare for so many sales employees to be in one place at one time, a fair amount of regular
business was also conducted in between sessions, especially over breakfast and dinner. Therefore,
conversations would constantly shift from the purely strategic, to straight business talk, and
sometimes to topics completely unrelated to TireCo.
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The explicit goal of the summit was to produce 15 business plans that would help achieve
the three goals in the topic statement: develop leadership at all levels, create solutions for dealers,
and improve the consumer experience of buying tires. The CSMO further clarified the task by
translating them into the language of sales. She identified six goals:
1. Help dealers and OEMs be more profitable
2. Retain customers in the face of declining units in operation
3. Provide dealers innovative solutions
4. Respond to new OEMs
5. Expand current service offerings to OEMs
6. Make it easier for dealer and OEM customers to be in the maintenance and light
repair business
The summit covered all four Ds and for the most part, and incorporated activities that
were considered standard for an AI summit. Each group activity was followed by a report-out or
presentation to the large group. Sandwiched between these strategizing episodes were
presentations by key executives, which would not be considered a typical AI summit activity.
These presentations appeared to have a vital effect on the activities that followed. Customers
were allocated extra time to report-out to the large group on Day 1 (60 minutes for customers, 45
minutes for internal stakeholders). While internal stakeholder groups reported by table with some
tables not presenting at all, every single customer was asked to present their comments at least
once. This implied that their voice carried considerable weight. The literature on AI tends to
focus on the democratic and participatory nature of the summit format. But the presence of key
executives and customers and the form in which they participate nevertheless do much to shape
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and frame the conversations that take place. AI summits draw on the experiences, the memories
and complexities of all participants, but not necessarily in equal proportions.
Presentations by the top management team provided context and information for the
subsequent discussions. TireCo’s co-founder and CEO gave a 45 minute presentation in which
he elaborated on the industry trends that he regarded as having a significant impact on TireCo’s
business. He was describing what he envisioned were the near term strategic challenges for
TireCo. Using Seidl’s typology, such a presentation would qualify as a decision-preparation
interaction. All the information was being presented directly from the CEO to the employees and
external stakeholders, thereby alleviating the problems of internal communication barriers. Many
of the questions from the floor came from customers, which provided some insight into what the
customers cared and worried about. The CEO’s presentation came after the customers’ report
outs on Day 1. It served as important background information in developing ideas and business
plans. Sensitive and strategic details were reserved for Day 4, the final day. Right before groups
went to finalize their action plans in the Deploy phase, the CSMO provided detailed financials to
the participants including current revenues, profitability and other key indicators. Again, these
numbers set the stage for the discussions that followed in developing actionable business plans
that aligned with the goals of the summit. Without disclosing such information, participants may
end up creating plans that did not reflect the realities of the business and are therefore less likely
to be executed.
TireCo’s top executives take a lot of pride in practicing a policy of open book
management. Providing detailed, strategic, confidential, proprietary information to everyone
present at the summit might be considered a substantial risk at some companies. But it is also
clear that sharing such information is critical if the expectation is to generate strategic plans that
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can be executed. Top management’s perceptions about the company’s future heavily influence
the decision premises of an organization. Their primary job is to engage in interactions that
produce of decision communications. TireCo had been using AI as a routine business practice for
nearly half of its life at that point. Top management clearly recognized that positivity alone will
not get results. They were also willing to be transparent about the company’s financial and
competitive data. Such information can be considered one type of self-description of the
organization, a crucially important description by top executives incorporating their personal
knowledge, expectations and images of the future.
I will now provide examples illustrating the main elements of organizational knowledge
creation during an AI summit.
System intelligence.
Seidl (2007) defined organizational intelligence as the ability of an organization to access
and leverage its nonknowledge—information and structures that are potentially accessible, but
lie hidden from view, completely outside the organization’s field of vision. Seidl also called it
the dark side of knowledge. Although the organization is functionally blind to its nonknowledge
during the normal course of its ongoing production of decisions, there are ways to bring that
knowledge back into its field of vision. An organization actively forgets the premises and history
that went into a particular decision, in order to absorb uncertainty. This is one way an
organization system deals with complexity. Following Ashby’s law, the environment is
exponentially more complex than the system. The system can either reduce the complexity by
making simplifications about its environment (e.g. condensing premises to absorb uncertainty),
or it can increase the complexity of its system by adding more variety. An organization system

161

can achieve the latter by purposefully orienting its vision towards areas of nonknowledge.
Examples of this were plentiful at TireCo’s summit.
One of the first episodes of TireCo’s summit was a presentation by three partners about
the early days of the company’s existence. As Seidl (2007) and Schoeneborn and his colleagues
(2011) have noted, organizations have a tendency to forget its history of decision making in
order to absorb uncertainty. Although TireCo was a young company, it was adding employees at
a feverish pace. The President and co-founder described what it was like when TireCo was little
more than a business idea and a handful of employees. “Our job is to kind of walk you down
memory lane and talk about where we came from and how everything is changed yet nothing
really hasn't,” he said. He pulled up the PowerPoint slides that TireCo used in pitching the first
tire program, which became the deal that launched the company. The Chief Supply Chain Officer
recalled her shock when she was recruited to the company in 2000. The Chief Supply Chain
Officer talked about how she was given a great sales pitch by a co-founder when she came to
TireCo in 2000. “A couple of mistakes that I learned. One, make sure you see the warehouse
before you take the job. Two, ask about the computer system,” she said. “We had no computer
systems for the warehouses. None. It was unbelievable. I knew I had to be mistaken.” The
company went on to implement a complicated ERP software package called J. D. Edwards.
TireCo defied the experts who claimed it would take them two years. “We were able to do it over
the weekend—all the warehouses went live. And it was fantastic. So that same energy, that same
passion that we had then, we still have today” she said. The CFO talked about “how we made
ends meet” and the tradeoffs the company had to make in order to secure equity financing right
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. TireCo had to guarantee a 35% compounded rate on return in
exchange for equity financing. Such stories provided a rich layer of information and context,
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especially for those of us who were new to the company. We were hearing about the
complexities of the business, sensing the nuances of the organizational culture and its core values
of innovation, fairness, accountability and playing-to-win (TireCo, 2011).
The positive orientation of the AI methodology also played a role at TireCo’s summit in
bringing attention to its nonknowledge. I offer two examples, one that highlights its effect on an
individual’s psychological system, the other on the interaction and organization system.
Positivity and individuals.
A psychological system reproduces thoughts. Positivity affects individual thoughts
through psychology, specifically positive psychology. AI summits are structured to stimulate
conversations that lift emotions and positive affect. Theories of positive emotions suggest that
they help broaden cognition to allow individuals to see the forest from the trees. In the context of
a strategizing conference, positive emotions may broaden the perspective of the individual
participants so that they are better able to see the macro issues facing the company. If an
employee can see how they fit within the greater organizational context, they may be more likely
to adjust their perspective so that they seek solutions that further the organizational goals rather
than their own self-interest. Studies have shown that the physical act of smiling appears to reduce
own-race biases in facial recognition (Johnson, Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010). When people
smile authentically, they are better able to make finer distinctions in the facial expressions of
people of a different race than one’s own. The authors concluded that facially expressed positive
emotions broadened attention. On an individual level, this might translate into a heightened
ability to empathize with people in a different department.
If an individual’s interests are in direct conflict with organizational ones, positive
emotions, therefore, would increase the likelihood that the individual changes how they think
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about an issue. If I am an outstanding sales person, and have cultivated best practices through
experience, would I be willing to share those practices with others? If I do, it could reduce my
relative competitiveness against my peers, and may even result in a lower bonus. Given the
theory of positive emotions, if I were overwhelmed by negative emotions, my cognition would
zoom in on my self-interests; I would want to preserve and protect them. Conversely, if I were
filled with positive emotions, my cognition would broaden. I might see how sharing my
experiences could benefit others, and in the long term, benefit me. Losada and Heaphy (2004)
demonstrated that business teams with higher levels of positivity had better outcomes than those
that were negative.
AI summits are designed to build up tremendous positive emotions at the very beginning
of the conference. The first major activity of an AI summit is the sharing of high-point
experiences through paired interviews. High point interviews are a hallmark method of AI in
general. But they are taken to greater heights when literally hundreds of these interviews are
conducted simultaneously in the same room.
Cooperrider served as the facilitator of TireCo’s summit. Shortly after the conference
began, he gave a 25 minute presentation on the AI approach. He began with the concept of
appreciation. “The word appreciation comes from the dictionary and I love the dictionary
definition; it has a double meaning. To appreciate means to see value,” said Cooperrider as he
began to explain the AI approach, about 30 minutes into the conference. “But it also means to
increase in value…. So there's an interesting double relationship here between what we take time
to appreciate and the process of further appreciation or development of greater value.”
About an hour into the conference, the participants began conducting their paired
interviews. Due to the limitation of time (20 minutes per person), many pairs, including mine,
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did not cover all four questions in the workbook. My partner and I spent most of our time on the
first question, which asked:
Think about a time that stands out to you as a high point – a time when you felt most
energized and passionate about your work, when you were really proud to be a part of the
TireCo selling organization or proud to work with the TireCo selling organization.
(TireCo, 2011, p. 15)
The conversations bring back some of the positive emotions felt during a high-point
experience. My interview partner talked about her recent performance evaluation. It was her first
evaluation since she took a sales position at TireCo’s corporate headquarters. She recounted how
she was overwhelmed with emotion when her supervisor gave her a glowing evaluation. For her,
this was a great accomplishment. Previously, she was in the restaurant business; she had no
experience selling tires. She joined TireCo because the recruiter had sent her a one page fact
sheet summarizing the core values and guiding principles of the company. Those values
convinced her that TireCo was a good fit. With 330 people participating in the activity, 115
conversations were unfolding simultaneously in the ballroom of the Intercontinental Hotel. One
had to talk extremely loudly to be heard, further enhancing the perception of the high energy
levels in the room. Theories of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) and
mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) might also explain the heightened levels of
positive emotions. Emotional contagion is “the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures and movements with those of another person”
(Hatfield et al., 1994, p. 5). It is a multidimensional package of “psychophysiological, behavioral,
and social phenomena” (p. 4). The mirror neuron system in our brains is thought “to play a
fundamental role in both action understanding and imitation” (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
Mirror neurons partly explain the phenomena of emotional contagion.
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The positive emotions generated at the initial stages of the conference through the paired
interview process, may also have a priming effect (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) on the participants
that influences the subsequent strategizing activities. Priming is “a nonconscious form of human
memory, which is concerned with perceptual identification of words” (p. 301) that functions
independently of other memory systems. Whether or not positive emotions increase the cognitive
ability of participants at an AI summit is open to further empirical research.
During the TireCo summit, the level of positive affect during the course of the conference
appeared to fluctuate. My own emotional level dipped markedly around Day 3, the beginning of
the Design phase. After two full days of strategizing from 8am to 5pm, participants were
noticeably fatigued. Furthermore, the activities of the last two days—Design and Deploy in the
4D cycle—are not as differentiated from conventional strategic planning meetings as the
activities in the first two days. While the underlying positive approach is still there, there are no
provocative positive questions to guide the design of an executable plan. The three main
activities of the last two days are brainstorming, rapid prototyping, and business plan
development. The final deliverables for TireCo’s summit were 15 business cases that could
potentially be presented to the board. There was no formal facilitation or structure, and the usual
dilemmas of discussing in larger groups outlined in the literature section—dilemmas of voice,
egocentrism etc.—crept back in. In my group of 17 people, a senior sales executive assumed the
role of moderator. Some people chose to stay on the sidelines while others dominated the
discussions. The exercise felt very different from the “images of the future” activity in the Dream
phase on the second day. What participants were being asked to do was to develop business
proposals to which people will be held accountable. The pressure to deliver was palpable.
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Positivity and social systems.
Despite the decreased levels of positive affect, however, positivity still played a role in
shaping the conversations that took place. Positivity in this context is differentiated from its
effect on psychological systems. Positivity increases the degree of suspension of an interaction
system during a strategic episode. This is simply because organizations tend to orient its
communication (and attention) towards problem areas. The dominance of deficit-based thinking
is one of the core assumptions of AI. People are not used to analyzing the root causes of success.
Organizations obviously cannot think though, so the organizational consequence of a deficitbased orientation is that its decision premises are more sensitive to decisions and communicative
events around problems rather than opportunities. This may inhibit an organization’s potential
for entrepreneurship, innovation and growth. Drucker (1993) noted that entrepreneurship is about
shifting resources to areas of opportunity. A deliberate focus on opportunity areas during a
strategic episode encourages interactions and decisions that are generative and more likely to
lead to the production of more interactions and decisions.
One of the groups at TireCo’s summit had a breakthrough on the last day, as they
struggled to develop measures to increase the effectiveness of each and every dealer visit. When
they presented their “prototype” during the Design phase on Day 3, the group identified time as
their key constraint. “Those things that we are doing in the dealership are very effective,” said
the group 4’s presenter. “We just really need more time.” Their idea was to hire administrative
assistants who could help them with “activities that take away from our time at the dealership,”
such as updating reports. The group received feedback from other participants that they ought to
look at what is possible—the opportunities—rather than the constraints. “We actually took a step
back today and regrouped a little bit,” said the presenter of group 4 on the final day. They asked
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themselves: “What does it look like now when we do a fantastic job with that, and what pieces
are we missing if time was not an obstacle?” Of the 18 members of the group, 10 represented
TireCo’s outside sales force, and 3 were upper level account managers.
The group scrutinized its best practices, and articulated immediate and longer term action
items for five tactical areas such as commitment and awareness, inventory, and inspection.
Action items in the “immediate” category were very specific and specialized: e.g. physical touch
of inventory, availability of a strategic elevator speech, weekly emails to general managers. In
Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory, these would be examples of
“externalization,” in which tacit knowledge is made explicit. A social systems perspective would
suggest that these ideas were made explicit because the reflections were taking place during a
strategic episode, and in addition, participants oriented their thinking towards the positive. The
resulting conversations are more likely to revolve around areas of strengths and opportunities.
Such conversations open up new pathways for decisions that could not have emerged otherwise,
and can trigger changes in the organization’s knowledge structures.
Diversity and the production of decisions.
Next, I explore the implications of participant diversity and its effect on producing
decisions while the AI summit is still ongoing. A defining characteristic of an AI summit as a
strategic episode is the large number of participants representing different stakes and interests.
The organizers of TireCo’s summit would consistently describe the summit as having about 400
participants, of which 40 were customers. This description masks the subtle shifts in the
composition of people who are actually present in particular episodes. The composition of
groups changes quite dramatically during the course of the summit. Individual participants are
structurally coupled to both the interaction system (the conference proceedings) and the
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organization system (TireCo) during the course of an entire strategic episode (sales summit).
Since the coupling between the individual and their organization is special—one of
interpenetration, a deeper form of structural coupling—who is present and absent will affect
what structures can be mutually perturbed. Put another way, decision interactions that lead to a
change in an organization’s internal structure, triggered by a change in how an individual thinks,
are more or less likely to happen depending on who is present in the interaction system.
In order to show how the composition of groups changed from one episode to another, I
calculated the diversity indices for the report-out for appreciative interviews on Day 1, the report
out for the action planning session on Day 4. Both episodes were among the most diverse in
terms of group composition because they are plenary sessions involving all participants.
However, the Day 4 report-out had both fewer people and stakeholder groups, as there were no
customers scheduled to be present on Day 4. The Simpson Index (Simpson, 1949) is a measure
of diversity used in biology to study ecological systems. It calculates the degree of concentration
of certain species in a given population. This diversity index takes into account both the richness
of species and the evenness with which individuals are spread out among species. Statistical
software packages such as PAST (which was developed for paleontologists) can be used to
compare the diversity indices of different populations. Using PAST, the Simpson index (1-D) for
Day 1 was 0.58 for Day 1, compared to 0.45 for Day 4. The difference was significant (p=0.004).
The diversity was measured across five “species” for which I arbitrarily used affiliation
according to the following five categories: Sales, Supply Chain, Corporate, Canada and Others.
Customers fall in the category “others.” How these categories are chosen will have an impact on
the index, but this is beyond the scope of this study. The limitation of the Simpson Index is that it
does not take into account how different one category is from another, in other words the
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distance between the categories. The qualitative difference between customers and internal sales
people is far greater than that between sales people and corporate employees. Other indices may
be applied depending on the nature of the research question.
The Simpson Index is useful only when there are enough data points in the population,
such as the large group report-outs. It cannot measure the changes in group composition during
the strategizing activities, which can have a dramatic effect on social dynamics.
At TireCo’s summit, the highest level of diversity was achieved at the plenary session,
where every participant is present. The min-mix groups were grouped according to stakeholder
groups including corporate roles such as inside sales and external stakeholder groups such as
Dealers. These groups would be characterized as routine. The action planning groups in the last
two days were self-selected. The level of diversity varied from group to group. Some had
representatives from many stakeholder groups in roughly equal proportions. Others skewed
towards the routine, such as one group which was almost completely made up of outside sales
and account representatives.
The dynamics of an AI summit are such that its decision making capacity is temporarily
expanded, while simultaneously cutting the time required to produce decisions. Hundreds of
personnel—chosen specifically to cover as much of the decision premises of the organization as
possible—participate in the strategizing activities. Ashby’s law says that a system is better able
to compensate for the variety of perturbations from the environment when there is a large variety
of actions available to it. Interaction systems are severely constrained by time and space. The
variety of its participants is usually limited. Putting the whole system in the room means that the
interaction system’s level of complexity is raised almost to the level of the organization’s
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complexity. The presence of external stakeholders has the effect of temporarily enhancing the
organization’s complexity to better match the complexity in its environment.
In addition, the organization has the ability to make decisions during the summit. At a
typical strategy workshop, the re-coupling of self-reflections to everyday operations can occur
only after the strategic episode. If top management decides on a new strategy for the company
during a strategy workshop, the change in strategy has yet to be communicated to the vast
majority of the company’s personnel. Although the individuals in the top management team may
think they have decided on behalf of the company, it does not constitute an organizational
decision event until their decision produces other decisions. This explains why a strategy decided
by top management may take on a life of its own during its execution, leading to unintended
consequences.
If an idea emerges during the summit to change the way the company is marketing itself
to its customers, the idea is presented to the whole system at once because many of those people
affected by the idea are physically present. For items that are immediately executable, decisions
can be made on the spot whether or not to implement that idea. A group at TireCo’s summit
developed a business case to ensure that the General Manager of a car dealer understands and
can articulate the value of TireCo and its offerings. All 12 people in the group were subject
matter experts—mostly account managers who talk to General Managers on a regular basis. One
of the deliverables presented by the group was a one-page spreadsheet which aggregated the key
pieces of information that clearly and concisely represented the value TireCo was adding to that
dealership. The group mentioned that they had added some metrics based on feedback they had
received on Day 3 from one of the group member’s customers. “He really wanted to see those
key metrics that we at TireCo want to affect change in, like service absorption” said the group’s
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presenter. “I'm actually going to start using this when I get back to work. It's fully functional,”
she said. Enough information was provided for other account managers at the conference to
decide whether or not they would like to use the one-pager.
What is important in the context of a strategic episode is that the decision to create a onepager for the company’s customers produced subsequent decisions, namely the decision to use or
not to use the spreadsheet. The decision to put all the key metrics valued by the customer onto
one page was produced from the decision to develop ideas that enable dealers to understand and
articulate the value of TireCo. This decision was a result of the organization’s self-reflection in
the early days of the conference. The development of the one-page spreadsheet during the
conference is an example of self-reflections connecting back to the organization while the
strategic episode is still ongoing. Decisions are made in vivo so to speak. The time required
between decision-preparation interactions and subsequent decision making interactions is
significantly reduced, thereby accelerating the pace at which a decision premise—organizational
knowledge—is modified or in some cases created from scratch.
Dreaming the ideal future.
I now describe an episode guided by the typology of episodes I introduced in Chapter 6.
Of the many episodes during the summit, one of the most unconventional activities took place on
Day 2 in the Dream phase. I have excerpted portions of the post-summit report I wrote for
TireCo, which describe the group activities and the presentation to the large group. These two
episodes are representative of an episode that is characterized by a high degree of suspension in
nearly all of the dimensions of the proposed typology. The excerpt has been edited for clarity and
to preserve anonymity. Following the excerpt, I will discuss the case in light of the typology of
episodes.

172

The main event of Day 2 was to visualize what the future of TireCo looked like.
In Dr. Cooperrider’s classes, I had watched video clips showing skits, pictures, and other
outcomes of such futuring and visioning exercises. So I had a sense for what the best of
these outcomes looked like. But I had also assumed this type of amazing output was
possible due to a special, creative spark that I did not possess. In addition, there were 18
people in our extended group. How could we possibly put together a skit or other creative
way of presenting the envisioned future of TireCo with such a large group of diverse
individuals?
I decided to trust the process and find ways to make as much of a contribution as
possible. Our task was to visualize the TireCo selling organization in three years’ time.
How are we driving dealer solutions that positively shift the consumer experience? What
is TireCo’s competitive advantage? We could portray our vision in any form we liked.
Our first challenge was a logistical one. More than 20 other groups were doing the
same exercise. Finding a quiet space to discuss became a priority. We wandered out of
the conference hall and eventually took over a small enclave where pay phones used to be,
the booths still there but serving no purpose. It was a subtle reminder of the effect of
technological obsolescence. For the next hour or so, we were to hole ourselves up in this
enclave, bouncing off one idea after another with the goal of performing a skit in which
all 18 of us had a part.
At first, we could not come to much agreement over the content of the skit. We
shared a vague sense that developments in technology would play an important part of
TireCo’s future. But our group was comprised of people from very different backgrounds,
age groups, affiliation and technical expertise. I tried to listen more than speak. But as we
struggled to look for common ground, I could not help feeling a little discouraged about
whether we can come together as a group, let alone develop and perform a skit. Some of
the themes we were trying to work with were how mobile phone apps would change the
consumer experience.
At some point in the conversation, I spoke up. I couldn’t help it. What specific
question I asked, I honestly cannot remember. I remember feeling slightly frustrated that
we were not thinking through what the app would do for the consumer. Soon, we began
talking about what the ultimate consumer’s experience would look like if they
unexpectedly had to change their tires. Why not contrast that experience with a Walmart
or Costco? Someone pointed out how we had some shiny heads in the room. We had four
people with varying degrees of hair loss. Couldn’t we use these heads to represent the
wear and tear of tires?
Two of us in the group had brought an iPad to the summit, one person from
marketing and myself. Tablet computing was an important development in technology. In
three years’ time, there were bound to be corporate applications of tablets. So I suggested
taking photos of the shiny heads and putting them on the iPad. An engineer at the dealer
can look at the iPad to diagnose wear and tear. Soon, I was snapping away on my digital
camera, taking photos of bald heads which I uploaded onto my iPad. My conversation
partner from Day 1 would play the part of the field engineer diagnosing the tires, utilizing
her knowledge of tires gained through her position in inside sales. In the meantime, a
field trainer was making props. We decided on Walmart as our competitor. One of our
group members was a dealer in Cleveland so naturally, we decided it would be his dealer
that appeared in the skit.
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A college student and his date are driving on the freeway when the car’s system
alerts them to tire problems. “There’s an app for that,” says the student. They pull over,
and the app walks them through the process. His girlfriend takes pictures of each tire and
sends it to the dealer. They are then directed to “Take 3, Route 3” to the dealership. On
another part of the stage, friends of the student are at Walmart getting their tires changed.
The tire change at the dealership is quick, easy and professional, and his girlfriend is
impressed. Over at Walmart, his friends are still waiting.
Everything came together extraordinarily quickly. We even had time for a dry-run.
All of us were psyched at the prospect of performing and were quite confident it would
be very funny. Luck was on our side. The randomizer had chosen our table to perform. I
would be playing the part of the app. We played to the audience as professional
improvisers would. The thunderous laughter when my conversation partner pulled out my
iPad with the shiny, bald heads made the performance memorable for all of us on stage.
(Makino, 2011)
The creative dreaming activity took place in the afternoon of Day 2. The morning was
devoted to training and education. I spent the morning with other external stakeholders learning
about the AI method from Cooperrider and staff from TireCo’s human resources department.
Employees of TireCo trained in topics of their choice, ranging from career development to a
maintenance program for a global auto manufacturer. After lunch, employees gave feedback on
the morning’s programs. Then, Cooperrider gave a presentation titled “Positive Image, Positive
Action,” an overview of the theory and research underpinning the AI methodology. So for the
TireCo’s employees, the day had proceeded with episodes that leaned toward the routine in that
all the activities had been tied to corporate education, including Cooperrider’s presentation.
Cooperrider introduced the activity around 2:30pm. The groups began work at 2:40pm and
returned to the ballroom for a report-out just over an hour later at 3:45pm, according to the video
transcripts.
After lunch, participants were seated at their table groups in the max-mix condition.
There were about 40 table groups in all. TireCo’s master planning document shows 309 people
scheduled to take part in the creative dreaming activity. Of these, 198 scheduled participants
were in sales, 15 in supply chain, 52 in corporate (including partners), 12 from Canada, and 32
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external stakeholders of which 24 were customers and one was a board member. The Simpson
index (1-D) as calculated using the software PAST, was 0.55 for the plenary group compared to
0.58 for Day 1 and 0.45 on Day 4. The difference between Day 2 and Day 4 was statistically
significant (p=0.04) while that of Day 1 and Day 2 were not (p=0.33). The composition of the
plenary group on Day 2 was slightly different from Day 1 some of the customers only attended
Day 1. Day 2 was significantly different from Day 4 mostly because there were at least 24
customers participating versus none on Day 4.
In terms of the plenary group then, the group configuration could be categorized as
diverse. The max-mix table groups were combined to form a larger group of up to 20 participants
each. In my report, I mention that our combined group had 18 people, but in the master planning
document I could account for only 15. There may have been some people who were added to the
table group after the conference began. The planning document shows that by combining the two
table groups, the group added diversity. The master plan had 34 categories for affiliation that
aligned with internal divisions for employees and stakeholder affiliations for external
stakeholders. Our table group had 7 categories represented, which expanded to 11 after
combining with another, including a customer.
The overall episode required a high level of suspension in terms of existing
organizational structures. We were being asked to depict an ideal future based on TireCo’s
strengths and on industry trends. Our group assumed that TireCo had the capacity to develop
apps. We also assumed that dealers would want an app like the one we presented. The skit was
grounded in our assumption that TireCo can provide value to its dealer customers by offering a
better solution than other tire retailers. These were extrapolations from TireCo’s current situation
that were strategic in nature.
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The activity was highly creative. The rules required us to have every single group
member play some kind of role in the skit. What worked well for our group was that we tried to
entertain every idea, and to incorporate them in some way into the skit. In her book Bossypants,
the comedian Fey (2011) wrote that the first rule of improvisation in comedy is to always agree
to what your partner says. We seemed to implicitly follow this rule. It appeared that for most of
us, including myself, this was an unusual and slightly awkward exercise, given we knew
practically nothing about each other. The creative element of the exercise raised the level of
psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) for the participants, lowering the barrier for people to
make contributions. As a result, I was able to contribute my idea of using an iPad. For many in
the group, tablet computing was not very familiar to them. Similarly, I was clueless in gauging
the degree of tire wear by looking at tire treads. For TireCo as a whole, tire related information is
an integral part of their working knowledge. However, newer IT trends like tablet and mobile
computing, was likely still a part of its nonknowledge. The organization had the potential to tap
into their nonknowledge base, but cannot easily access except through a strategic episode.
The coupling of the interaction system to the organizational system, at least during this
particular episode, was loose. Although the group was diverse, there were only 18 people
representing different parts of the organization. The highest ranking person in terms of title,
would have been the customer in the group, who was the president of a local dealership and
therefore an external stakeholder. Most were mid-level and frontline employees. We did not have
any senior executives in our group. Some people were very familiar with IT including
smartphones and apps while others were not.
Our group was fortunate to have the opportunity to present our skit to the large group in
the subsequent episode: the report-out. The interaction system of the report-out is far more
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tightly coupled to the organization because of the vast number of positions represented. Our skit
showed how technology might be leveraged in the future through a story acted out using props,
including a real iPad. In the previous session, other participants had referred to the use of
technology as one of TireCo’s strengths. Our skit connected to those interactions and
extrapolated them into the future. Tablet computing may have been part of TireCo’s
nonknowledge prior to the summit, especially if it had no concrete plans to develop an app. A
concept that was still abstract for many people at the time—tablet computing—may have gained
more meaning by linking it to TireCo’s operations. The insights of early adopters were presented
to the organization in a non-threatening manner: a funny skit. In the subsequent action planning
activities, plans to develop mobile apps was a recurring theme, suggesting that the organization
was producing decisions in the forms of new initiatives and teams to pursue this opportunity.
Conceiving new programs and initiatives.
At an AI summit, the presence of so many organizational members at the same time in
the same room engaged in the same activities temporarily increases the nonknowledge available
to the organization. The redundancy of positions that are coupled to the organization system
reduces the risk of particular individuals blocking access to strategic, nonknowledge. At the
same time, the temporal constraints of the interaction system—such as the need to break for
lunch, or for the conference to end—enforces some discipline on the interactions so that
conversations do not verge onto an extreme tangent. The topic statement also guides the
discussions towards a specific goal. Unless an idea (in the form of an interaction) resonates and
triggers a selection by either the individuals or the organizational system as relevant to the goal,
no new interactions on that idea will be produced.
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One of the common themes that emerged over and over again at TireCo’s summit was the
relevance of mobile apps and social media to TireCo’s business. Many of the images of the
future presented by the groups incorporated some kind of smartphone or tablet app. Our group,
for example, presented a skit in which a car owner snapped photos of their tires using an app on
their phone. The app sent the photos to the dealership, where a technician diagnosed the varying
degrees of each tire’s wear and tear on an Apple iPad. The underlying idea was that this would
reduce the time the car owner would have to wait for a new set of tires. This was February 2011,
one year after the iPad had launched. Smartphone and tablet use, while already prevalent at the
time, was not nearly as pervasive as it would become only a year later. For non-users, apps and
social media are situated in their nonknowledge; it is difficult to imagine a future around such
technology. TireCo had embraced LinkedIn and Twitter for its recruiting practices, but there
were key personnel at the summit who were openly ambivalent about leveraging social media for
internal communications. Many aspects of apps and social media were therefore hidden from
TireCo’s organizational line-of-sight. Such information resided in its organizational
nonknowledge. TireCo had no specific plans for app development at the time, and therefore, the
decision premises related to such an effort remained in their nonknowledge—as a potentiality not
an actuality.
The business plan presentations on the last day of the summit reinforced the idea that
apps and social media were trends that TireCo must begin to grapple with. So many of the plans
incorporated these new technologies that one participant remarked to me, “They all look the
same.” One group’s entire plan was around developing a specialized app for dealers. Another
group tasked with recruiting strategies showed a video clip from the internet titled “What the
HELL is social media - in 2 minutes” (timetogetsocial, 2010). The video gave 10 reasons why
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we should care about social media, including not so trivial information such as “reason #6:
Because the next 3 billion consumers will access the internet from a mobile device” and “reason
#7: If Facebook were a country it would be bigger than the USA and 3rd largest in the World” as
Facebook adds 0.5 million users a day and users spend 5 billion minutes a day there. These
statistics were at least one year old—the video had been uploaded in February 2010.
Nevertheless, they were a stark reminder to the summit participants of how rapidly the world was
evolving.
Similar information may have presented itself in a small group strategy workshop. The
dynamics would be different, however. Depending on who was present, changing the decision
making premises of the organization based on these trends can easily be met with resistance or
euphoria. At an AI summit, information coming from an organization’s nonknowledge reservoir
can be tested to some extent. This lowers the risk that an organization overweights or
underweights the impact of a specific piece of information. A piece of information is
incorporated into the communication and interactions of a summit, and if that information is a
difference that makes a difference to the social system, then the system will produce more
decisions and more interactions related to that information. If an important decision maker shoots
down an idea to use Twitter at the corporate level, this may be cause enough for experienced
Twitter users in that group to refrain from contributing their strategic knowledge to the
organization. However, those same users may be encouraged to speak up, if they see that another
group at the summit is pushing for strategic Twitter use, opening up new pathways for
interactions and decisions. At a smaller meeting, such pathways would have closed as soon as
the idea was shot down.
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In the previous example of the one-page fact sheet for dealers, feedback from the
customer was used to make changes to the final deliverable. Getting such customer feedback was
extremely easy for TireCo, given that the conference’s purpose was to generate strategic plans
that would benefit solutions for its customers. Moreover, the customer was right there at the
conference, ready and willing to answer questions. The accessibility of customers and other
external stakeholders at the summit lowers the threshold in obtaining information that would
have otherwise been confined in the organization’s nonknowledge.
Self-organizing project teams.
I will now explore a phenomenon that is arguably the most important outcome of an AI
summit: the emergence of self-organizing project teams. Given the nature of innovation as
“creative destruction,” an innovative idea is disruptive to the existing organizational structure. In
the context of social systems theory, an innovative idea can only be implemented if an
organization can continuously produce a stream of decisions regarding the innovation. But the
innovation will likely disrupt the organizational structure. The organization is faced with a
choice. It can select decisions to change its structures and its organizational knowledge to adapt
to the disruptions, or it can make the decision not to change. The stream of decisions regarding
the innovation would be blocked from producing further decisions, if it decides not to modify its
organizational knowledge. In summary, when an organizational system decides to adopt an
innovation, it must modify its decision premises so that they are consistent with the innovative
idea. If the idea is highly disruptive, the organization may need to create new positions, filling
them with new personnel, incorporating new communication channels and deploying new
initiatives.
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The social systems view of organizational innovation is consistent with Rogers’ diffusion
of innovation theory. Diffusion is a “process by which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated
through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 2003,
p. 11). In the previous section, I argued that AI summits can accelerate changes in organizational
knowledge because it creates new communication channels, produces decisions while the
strategic episode is still ongoing, and therefore, condenses the time required for self-reflections
to connect back to the day-to-day operations of the organization. If the emerging idea is an
innovation, an AI summit can significantly accelerate its diffusion.
That said, the benefits for diffusing innovative ideas may last only as long as the
interaction system is in place. Once the conference—namely the strategic episode—comes to an
end, all the members of that social system—the interaction system—inevitably return to their
routine operations. There is no guarantee that the stream of decisions produced at the conference
will over time, actually continue. This risk is especially acute for innovative ideas, but is equally
applicable to incremental improvements. Incremental improvements are not as disruptive, but
nevertheless require some modifications to an organization’s structures and knowledge. Whether
it be an innovation or an incremental improvement, if the decisions made during the strategic
episodes are subsequently rejected by the organization at a later time, this may have the
unintended effect of reinforcing and fortifying the existing structures, making it more difficult
for decisions regarding the innovation or improvement to be produced.
In Luhmann’s social systems, systems reproduce themselves based on ephemeral
communication events that vanish as soon as they appear. New ideas are particularly fragile in an
organization because the decision premises to back them up may not exist. Each time a decision
related to the idea produces another decision to carry it forward, the connections and pathways
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required to produce more decisions are made durable. At an AI summit, new communication
channels are always created, simply by virtue of the multiple configurations of groups. The
problem is that these channels may be temporary and not survive beyond the conference.
This is why one of the most important outcomes of an AI summit is the emergence of
self-organizing project teams. These teams become a vehicle for which the decisions produced at
the conference can produce more decisions after the conference ends. These teams are crucial for
an AI summit’s success. Without them, the novel connections and pathways for organizational
knowledge cannot be made permanent. The design and deployment phase is a hotbed for project
teams to form organically. If the idea is novel and innovative, the self-organized project team
represents a brand new set of decision premises. The positions on a project team are filled with
existing personnel in new roles, communicating through new channels about a new initiative. If
there is great excitement about the idea, these project groups may evolve into hot groups
(Lipman-Blumen & Leavitt, 1999), an “impassioned collective state of mind” (p. 15) that can
ignite organizational change and innovation.
Self-organized project teams emerged at TireCo’s summit on the fourth and final day of
the conference. This was the Deployment phase of the 4D cycle. Of the 15 action planning
groups, several mentioned in their final presentations that they had already formed or will be
forming a “task force” or a “team” or a “steering committee” to facilitate the implementation of
the plans generated at the summit. These teams were conceived through a two-step selection
process. At the beginning of Day 3, participants were asked to join one of 15 groups. Each group
had a specific task. Although the reasons for selecting one group over another no doubt varied
from individual to individual, the important point is that it was a matter of self-selection.
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By this point of the conference, customers were no longer officially present. The number
of scheduled participants had dipped to 280. Of that number, only 210 participants were
represented by name in the final PowerPoint slides that were submitted to the summit organizers.
About 15 participants belonged to a group that did not put their names on their slides. It is not
clear why the remaining 50 or so participants apparently were not part of any action planning
group. In my group, the senior executives who were active participants in our discussions were
not named in the PowerPoint slides. It also appears that employees from some of the corporate
divisions may not have taken part, perhaps because the 15 tasks were heavily oriented towards
sales issues. None of the nine partners of the company appeared to take part either, although they
were present at the report-outs.
The second selection step happened during the action planning process. Since I could
only observe one group, I have no direct observations on how the project teams formed except in
my own. Our group had 17 members, and represented 12 different stakeholder groups/divisions.
Our task was to find ways to ensure that the collaborative DNA of the company lived on.
Participation and contribution varied greatly. Some people hardly spoke up. One participant
remained mostly quiet until the final day, when she made it known that she was the program
manager for an existing, online initiative designed to facilitate collaboration using the intranet.
My personal perception of our group discussions was that they lacked the energy and enthusiasm
of the group activities of the first two days. No specific project team formed during the
conference. Instead, it was noted in the PowerPoint slides that “Team #10 will form a team (for
the inaugural year) to move these ideas forward.”
Other groups also talked about the formation of cross-functional project teams as the first
step in implementation. The more committed these groups, the more likely that the decisions
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produced during the summit will connect back to the organization’s existing system to produce
more decisions, thereby strengthening the organization’s autopoiesis. Tracking the progress and
development of these organic, self-organizing project teams beyond the summit should provide
additional insight into why some initiatives succeed and others do not.
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Chapter 9 Discussion of Findings
Introduction
In Chapters 7 and 8, I applied a social systems theoretical lens to describe the strategizing
activities of an appreciative inquiry (AI) summit. Luhmann’s social systems theory assumes a
very radical view of organizations and knowledge. The strength of Luhmann’s theoretical lens is
the clarity with which one can delineate and identify the social dynamics of a complex system
like an AI summit. The dynamics inherent to social systems are differentiated from the dynamics
that belong to the domain of human psychology. Macro (organization) and micro (individual)
level phenomenon are distinguished so as not to muddy the waters of analysis. The relationship
between the macro and micro levels is kept squarely in view so that one level is not bracketed
out at the expense of the other.
This approach introduces a finer distinction between organizational knowledge and
personal knowledge. Organizational knowledge includes decision premises such as
communication channels, organizational roles and programs. It does not include thoughts or
beliefs because these are personal knowledge. Knowledge in social systems theory is
interchangeable with structure. Knowledge orients how the system deals with information.
Human beings use mental models, schemas, emotions and other cognitive and physical structures
as knowledge. Organizational knowledge in the broadest sense is any internal structure that
guides how it observes itself. Organizational structures determine how an organization selects an
appropriate response to a particular event from its portfolio of possible responses. Organizational
knowledge is merely analogous to the mental structures of a cognizing individual. But they are
not the same. Organizational knowledge therefore cannot be described as an extension of
personal knowledge or as justified true belief.
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New knowledge is created in an organization when new structures emerge through
patterns of decision communications. I framed an AI summit as an extended strategic episode to
examine how it changed or created organizational structures, specifically decision premises. An
organization can modify existing structures, reinforce them by keeping them the same, or create
new structures. I applied Luhmann’s social systems lens to an AI summit to identify the
structural features of the conference that affect its organizational decision premises. The most
obvious knowledge outcome of a summit is the establishment of new communication channels.
Some may be formalized. Others may remain informal but nevertheless affect an organization’s
decision making.
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the key findings from Chapter 6 and 7. I then
juxtapose the social systems perspective of AI summits against the five core principles of AI to
highlight the contributions and limitations of a Luhmannian approach. I consider the relevance
and implications of this study in the broader field of management studies, including possible
research areas. Finally, I contemplate the future by looking back in history. I draw on work by a
pioneer in management studies, Mary Parker Follett, who foresaw many of the ideas discussed in
this study.
Social systems model of an AI summit.
In Chapter 6, I developed a conceptual model of an AI summit based on social systems
theory (Figure 1). There are three primary component systems: the organization system
(company), the interaction system (AI summit conference), and the individual participants’
psychological systems (psychic systems in Luhmann’s terminology). Each system maintains its
identity through different modes of production. The organization produces decision
communications, the interaction system produces interactional communications, and the
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psychological system produces thoughts and perceptions. It is extremely important to remember
that in the context of this analysis, individuals do not make decisions. Individuals are not “agents”
acting on behalf of the organization. Only an organization can produce decisions in the form of
communication events that vanish as soon as they are produced. Simply documenting decisions
in the form of memos and emails does not constitute a communication. Under Luhmann, such
documents must be understood by someone and produce another decision to qualify as a
communicative event. Decisions may be incorporated into processes, procedures, and programs,
at which point they become structures—in other words, organizational knowledge.
Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of this model. It is simplified because each individual
participant is an autonomous, closed system that is coupled separately and independently to the
organization and interaction system. So there should be as many recursive circles of
psychological systems as there are participants. The double-headed arrows represent the systems’
structural couplings. The coupling between the organization and interaction systems is
influenced by the nature of strategic episodes. The interactions take place in a strategic context in
which existing structures are temporarily suspended. Participants are coupled to the organization
through their positions. The coupling between the participants and the interaction system is
moderated by AI’s emphasis on positivity. Effects from positive psychology are limited to this
particular coupling.
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Figure 1: Social systems model of an appreciative inquiry summit
The structural coupling between each of the systems in an AI summit is of a special type
called interpenetration. Closed systems cannot directly access the internal structures of another
system. A core principle in autopoietic theory is that a system can merely trigger a perturbation
in another. A perturbation can be so great that it has catastrophic consequences for a system. A
different system may respond differently to the same event, and thrive from the same
perturbation. Over time, systems can become structurally coupled such that a particular event can
trigger mutual perturbations in those systems. The social behavior of ants for example, is made
possible through such structural couplings. In an interpenetrating relationship, the coupling is so
tight and intimate that a system can penetrate the other system’s internal complexities. The
penetrating system can use that complexity to its advantage in constructing its identity. The
systems actually achieve greater degrees of freedom even though the interdependency between
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the systems increases. At an AI summit, system interdependency is especially high because of
the diversity and large numbers of people in the room. This increases the system’s complexity.
Further empirical study is needed to determine exactly how much diversity and how many
people are necessary. Complexity theorists are currently developing computational models to
simulate diversity in systems and their impact on innovation (Page, 2010) and could serve as a
guide to developing benchmarks. At an AI summit, the organization system essentially gets the
best of both worlds—variety and redundancy—by virtue of having so many organizational
positions physically represented at a summit. A summit temporarily boosts the ability of an
organization to compensate for the complexities and uncertainties in its external, competitive
environment. This gives the format an edge over its small group peers in its capacity to generate
organizational knowledge.
Key features of AI summits.
An analysis of an AI summit using a Luhmannian lens yielded five features that
differentiate an AI summit from conventional strategizing workshops and meetings. They are
summarized in Figure 2.

Structural features of an AI summit
1.
2.
3.
4.

Internal and external communication barriers are reduced
Access to latent knowledge (nonknowledge) is enhanced
Structural decisions are produced in vivo
Decisions reconnect back to routine operations even before the strategic
episode ends
5. Episodes continuously oscillate between strategic and routine contexts

Figure 2: Five key structural features of an AI summit identified by a social systems theoretical
lens.
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First, both internal and external communication barriers are significantly reduced by
virtue of the large numbers of people participating in the conference at the same time and in the
same place. The organization can adopt and apply the AI methodology to their internal strategy
development process as it pleases and on its own terms. The AI consultant is more a guide than a
strategy expert. The organization’s own members collect and analyze the data necessary for
strategizing. Luhmann brazenly claimed that consultants and their clients cannot truly
communicate or transfer meaning because they each operate using logic that is idiosyncratic to
their respective organizations (Luhmann, 2005b; Mohe & Seidl, 2011). During an AI summit,
the AI consultant’s role is diminished so much that the communication barriers inherent in a
client-consultant relationship become essentially irrelevant. Furthermore, the presence of
hundreds of internal stakeholders reduces internal communication barriers between different
departments and hierarchical levels.
The second feature I identified is increased levels of access to knowledge that an
organization cannot normally access in its day-to-day operations—its organizational
nonknowledge (Seidl, 2007). An organization has a tendency to forget its history of decision
making (Luhmann, 1995). An organization is constituted by communication events. It does not
have a memory system. People do have memories; lost history may be recalled by individuals
who remember. For example, TireCo incorporated presentations by executives who had been at
the company in its early years. The active participation of external stakeholders plays an
additional function. Their presence allows an organization to incorporate into its decision making,
information that usually lies outside its system boundary. Here again, the complexity an
organization can handle gets a boost.
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The third feature is that organizational decision communications (distinguished from a
decision made by individuals) are produced during the strategic episode. Importantly, those
communications connect back to the organization’s routine operations during the episode as well.
This is the fourth feature. Decision communications are both produced and reconnected in vivo
so to say. The third and fourth features accelerate the production of decisions, and are the most
striking aspects of an AI summit compared to traditional strategy meetings. A decision in the
organizational sense is a special type of communication, not an action taken by an individual. A
decision is only a decision when it produces and connects to another decision. It is the ongoing
production of decisions that allows an autopoietic, organizational system to maintain its identity
and existence. An utterance becomes a communication only when there is understanding (or
misunderstanding) between two or more individuals. A typical strategy meeting rarely produces
organizational decisions of the social systems variety, because the communication events of the
meeting have yet to connect to the rest of the organization. A “communication rollout” is typical
at organizations after an executive strategy meeting. At an AI summit, decision premises such as
programs, communication channels and the people who fill positions, can change during the
conference. The table groups at the beginning of an AI summit encourage the production of new
communication channels by seating people next to someone they are likely not to know. Even
though the episode is strategic in nature and existing structures are suspended, it is as if the
organization in all its entirety and complexities is present at the summit in its operational context
as well because so many stakeholders who are intimately coupled to the organization are present
for an extended period of time, participating in the same activities. It is as though the summit is a
simulation of organizational life.
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This leads us to the fifth and final feature: the constant oscillation between strategic and
routine contexts during the strategic episode. This social dynamic moderates the production and
reconnection of decision communications at an AI summit. It makes the connections between
decision communications more resilient and robust. I proposed a typology of episodes that is a
point of departure for analyzing the impact of such oscillations on the summit outcome. I
conceptualized an AI summit as a sequential series of episodes that unfold over multiple days.
Episodes have a definite beginning and an end. They provide organizations relief from the
constant stress of having to absorb uncertainty all the time. Episodes enable closed, selfreferential systems to change its internal structure and composition (Luhmann, 1995). TireCo’s
summit was comprised of about 50 episodes or segments that the organizers had broken out in
their planning documents.
A central observation of this study is that the degree to which existing structures are
suspended differs from episode to episode. The typology I proposed looks at four dimensions of
an episode: the overall strategic context, the levels of diversity in group composition, the nature
of the activities, and the level of decoupling from the organizational system (Figure 3). The level
of suspension of existing structures can be depicted on a sliding scale from no suspension to high
suspension.
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Figure 3: Typology of episodes
Certain configurations of episodes are more likely than others to lead to certain impacts
on the organization’s structures. For example, diffusion of innovation theory would suggest that
novel and destabilizing changes to an organization’s structure would require configurations that
result in a higher degree of suspension and more decoupling from the organization’s existing
structures. An innovative idea would require a higher degree of suspension in order to diffuse
compared to an incremental improvement to existing processes. Innovation is disruptive.
Existing decision premises may block its diffusion, and those structures may need to be modified
for the innovation to take hold.
An interesting feature of TireCo’s summit was that not all of the episodes had high
degrees of suspension. Episodes that fell in the last D of the 4D cycle, Deploy, had lower degrees
of suspension. This increased the likelihood that the decisions produced during the AI summit
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would reconnect back to the organization’s routine. Participants were held accountable for the
plans they were developing. This incentivizes people to think and act based on their positions
within the organization. Some changes to decision premises were produced on the spot. For
example, project teams that were formed during the action planning sessions qualify as new
decision premises. These teams are an important vehicle through which the organization can
connect decisions from the summit to potential decisions after the summit ends. Without such a
mechanism, the plans and ideas from the summit degenerate into good intentions, not results.
Discussion
The AI summit is a highly complex phenomenon. In fact, its social dynamics suggest it is
almost as complex as the organization itself. The summit is attended by hundreds of stakeholders
representing different interests, roles, and responsibilities. A significant variety of organizational
positions are represented, including those at the peripheral. Consequently, the dynamics that
come into play at an AI summit are more likely to resemble the organizational dynamics that
exist in its day-to-day operations. This is not so in more conventional styles of strategy
development in which strategy meetings are confined to the inner circle of top management.
I draw on an analogy with computing. Traditional strategy development is much like the
early days of computing. Computers could only handle one application at a time. A spreadsheet
application needed to close before one could write a report using a word processing application.
Similar to such linear computing processes, strategic decisions in most organizations are
produced sequentially. Executives might decide on a strategy at a strategy meeting, senior
managers decide on how the strategy is implemented at the department level, front line
employees decide how to execute in practice, and finally, the customers decide whether they like
what they are being offered.
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In contrast, the AI summit format can handle multi-tasking. Multiple applications can be
open and running in parallel. The strategizing process of the AI summit allows multiple small
groups to work on the same task. The groups operate like multiple processes running in the
background. Their work is then consolidated at the large group session, much like the reporting
function in an Enterprise Resource Planning system. In computing, parallel processing not only
increased raw computing power; it also changed people’s thought and behavioral patterns. The
introduction of multi-tasking in computing coupled with networking technology has profoundly
affected how people deal with information, in other words, their personal knowledge. Evidence
can be found in our working vocabulary. “You can Google that,” we casually remark when
someone asks for information.
The AI summit and other large group methods of strategizing represent a similar
paradigm shift. The structural coupling between the organization and the vast number of
members who are collectively strategizing in parallel, has implications for how an organization
produces decisions, which will then influence how that organization deals with information, its
decision premises and organizational knowledge. The AI summit is complex. So many of its
parts are interdependent, it is very difficult to analyze using classic systems theory. Trying to
model a summit using inputs and outputs can be overwhelming, given the massive number of
variables to consider. Deconstructing the summit into more manageable parts, for example,
group processes, brings challenges of its own. There is no way of determining whether the
dynamics driving group processes can be useful for explaining the dynamics at an organizational
level. A systems perspective assumes that the parts are different from the whole. Describing an
AI summit from a systems perspective is rather like describing the inner dynamics of the current
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generation of personal computers. One can get very quickly bogged down by the complexity of
the system.
This is why a Luhmannian perspective has utility. Although there are scholars who object
to the application of autopoiesis to social systems, nevertheless, a theoretical framework that
emphasizes the coupling mechanisms between interdependent but autonomous systems can shed
light on the systemic dynamics that have a major impact on the overall system. At the heart of
Luhmann’s social systems theory is communications. His take on communications is radical. It is
hard to swallow on the first bite. Luhmann asks us to reconsider notions we have come to believe
as common sense, such as the notion that people communicate. Communication cannot happen
without people. Even Luhmann admitted that. Luhmann’s contribution was to bring meaning
back into communication theory. Meaning is reduced to bits and bytes in the fundamental
communication theories that gave birth to personal computing and the Internet. Luhmann adds
understanding (and misunderstanding) to the definition of communication, and brought meaning
back into play. When understanding becomes part of communication, communication leaves the
domain of individuals. Communication is a social interaction, and therefore can only be
produced by social systems. Luhmann also asks organizational scholars to question a commonly
held assumption that organizations can have beliefs, perceptions, and knowledge in the cognitive
sense of those words. Cognition belongs exclusively to the domain of individuals. Cognition in
this context refers to embodied cognition, which includes emotions and motivations that an
individual may or may not be aware of fully conscious of.
Luhmann’s radical view of organizing and knowledge when applied to the dynamics of
an AI summit, makes a distinction between decision communications and individual cognition. I
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will now discuss the five principles of AI that underlie the AI summit format as seen through a
social systems lens to highlight how this approach complements AI theory.
AI principle 1: Constructionist.
Social constructionism is fundamental to AI. Autopoiesis and social systems theory
provide additional support to the notion that words create worlds (Cooperrider et al., 2008;
Gergen, 2009). Autopoiesis in its original theoretical form under Maturana and Varela, explains
how our minds are biologically wired to socially construct reality. Language allows cognitive
systems to construct structures and mental models that orient how a person describes themselves
(their self-identity) and their environment. Language shapes reality. If we are to take autopoiesis
seriously, language can only be a social phenomenon, never a personal one. According to
Maturana and Varela (1987), we exist in language. Language “cannot be used as a tool to reveal
the world” (p. 234) they asserted. Language coordinates behavior, which brings forth a world.
“We work out our lives in a mutual linguistic coupling, not because language permits ourselves
to reveal ourselves but because we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming that we
bring forth with others” (p. 234). This means that the world we see “is not the world but a world
which we bring forth with others” (p. 244). This is fully consistent with the AI approach which
aims to bring multiple realities together to co-create a future.
Words do create worlds. The Luhmannian perspective demands more rigor in
determining the implications of this notion. Social constructionism came out of the broader,
postmodernism movement. Postmodernism in general seeks a reappraisal of widely held
perceptions. It focuses on the role of language and power in the social construction of beliefs and
values. Seen in the postmodernist light, AI can be viewed as a method for empowering those
who have no voice. The emergence of alternative narratives and discourse during an AI summit
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are of central concern. Luhmann draws a strict line between language and communication.
People can language, but that does not constitute communication. When this line is drawn,
narratives become confined to the domain of individuals. They only become relevant to an
organization if it produces decisions such as a decision to change its existing structures. The
durability and resilience of the connections between decisions gain greater significance.
The AI summit is a strategic episode that temporarily suspends existing organizational
structures for the sake of strategic reflection. Participants engage in activities as if they are all
equal. This does not mean that the existing structures do not matter. They do. They matter
because participants are intimately coupled to the organization through their positions, which
were defined by pre-existing programs and initiatives. The impact of existing organizational
structures on an AI intervention tends to get buried in conventional descriptions of AI. The
context of the specific organization such as its organizational culture, dictates the degree to
which structural elements matter. Suspension of structures had an important impact at the
summits conducted by the U.S. Navy (Powley et al., 2011). They may not be as significant at a
loosely coupled, entrepreneurial company. Or, in the case of a university, the suspension might
matter for different reasons—to tighten organizational controls (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008).
It is naïve to think that the effects of hierarchical order, power, and culture are somehow
moderated by the positive energy generated at a summit. In fact, a social systems perspective
would deem that such a conclusion is wrong. Positive emotions and high levels of motivation do
not influence organizational decisions because they belong to the domain of an individual’s
behavior, not an organization’s. Such reasoning lends credence to concerns raised by Aldred
(2009) of the possibility that ideas generated during an AI intervention by organizational
members with lesser power could “become co-opted into a corporate agenda” (p. 69).
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A suspension of existing structures increases the options from which the organization
system can produce decisions. The potentiality of the organization is by definition outside the
boundaries of the actuality of the existing organization. It resides in the organization’s
nonknowledge, which can be accessed during a strategic episode. Potential decision making
criteria and information can re-enter the system. Once they re-enters the organization system, the
organization can utilize such information to produce decisions. The doors to an organization’s
nonknowledge are open only temporarily. Inevitably, they close with a thud at the conclusion of
the summit. Ideas that were generated from information that re-entered the system during the
summit must produce decisions and reconnect to the organization. Otherwise, the organization
has essentially de-selected that idea from its decision making considerations, and the idea will
vanish.
Richer et al. (2009) noted that not all of the innovative ideas initiated by nurses during
the AI intervention subsequently received the support of management. “During management
meetings, external context issues, and new emerging internal pressures, took precedence over
discussions of ideas proposed in the action plan” (p. 952). In contrast, the ideas that were
implemented “mainly involved the mobilized actions of individuals who participated in the AI
process” (p. 952). The same situation can occur the other way around. It is the all-too familiar
scenario in which management decides on a strategy that, for whatever reason, fails to get
implemented in the field.
A social systems

perspective emphasizes

the connections between decision

communications. Ultimately, if a decision does not connect to another decision, then the game is
over. New knowledge can emerge in the form of new or modified communication channels,
programs or personnel. The changed organizational structure, though tentative and fragile, allows
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decision communications during the summit to connect to decisions that will be made once
everybody gets back to work. This is why the emergence of self-organizing project teams is so
important. The team members become the vehicle through which decisions can connect back to
the organization’s routine operations. Evolutionary theory would suggest that the emergence of
such project teams is to some extent random. This does not rule out the possibility that the
constant oscillation between strategic and operational contexts over an extended period of time
might moderate the conception and incubation of such teams. Empowering those at the
peripheral to create alternative narratives may tentatively change the existing organizational
decision premises. Whether those changes carry forward and turn into more stable, robust and
permanent structures depends largely on the durability and resilience of the decision
communications that follow after the summit ends. Social constructionism in the AI literature
emphasizes concepts such as collective narratives and the inner dialogue of an organization
(Cooperrider et al., 2008). Social systems theory suggests that even if such narratives emerge
during the interactions of an AI summit, they are prone to vanish as soon as they appear.
Emerging narrative accounts must impact the organizational structure in such a way that they
change the premises—communication channels, programs and personnel—for decision making.
Otherwise, they will end up on the dark side of the organization’s field of vision to be forgotten.
AI principle 2: Simultaneity.
The principle of simultaneity assumes that change is generated the moment one asks
questions. Inquiry and change go hand in hand. “One of the most important things a change
agent or OD practitioner does is to articulate questions” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 9). A social
systems perspective distinguishes between individual and organizational change. A provocative
question is effective because it is an unexpected one. It opens up options to which a system may
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have been blind. More nonknowledge is accessed, increasing the system’s intelligence. This does
not guarantee changes in an organization’s structure, however. A social systems perspective
suggests that it is the intimate relationship between the individual participant’s psychological
system and the organization’s decision communication system that triggers change. The
conceptual model I propose shows that participants are structurally coupled to the organization
through their positions.
A participant’s position within the organization will frame how that person will think and
act. Structural coupling is the mechanism by which systems co-evolve through mutual
perturbations. An individual can penetrate the structural conditions of an organization in
perceiving the events that unfold during a summit. Conversely, an organization can reach into the
structural conditions of an individual to select what decision communications to produce. This
special kind of structural coupling is called interpenetration (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 210-254).
Interpenetration is “the contribution of complexity to the construction of emergent systems” (p.
216). Luhmann drew on an empirical study by Stager (1967) on decision making in small groups.
Groups whose members could conceptually deal with higher levels of complexity (high
conceptual level) required less structure to make decisions. This led Luhmann to posit that
“social systems that can enlist more complex psychic systems need less structure” (p. 217). Such
systems can cope more effectively “with greater instabilities and quicker structural change” (p.
217).
In practice, this plays out as interpersonal conflict. I described how at TireCo’s summit,
there was a noticeable shift in both emotional affect and strategic context as the conference
entered the second half of the 4D cycle. The final two phases—Design and Deploy—were where
the proverbial rubber hit the road. Participants were now being held accountable to results. An
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account manager might work on a plan to increase the effectiveness of a customer visit because
their performance evaluations may be directly linked to the outcomes of such a plan. Rather than
being suspended, existing structures may weigh heavily on the interactions that take place. There
was a great deal of conflict during the breakout sessions. Suddenly, a person’s rank within the
organization mattered. Several newer and younger employees chose to literally sit on the
sidelines in my group. Descriptions of this kind of conflict have rarely made their way into the
AI literature, perhaps because they run counter to AI’s principle of positivity. Stager’s (1967)
research showed that interpersonal conflict was high in two of the four group compositions: the
groups with the highest and lowest conceptual levels. The curvilinear relationship was significant
(p < 0.01). Interestingly, the high conceptual level groups were much more likely to synthesize
such conflict into their decisions compared to lower conceptual level groups. Observational
ratings of conflict utilization increased linearly (p < 0.01), and the group composition effect on
the use of generated conflict was also significant (p. < 0.01).
The interaction system of an AI summit can also penetrate the organization and
individual psychological systems. The interaction system can leverage the complexities of both
the organization and individuals. A social systems perspective therefore suggests that it is the
interpenetrating nature of the structural couplings that enable organizational structures such as
decision premises to change more quickly. An extended strategizing session with hundreds of
organizational members can enlist much more complexity than a meeting limited to the top
management team. As a consequence, less structure is necessary to institute more rapid change.
AI principle 3 & 4: Poetic and anticipatory.
The poetic principle of AI emphasizes the notion of building new narratives (Bushe,
2011). The anticipatory principle assumes that images inspire action. Organizational members
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are free to choose what they want to study and how they frame the topic of inquiry. Metaphors
and stories are used to describe an organization’s structures. The paired interviews on peak
experiences are an innovative way for people to share stories that can make explicit some of the
tacit assumptions they hold about the organization (Bushe, 2011). Cultural norms and values, for
example, can be so deeply engrained in organizational structures that they are taken for granted.
Normative structures are much more resistant to change than operational structures such as
decision premises. In situations where the norms of an organization are mismatched to its
operational realities, a strategic episode like an AI summit offers an opportunity for the
organization to come to grips with its new realities. The organization can produce decisions to
adapt its theory of business to better align with its norms and values. On rarer occasions, it may
decide to change its norms and values. The topic choice need not be positive for such decisions
to be produced, however. The organization simply needs to recognize that its internal structures
and the environment are out of alignment.
An AI summit can be a forum for aligning the inner dialogue of an organization to areas
of growth and opportunity. I would point out that both these principles are grounded in human
behavior. Narratives are a form of linguistic behavior. Actions in this context imply actions by
people. Under a social systems framework, these principles cannot directly apply to social
systems. Narratives and images structure the perceptions and actions of an individual.
The analog of narratives for social systems is the AI summit process itself. The format
and activities of an AI summit essentially structures the interactions generated during the
strategic episode and the decisions produced by the organization. Storytelling and cognitive
mapping exercises benefit individuals by facilitating tacit to explicit knowledge conversion,
thereby increasing organizational intelligence. The structured group activities prevent the
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interaction system from breaking down into chaos. The time-bound nature of strategic episodes
provides pressure to get things done. The oscillation between strategic and operational contexts
serves as added assurance that the interactions do not deviate too wildly and unrealistically from
existing structures, while allowing room for strategic reflection. Such interactions may lead to
the creation of new decision premises, or in some radical cases, novel self-descriptions of the
organization that result in decisions to change the organization’s identity.
AI principle 5: Positivity.
The principle of positivity assumes that change requires significant amounts of positive
affect (Cooperrider et al., 2008). “Organizations, as human constructions, are largely affirmative
systems and thus are responsive to positive thought and positive knowledge” (p. 10). This view
is not consistent with social systems theory. Organizations are social systems that are constructed
from communications. Whether or not social systems are more responsive to positive rather than
negative thoughts that are uttered by people is an open question and beyond the scope of this
study. Losada and Heaphy’s (2004) study of high performing teams offers some indication that
at the meso-level, positivity is correlated to performance. I can only speculate that a social
system’s responsiveness will largely depend on the context of the situation. As I noted in the
previous chapter, positive psychology can only have an indirect effect on an organization’s
structure because it operates independent of a human being’s cognitive and psychological
systems. An organization’s identity is maintained through a different mode of production,
namely the production of decision communications. This does not exclude the possibility that the
organization can take advantage of a person’s broadened cognition and higher levels of intrinsic
motivation that are stimulated by positive emotions during an AI summit. If the participant is an
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organizational member, the organization can penetrate that person’s cognitive system and use it
as a basis for selecting and connecting decision communications.
The bigger implication of positivity for organizations stems from the AI methodology’s
insistence that we focus on opportunity areas. Drucker (2008) strongly advocated that for an
organization to perform, it must consistently direct its attention to opportunities. “Of course,
problems cannot be neglected. But the problem-focused organization is an organization on the
defensive. It is an organization that feels that it has performed well if things do not get worse” (p.
284). Other scholars have shown that in an age of global hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 1994),
defensive strategies are unsustainable. An environment of hypercompetition is one where
“advantages are rapidly created and eroded” (p. 2). Product cycles are compressed, and the pace
of innovation increases. The fervent rise and fall of so many new ventures in Silicon Valley is a
testament to how low barriers to entry have become. “Every advantage is eroded,” (p. 7) warned
D’Aveni (1994). Trying to sustain an advantage distracts an organization from developing new
advantages. “It is like shoveling sand against the tide rather than moving to higher ground” (p. 8).
Drucker (2008) put it this way:
One has got to face up to a very simple, very brutal, very harsh rule—one starves the
problems and one feeds the opportunities. And above all, one puts the resources into
tomorrow, where the results are, and not into yesterday, where the memories are. (p. 285)
In a hypercompetitive environment, D’Aveni (1994) argued, cost and quality advantages
in and of themselves are unsustainable. The only enduring advantage is “the skill of generating
new cost and quality advantages” (p. 234). Painstaking planning processes are a luxury in a
highly dynamic, ruthlessly competitive environment. “Strategy in the current environment is
more a process of fine-tuning reflexes and searching out or creating temporary opportunities” (p.
237). D’Aveni proposed a seven point framework to develop dynamic theories of business that
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can deal with hypercompetition. They include superior stakeholder satisfaction, positioning for
speed and surprise, and simultaneous and sequential strategic thrusts (pp. 243-244). These
aspects can be accommodated by an AI summit when hundreds of stakeholders are made
available to the organization for strategic reflection.
An AI summit’s deliberate focus on positive aspects of organizing also compensates for
the tendency of people to pay more attention to problems than opportunities. At a meeting
attended by 45 executives from companies and major public institutions, Elliott (1999), a
management scholar and consultant, asked the attendees to list 20 adjectives that most accurately
reflect the flavor of their organizations. All of the executives were well integrated into their
organizations. The results were astonishing. An overwhelming majority of the words (72%) were
negative. Only 15% were positive. The negativity bias occurs at the level of people’s
consciousness. Such biases at the psychological system level likely have implications in how an
organization produces decisions. Without processes for systematically articulating strengths and
opportunities, an organization risks producing decision premises that are systematically biased
towards a defensive strategy. I conclude that an AI summit is an advanced form of strategy
meeting particularly suited for developing dynamic strategies in a hypercompetitive world.
Limitations of the study
There are several limitations to this study. First, autopoietic theory in general, and
Luhmann’s social systems theory in particular, have yet to be generally accepted by management
scholars. Not only is autopoiesis a radical type of systems theory, it is also notoriously difficult
to comprehend. Many of the concepts are counterintuitive for those of us who have grown up in
a world dominated by open systems theory. The notion that an organization’s operations are
closed to the environment sounds very misguided and downright wrong to an analyst used to the
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conventions of open systems. On the surface, social systems theory looks as cold and impersonal
as the frameworks developed using microeconomics, frameworks in which there is a curious
absence of human actors. Reducing organizations to communications rather than people seems as
offensive as reducing people into data points. And the conclusion Luhmann reached about
management consulting—that consultants can never overcome the communication barriers
inherent in the client-consultant relationship—would be vehemently opposed by those who
practice consulting.
I have argued in this study that it is precisely the radical nature of social systems theory
that can shed light on the unique social dynamics of an AI summit. AI methodologies have, for
the most part, defied evaluation. A Luhmannian perspective allows one to begin tackling the
complexities embedded in an AI summit. Modeling an AI summit using an open systems
approach is both complicated and wrought with challenges; there are just too many variables and
different levels of analysis involved. A social systems perspective brings to the forefront the
various system interdependencies between the organization, participants, and the conference
proceedings. Although the theory itself is complex and unorthodox, it is relatively simple to
apply. By analyzing episodes and structural couplings, a third-order observer can begin
identifying the systems dynamics that matter to an AI summit which can then be compared with
other strategizing formats. The emergence of self-organizing project teams, to which I will return
later in this chapter, is an example of an outcome that is physically impossible in small group
strategy meetings.
A second limitation is that Luhmann’s theory does not adequately address dynamics at
the group or meso-level. Large group methods such as the AI summit depend heavily on small
group activities. In an AI summit, group activities are self-facilitated. The groups decide what
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ideas ought to be presented to the larger group. The redundancy and variety of participants, as
well as the oscillation between strategic and routine contexts, assure to some level that
significant issues will bubble to the surface. However, this does not exclude the possibility that
important issues get shoved under the carpet, whether arbitrarily or systematically at the group
level. The role of positivity at the group level may be different from the individual or
organizational levels. Theories from social psychology would be the more appropriate lens to
analyze such group dynamics. How those dynamics affect the organization and interaction
systems is another question this study is unable to address.
Another major limitation of this study is its methodology. This study was exploratory and
went through several iterations of theorizing and analysis conducted by a single researcher.
While I have tried to make explicit my personal biases in this study, one is usually blind to such
biases, as autopoietic theories of the mind would suggest. Here, I point out some obvious ones. I
have had to rely heavily on the work of Seidl and his colleagues in interpreting Luhmann’s social
systems theory and its application to organizations. Only a relatively small portion of Luhmann’s
work has been translated into English. His work on organizations in particular, has yet to be fully
translated. I made an effort to compensate for this through discussions with Schoeneborn and
Seidl at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management in 2012. While I am confident that I
have a working understanding of Luhmann’s theories, I am limited in the depth and breadth
compared to scholars who are able to read his writings in German. My experience with AI
summits is also limited to what I have read in the literature and what I experienced and observed
at the one AI summit that I have ever attended: TireCo’s sales summit. I could physically only
participate in one group—my own—during the summit, and therefore, cannot generalize what I
observed in the group activities. The description of the skit my group performed during TireCo’s
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summit is based on my personal experience and observations. Another participant may have
described the same episode quite differently. Much of the intense theorizing was conducted more
than a year after the summit. The video footage of the large group sessions was indispensable for
both the theorizing and data analysis phases. I was limited in my analysis to what I observed in
the video, as well as other notes and documents I had gathered during the data collection phase.
This study was intended to be exploratory, and as such, I hope these limitations I have noted will
be addressed and corrected through future research.
Relevance and implications for research
This study set out to examine alternative ways of evaluating the effectiveness of the AI
summit format. My approach was to situate the AI summit as a strategizing practice that
generated organizational knowledge. This marked a departure from existing studies on AI, which
positioned the approach as an intervention for transformational change. I focused on
organizational knowledge as an outcome variable because it is a recognized source of
competitive advantage in the strategic management literature. Transformational change, in
contrast, is harder to link to firm outcomes. Previous studies suggested AI interventions were a
source of new knowledge (Bushe & Kassam, 2005) and innovative ideas (Richer et al., 2009). I
reasoned that by understanding how and why an AI summit generates, and possibly accelerates
knowledge creation in an organization, we can begin to identify what makes the AI summit an
effective method of strategizing, and open up new avenues for evaluation.
I adopted Luhmann’s social systems theory, which is grounded in the biological theory of
autopoiesis. Use of this alternative lens provided a more granular and complex view of an AI
summit, by delineating the macro-level social dynamics from the micro-level psychological and
behavioral dynamics. A social systems perspective of AI summits contributes to the AI literature
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in three primary ways. First, it identified five features that are unique to the AI summit
strategizing process (Figure 2). These features demonstrate how an organization can produce
intelligent decisions quickly as a result of the structural coupling mechanisms between the host
organization, its stakeholders and the conference proceedings. They complement AI theory by
providing a more detailed account of how and why having the whole system in the room
generates organizational knowledge. In particular, the extended duration of an AI summit creates
a dynamic in which the strategic context of an episode continually shifts. The constant oscillation
between strategic and routine contexts is a dynamic that has not been explicitly recognized in the
previous literature.
Following Seidl (2007), knowledge is defined as the structures that orient how an
organization deals with information. This definition seems like a sleight of hand. In one broad
stroke, organizational knowledge is made interchangeable with organizational structure.
Knowledge in the organizational sense is not about developing shared mindsets or beliefs or
perceptions or strategic information; organizations are not cognitive systems and can never think.
Knowledge creation is about changing the decision premises of an organization. It is about
adapting organizational structures to select and produce responses that accommodate the
uncertainties of the external environment. Ironically, I find myself in familiar territory: the
notion that AI summits allow an organization to modify existing organizational structures and
construct new ones. We have thus come full circle, but with a richer understanding of how and
why this is so relative to other strategizing methods. It directs our attention away from changes
in normative behavior (which can only be observed at the individual level), to changes in
decision premises.
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A social systems lens suggests that scholars and practitioners may be overlooking an
important outcome of an AI summit: the emergence of self-organizing project teams at a summit.
These teams are vital for temporally connecting organizational decision communications from
the AI summit to the organization’s operations, once the strategic episode ends. Under Luhmann,
decisions are communication events. They vanish as soon as they are produced. Organizational
structure is created when decisions produce other decisions and become premises for future
decisions. While the AI summit system is capable of creating and modifying decision premises
on the fly, they are quite tentative. Whether those premises gain permanence is contingent upon
the premises’ ability to continue producing streams of decisions in the future.
A project team is a temporary type of organizational structure. In Luhmann’s vocabulary,
they constitute a new organizational decision premise comprised of personnel, an emerging
initiative or program, and new communication channels. A new project team, therefore,
represents new organizational knowledge. The AI summit seeds and incubates such project
teams. People self-select themselves for these teams, usually by choosing the specific task or
topic they want to work on during the Design and Deploy phases. At TireCo’s summit, each
participant could choose only one group. People can make their selections based on subject
matter expertise, their organizational responsibilities, their interests, or at random.
Participants are encouraged by the organizers to choose what they are most passionate
and enthusiastic about. The AI summit provides fertile ground for conceiving what LipmanBlumen and Leavitt (1999) named hot groups. Members of a hot group share a state of mind that
is “task-obsessed and full of passion” (p. 3). It implies that its members are experiencing flow
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990); they are absorbed in their task, and their skills are capable of meeting
the high challenge level. Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt claimed that organizational teams rarely
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become hot groups because hot groups are mismatched to the nature of traditional organizations.
They more often are bred in smaller, “not-yet-well-organized companies” (p. 20). The lack of
organizational structure forces members of a hot group to “cling for security to the life raft of
common purpose” (p. 20). To grow hot groups in a highly structured organization, “it first needs
to relax its old rules and constraints” (p. 177). An AI summit temporarily suspends existing
structures, providing that habitat. Not all self-organizing teams become hot groups. Some will
run out of steam. Others may provide an organization with an impetus for driving innovation.
Intrinsic motivation appears to play a major role in hot groups. Therefore, members of such
groups cannot be forced to do one thing or another. Although some leaders may have a knack for
seeding multiple hot groups, this is rare.
An AI summit appears to be a systematic method for seeding hot groups. Therefore, the
most promising area for future research is to empirically study the formation and impact of selforganizing project teams that emerge from summits. To date, I could not identify any empirical
study of an AI summit that tracked the progress of such self-organizing teams. Such teams
appear to be taken for granted as a matter of course. It is hard to imagine that the ideas generated
at a summit could be implemented without a these teams of people dedicated to delivering results.
Practitioners of AI realize the importance of post-summit activities. At TireCo’s summit,
members of the steering committee called on participants to join their post-summit committee
several times during the conference. TireCo’s chief sales and marketing officer often remarked
about the importance of maintaining post-summit positive energy and momentum. The social
systems lens would suggest an emphasis on identifying ways in which the organization can
nurture and promote the new project teams into something more substantial. These teams are of
crucial importance to continue producing decision communications based on the interactions
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from the strategic episode. A new project team represents a new organizational decision premise.
This has implications for existing decision premises and positions. A person can wear only so
many hats. If the tentative team structure gains more permanence, the organization will be
pressed to produce decisions about what to do with the existing positions that the team members
are maintaining while they are working on the new project.
Another contribution of this study is that it offers a starting point for comparative studies
of AI methods. I was guided by Mohe and Seidl’s (2011) three step methodology for analyzing
“contact systems” in management consulting to develop the conceptual model, and I believe that
the method is generic enough to be applied to other forms of strategizing. The steps are to
identify the different systems to reconstruct the communication logics, identify the structural
coupling mechanisms, and then examine how mutual perturbations are internally (re)constructed
(Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 18).
The conceptual model I proposed is specific to AI summits hosted by organizations. It
does not address AI summits hosted by communities. AI has a rich history of being used for
community development around a common cause. Most recently, Cooperrider and Senge have
been promoting a series of AI summits in cities across the United States in the field of
sustainability. A social systems model of such summits will be more complex than the one I
described. A community is made up of many organizations and institutions. Examining the
structural coupling mechanisms may identify characteristics and dynamics that are different from
an organizational summit. Such an analysis may yield insights into what key considerations need
to be made for a community summit to deliver results.
A qualitative study using the proposed conceptual model and typology of episodes could
compare AI summits to other forms of democratic strategizing such as Future Search
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conferences (Weisbord & Janoff, 2010) and crowdsourcing (Stieger, Matzler, Chatterjee, &
Ladstaetter-Fussenegger, 2012). AI summits evolved from the Future Search format and share
many of the same design principles and activities. However, there are notable differences. Future
Search conferences are smaller in size and do not emphasize positivity. An empirical study could
shed light on how the structural differences between these two formats affect the generation of
organizational knowledge and changes in an organization’s structure.
Crowdsourcing is another promising candidate for comparison. Crowdsourcing is a
method for sourcing ideas and products from crowds of people (Howe, 2006). It is made possible
by advances in computer networks. Stieger and his colleagues (2012) developed a framework for
company-internal applications of crowdsourcing. They described a project at an Austrian
company where a “dialogue platform” for strategizing was deployed to stimulate discussions on
issues important to the company. Four conversation topics were chosen by top management:
success factors, future customer solutions, process improvement, and innovation (p. 54). All 370
employees were invited to discuss these issues on an online platform for four weeks. Comparing
an AI summit with a crowdsourcing platform could show the relative strengths and weaknesses
of face-to-face conference compared to a social networking model of communication.
Luhmann’s concept of episodes might be extended to discussion threads in the dialogue platform,
and then compared against the episodes of an AI summit.
A method of applying network analysis to communication episodes can be particularly
useful in such a comparison. Blaschke, Schoeneborn and Seidl (2012) demonstrated how
network analysis can be used to model communication topics and their transitions over time.
Social network analysis typically designates people as nodes. For example, gatekeepers of
information can be identified by looking at the flow of information between people. In contrast,
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Blaschke et al. turn this perspective inside out to accommodate a Luhmannian framework.
Communication episodes are designated as nodes, while the edges represent people.
Communication topics at a startup company initially showed a concentration around research and
development, but subsequently shifted to marketing as the company grew. This kind of data
visualization can quantify the relative importance of one topic over another.
Finally, this study makes some contributions to organization theory. I extended
Luhmann’s social systems theory to a new application area in strategizing activities. It
complements findings from studies of strategy practices applying a social systems approach in a
university setting (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008), management consulting (Mohe & Seidl, 2011),
and strategic episodes (Hendry & Seidl, 2003). The typology of episodes I developed could be
used to generate research questions related to strategy meetings. For example, the impact of
temporary suspension of structures during strategy meetings could be compared in a variety of
organizational contexts such as loosely coupled organizations versus tightly coupled ones.
The study complements theories of organizational knowledge creation by describing the
knowledge creation process by clearly distinguishing personal and organizational knowledge.
Personal knowledge is served by psychological and cognitive structures. Organizational
knowledge is served by decision communication structures. This distinction can help unravel the
interdependent and complex relationship between individuals and the organization in the creation
of organizational knowledge. Nonaka and his colleagues’ (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al.,
2000) concept of shared contexts or “ba” is rather ambiguous. A “ba” is not necessarily a
physical space: it includes virtual space like emails, as well as mental space like shared ideals
(Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 14). The authors claimed that “Ba sets a boundary for interactions
amongst individuals, and yet its boundary is open” (p. 15). It is unclear how those boundaries are
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set, and what a boundary that is simultaneously open and closed looks like. Luhmann’s concepts
of interaction systems and episodes are much more rigorous in their definitions. A study
analyzing concepts like ba and the SECI model through a social systems lens might help clear up
some of the ambiguities for better applicability to empirical studies.
Implications for practice
The findings of this study have immediate implications for managers of organizations,
especially executives responsible for developing corporate strategy. One of the greatest strengths
of the AI summit format from a strategizing perspective is that it combines strategy development
with execution. What managers call “execution” happens when an organization adjusts its
organizational knowledge and structures to enable the production of new decisions based on the
new strategy the organization has selected. In typical methods of strategy development, there is a
lag between the development of corporate strategy and it execution. However, one of the key
features of an AI summit is the organization’s ability to change its decision premises while the
strategic episode is still taking place. The most significant of these structural changes is the
emergence of self-organized project teams. At many organizations, it could take weeks,
sometimes months to put together a working team or task force to begin implementing a strategic
initiative. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the new team will be functional. Depending on
how the members are selected, some employees may resent the extra work the new initiative
creates for them.
The teams that form during the AI summit are somewhat different. Participants
spontaneously decide for themselves whether they want to be part of an emerging initiative or
not. Therefore, the members tend to be highly energized and motivated from the outset. Working
groups like project teams and task forces are essential for any new organizational program to be
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executed. The AI summit not only enables such groups to form on the spot without the normal
time lag of weeks and months, but does so in a manner that encourages these groups to become
hot groups.
The formation of hot groups is one thing. Whether or not they continue to flourish after
the summit ends is a completely different matter. Project management after the summit is a
critical element of post-summit activities, an element that appears to be seriously neglected. One
of the biggest takeaways of this study is for managers to recognize the importance of project
management in making an AI summit successful. Organizations that have a specialized, project
management office (PMO) might consider having at least one person from that office to be part
of the summit steering committee. Once the summit is over, a project manager could be assigned
to oversee and monitor the various project teams that emerged during the summit. The selforganizing project team in and of itself is a form of new organizational knowledge because the
team represents a new structure that changes how the organization makes subsequent decisions.
In order for decision communications to continue to be produced, additional communication
channels in the form of email groups and meetings may need to be formed. Such activities
require management and coordination. The project manager may also need to initiate
negotiations with executives to allocate the funding and resources required by the project teams.
Organizations without a dedicated PMO should assign someone with project management
expertise to help support the activities of the teams that emerged from the summit.
Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt (1999) gave some general guidelines on how organizations
can nurture hot groups. They suggest that a good way to begin is to do the opposite of what
organizational manuals prescribe. For example, they suggest that less organization is better than
more. Hot groups need room to innovate. Micro-management can stifle their progress. Another
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suggestion is to loosen controls, not tighten them. Existing organizational controls may
undermine the very results that the groups are trying to deliver, especially if the group is working
on an innovative initiative that may be considered a threat to existing business units. LipmanBlumen and Leavitt also advocated for increasing the span of control of the managers in hot
groups rather. Limiting the span of control can diminish the opportunities that the hot group is
able to exploit.
An AI summit is indeed resource intensive. That said, in order to gain competitive
advantage in a hypercompetitive world (D’Aveni, 1994), experimenting with large group
strategizing methods like the AI summit may no longer be a luxury but a necessity. The format
can bring payoffs beyond the incubation of hot groups. I argued that including external
stakeholders in an organization’s strategizing activities boosts an organization’s intelligence.
Developing strategy together with the customer is unconventional and may initially sound risky
to some managers. The AI summit is a strategic episode in which organizational boundaries are
temporarily suspended and relaxed. Participants strategize as though they belong to one entity,
whether they are internal or external stakeholders. The positive orientation of AI summits creates
a safe environment for customers and suppliers to provide feedback which they may not
otherwise be willing to share. Taken together, interactions at an AI summit result in a freer flow
of information that produces decisions that may not have been possible under normal conditions.
For the summit to achieve its full potential in developing and executing strategy, summit
organizers must also be mindful of existing organizational structures and their potential impact.
First, the summit must have the buy-in of its executives. Executives must be willing to share
decision-making authority with the summit participants. Otherwise, the ideas and new
knowledge generated at the summit will not only be buried and converted to nonknowledge, but
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existing structures will be reinforced and made more rigid. If the organizers had positioned the
AI summit as a way to transform the organization, then such an outcome would be highly
demotivating.
The selection of summit participants is critical. Organizational decisions cannot be
produced during the summit unless the positions associated with those decisions are represented
at the summit, whether those positions are at the top, middle or bottom of the organizational
pyramid. It is unclear how inclusive and diverse a summit has to be for an AI summit to be
successful. Wholeness is an important concept in AI, and therefore, the rule of thumb is to be as
inclusive as possible. At the very minimum, anybody who plays a key role in executing (or
blocking) the task assigned to the summit ought to be selected for participation. The absence (or
lukewarm participation) of important decision makers will certainly undermine the knowledgegenerating capacity of a summit. Organizers should be careful not to overlook important opinion
and thought leaders, gatekeepers, and subject matter experts.
Sometimes, the true experts may not be the people with the official title. Customer
service representatives may have much better information about consumer behavior as it relates
to their particular organization than the marketing specialists that rely on aggregated market data,
for example. The benefit of having the whole system in the room is that it makes it easy to locate
and take advantage of the people with the expertise needed for the task at hand. The spirit of
contribution at a summit compels participants to tap into their personal knowledge to contribute
useful information. Here again, the organization is able to access what might otherwise have
been trapped as nonknowledge. While other large group methods have the potential of surfacing
nonknowledge, the AI summit format is particularly strong in this area because of the focus on
opportunities and positive aspects of organizing.
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Finally, summit organizers and participants may want to reconsider what activities are
necessary after the summit to reconnect the decisions produced during the strategic episode back
to the organization’s day-to-day operations. Maintaining the positive momentum of the summit
is secondary. Most important is how to prevent the fragile and tentative new structures that
emerged at the summit from disintegrating. These structures include communication channels,
programs, people and their positions. They constitute an organization’s knowledge, because the
structures orient how an organization deals with information after the summit ends. A social
systems perspective suggests that documenting what happened at a summit in the form of reports
and videos, then distributing them organization wide (especially to the people who did not
participate) has limited impact. First, the act of distributing information does not constitute
communication under Luhmann’s definition, until somebody understands (or misunderstands)
the information that has been transmitted. The notion of a “communication rollout” to the
organization is misguided. More importantly, efforts to communicate may enhance the personal
knowledge of the people who read or view the reports by evoking thoughts and emotions, but not
the organizational knowledge base. Organizational knowledge is produced by changing or
creating organizational structures. Post-summit activities should therefore be directed towards
monitoring and managing the structural changes initiated at the summit. The project management
aspect is crucial for decision communications to continue to produce more decisions in order to
contribute to the autopoiesis of the organization.
Experimenting with “experience meetings”
This study sought to understand how and why an AI summit generates organizational
knowledge. Taken together, the findings suggest that the social dynamics found in an AI summit
not only enable an organization to create new structures and hence knowledge, but also

220

accelerate the process. Using the jargon of the information age, an AI summit can be described
as a crowdsourcing platform for developing strategy—with a twist. The twist comes in two
forms: positivity and physical, face-to-face interaction. Social networking sites on the Internet
arrived with great fanfare in the 21st century, and are undoubtedly revolutionizing how people
communicate. Conferences sound anachronistic in contrast. But ignore them at your peril. The
potential of innovative conference formats has only just begun to be tapped.
As I went back to early management theories for this research, I discovered that one
person had the foresight to anticipate these large group methods nearly one hundred years ago.
Her name is Mary Parker Follett, a political scientist who in her later career, became a thought
leader in management. Drucker called Parker Follett a prophet of management (Graham, 1995)
whose insights on managing organizations were light years ahead of her peers. In the midst of
the roaring twenties, she advocated for a democratic form of governance through which people
could fulfill their potential and strengthen the groups to which they belong (Graham, 1995, p. vii).
It is stunning how she had a keen sense of an embodied mind almost half a century before
Maturana and Varela formalized their theory of autopoiesis. Her thoughts foreshadow
Luhmann’s social systems theory. Consider the following quotes from her 1924 book, Creative
experience:
•
•
•
•

•

Democracy…is an assertion that the people who are doing the doing are also
thereby doing the thinking. (p. 203)
Integration, the resolution of conflict…must take place on the motor level, not on
the intellectual level. (p. 150)
Interpretation, like everything else, originates on the motor level. (p. 216)
We cannot get genuine agreement by mere discussion in conference. As our
responses are governed by past habits, by what has been incorporate in the
organism, the only way of getting other responses is by getting other things
incorporated in the organism. (p. 150)
There is no use chasing through the universe for a “real” you or a “real” me; it is
more useful to study our interactions, these are certainly real. (p. 177)
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•

•
•

There is no static collective will nor “group mind”: we have continuing activity;
at any one moment the function which that activity is of the situation is the
collective will. Thus its nature is wholly dynamic. We must think no more in
terms of social institutions but of social activities. (p. 207)
The idea of collective will as a unifying of wills must go; there is only a collective
will as a unifying of activities—a different matter. (p. 208)
Psychology now shows us how experience generates its own thought, will,
purpose. This means that between expert and people is a chasm which ideas
cannot cross. (p. 205)

Nohria, the current dean of Harvard Business School, noted how he was struck by the
clarity and comprehensiveness with which Parker Follett articulated the organizational principles
that were in vogue in the 90s (Nohria, 1995, p. 156). For example, she wrote that authority must
be derived from knowledge and experience, not rank, recognizing that knowledge does not only
reside at the top. Nevertheless, Nohria remained highly skeptical and pessimistic about
organizations ever achieving Parker Follett’s brand of democratic governance, concluding that
her principles are more idealistic than pragmatic.
I am inclined to agree with Nohria. The string of corporate scandals in the knowledge
society we have experienced in the 21st century only support his claims. I would point out though
that at the time of his writing, large group methods of strategizing were only just beginning to
come of age. Interestingly, one of the techniques Parker Follett advocated for achieving
democratic forms of governance was the experience meeting (1924, pp. 212-216). An experience
meeting has three steps: 1) Present the meeting topic in a way that clearly shows its relation to
our lives; 2) Find anything in our own experience that throws light on the question; and 3) Unite
our various experiences with material provided by the expert. After the meeting, the participants
are encouraged to experiment based on what they learned. They would return to another meeting
to suggest what new directions experiments can take.
“I am not hereby glorifying ‘the people,’” she stressed. She rejected a “mystic faith in a
rightness of public opinion” (p. 216). The origin of power, she believed, came from experience.
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Nearly a century has passed since Parker Follett urgently advocated for “experience meetings as
an experiment in democracy” (p. 216). Experiments with large group methods such as AI
summits are in full swing among giant organizations such as Walmart and the U.S. Navy.
Companies like Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, the maker of the ubiquitous K-cup coffee
system, have used AI summits to articulate their corporate purpose. The impetus for such
experimentation is not democratic ideals, but the economic realities of a knowledge-based
society.
Companies require a high spirit of performance (Drucker, 2008) to thrive in times of high
uncertainty. An organization “will have the thrill of excitement, the sense of challenge, and the
satisfaction of achievement if its energies are put where the results are, and that means on the
opportunities” (p. 284). Parker Follett’s insights on democratic governance were derived through
a synthesis of psychological research and her empirical observations of social work as a political
scientist. They deal with dynamics at the individual system level. Luhmann’s theory of social
systems gives us a different and complementary vantage point—the organizational view.
Through experimentation in both theory and practice using multiple approaches, eventually, we
may hit upon a method for conducting effective experience meetings.
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